Shih-Hao Liu

Traditionally, theorists regard metaphysical modal discourses as concerning a mind-independent modal reality. Such a position soon raises two worries: whether we must introduce eccentric entities to make sense of these modal discourses, and how we come to know modal matters. In her works, Thomasson defends modal normativism, which both avoids introducing mysterious entities and aims to demystify the epistemology of modality. In brief, modal normativism holds that metaphysical modal discourse does not aim to track or describe a so-called mind-independent modal reality. Instead, metaphysical modal claims primarily express or convey semantic rules, or permissions grounded in such rules. Since modal terms do not serve a tracking function, we need not posit entities such as Lewisian possible worlds or abstract objects, which might raise ontological worries. Furthermore, our knowledge of metaphysical modality is straightforward, arising from a combination of our knowledge of semantic rules and empirical matters. In this paper, my aim is twofold. First, I argue that Thomasson’s account fails to explain certain modal claims in ordinary practice, such as claims about ability or observability. I suggest that in such cases, modal terms play a role that goes beyond a merely regulative function. I call this the problem of sophistication. Second, I draw on insights from Eklund’s discussion of ontological indifferentism. I briefly sketch what I call modal indifferentism, which inherits the advantages of modal normativism while better accounting for modal discourse about ability, since my view does not rule out a descriptive function for modal terms in some cases.

According to super-explanatory essentialism, the essences of natural kinds are identified with their core causal properties. Several proponents of this view develop a distinctive form of modal epistemology, maintaining that our modal knowledge about natural kinds can be derived from knowledge of these core causal properties. In this paper, I argue that this epistemological project is explanatorily unsatisfactory because it presupposes pre-existing modal knowledge for which the account itself lacks explanatory resources. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I highlight that a crucial component—the epistemology of super-explanatory properties—is underdeveloped in the literature. Second, I propose an abductive epistemology as the most plausible reconstruction and rationalization of how we might come to know these properties and argue that it best captures the super-explanatory essentialists’ intent. Third, I contend that such an abductive approach requires antecedent modal knowledge to even get off the ground, as the knowledge of causal dependencies should be in place. However, knowledge of causal dependencies is saturated with modal knowledge. If this is so, the explanatory ambitions of the super-explanatory essentialist’s modal epistemology remain unmet. Finally, I consider several possible moves for super-explanatory essentialists to salvage their account: appealing to intuition, appealing to conceptualization, and adopting an externalistic interpretation. I argue that none of these moves succeeds in avoiding the problem.

Meta-philosophical skepticism goes that we should suspend our beliefs about philosophical claims. Previously, many argued that prevalent disagreements among peer philosophers motivate the skepticism. One immediate anti-skeptical response is that meta-philosophical skepticism is epistemically self-defeating. In brief, meta-philosophical skepticism calls for the suspension of beliefs about premises deployed in arguments for the very position. This makes the skeptical position ultimately call for belief suspension of itself. Many regard the self-defeat worry as a challenge that meta-philosophical skeptics can hardly meet. In this paper, on behalf of the skeptics, I’ll argue that it is possible for meta-philosophical skepticism to sidestep the self-defeat worry with the notion of practical justification. I first contrast traditional evidentialist’s view about the ethics of belief which states that beliefs can only be justified epistemically with a pragmatist’s view that holds beliefs can also be justified practically. To pragmatists, as long as holding a belief facilitates some practical interest like maintaining a flourishing ordinary life, a belief can be pragmatically justified even if the evidence an agent possesses is neutral or silent regarding the justification of the very belief. I contend that the justification of premises deployed in meta-philosophical skeptical arguments can also be explained with pragmatist’s view. That is, these premises might be epistemically defeated according to meta-philosophical skeptical arguments. However, skeptics are, in a pragmatic sense, still rational to deploy premises since they exhibit some practical values. While self-defeat can be a serious issue in the epistemic domain, it is not so detrimental in the practical domain since many principles can be implicitly self-defeated but still pragmatically justified.