Shlomit Wygoda Cohen

Grounding is sometimes thought of as metaphysical causation. If we take this analogy seriously, given the possibility of indeterministic causation we have at least prima facie reason to accept the possibility of indeterministic grounding. However, prima facie reasons are defeasible and there may be stronger reasons to reject this possibility. This paper sets out to critically examine this mostly overlooked possibility. After introducing the possibility of indeterministic grounding as analogous to indeterministic causation (Sect. 1 ), I clarify further the notion of indeterministic grounding by relating it to failure of supervenience (Sect. 2 ). I then construct an argument for the logical or conceptual possibility of indeterministic grounding, and defend it against a few possible objections (Sect. 3 ). Next, I explore and reject various reasons for dismissing the possibility of indeterministic grounding (Sects. 4 and 5 ). And I conclude by considering why philosophers almost universally overlook or rule out the possibility of indeterministic grounding, by examining the case of physicalism (Sect. 6 ).

Assuming the existence of God and divine commands, it makes sense to ask to what end God issues commands. This question has been raised in recent philosophical literature in the context of whether there can be a divine command to believe in, or to worship, God. In this article, I argue that the answers proposed to this question fail to appreciate the wide range of possible purposes of divine commanding. In particular, I argue that commands that cannot be conformed or complied with may still have purpose.