Shiho Sugiura

In Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry, Şerife Tekin proposes the Multidimensional Self (MuSe) model as a scientific model that places the self at the center of psychiatric explanation and intervention while remaining compatible with psychiatry’s scientific commitments. This commentary examines MuSe’s status as a case of scientific modeling by situating it within the broader field of philosophy of science. While agreeing with Tekin’s aim of highlighting the self in psychiatry, we argue that the analogy between MuSe and paradigmatic scientific models is more limited than her proposal suggests. In particular, we identify two disanalogies. First, unlike many established scientific models, MuSe does not yet clearly support surrogative reasoning that yields novel inferences about mental disorders, and its primary epistemic contribution lies in organizing and interpreting information about the patient. Second, whereas most scientific models represent independent systems, MuSe represents the self that is reflexive, hence the act of modeling inevitably reshapes the self. We argue that recognizing these disanalogies clarifies the epistemic role MuSe can play and the direction of further development required for it to function more robustly as a scientific model.