Shoaib Malik

The crisis of the age inheres in this, that notwithstanding the century’s mind-numbing disasters, it persists in subscribing to propositions which have logically led to the atomization of the whole cloth of human experiencing, and being. Great indeed is the value which is placed on the procedure of analytic dismemberment. While the method has certainly been result-producing, materially, in its wake it has brought immense suffering – both physical and spiritual. The price paid for a lopsided advance is thirty major wars – with their toll of one hundred and thirty million lives, and the irreparable destruction of the natural environment.

U posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća svjedočimo velikom razvoju istraživanja na području znanosti i religije. Jedan takav razvoj naziva se 'teologija prirode' (ToN), što uključuje aktivnost izgradnje ili revizije teoloških okvira u svjetlu suvremenih znanstvenih razvoja, npr. evolucije, teorije kaosa i kvantne mehanike. Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne i Arthur Peacocke, kršćanski mislioci, najpoznatiji su zagovornici ove vrste razmišljanja. Međutim, ovaj diskurs nije ispitan iz islamske perspektive. S obzirom na ovaj jaz, u članku razmatramo ovaj način razmišljanja iz perspektive Ashʿarī škole mišljenja koja je dio sunitske islamske kalām tradicije. Prvo ćemo razmotriti kako se ToN manifestira u djelima ranije spomenutih mislilaca. Nakon toga ističemo bitna načela ašʿarizma koja su relevantna za Boga, Njegovu interakciju sa stvorenim svijetom i znanost. One se potom uspoređuju s idejama navedenih mislilaca. Dolazimo do dva zaključka. Prvo, pokazujemo da se atomizam, koji se općenito shvaća općeprihvaćeno stajalište u Ashʿarī tradiciji, ne bi trebao smatrati teološkimgledištem, već prije filozofskim ili znanstvenim. Drugo, napravljena je važna razlika između znanstveno informirane teologije (SIT) i kontingentno informirane teologije (CIT). Za Ashʿarīje, CIT je dovoljan za razumijevanje Boga, ali oni bi smatrali da bi SIT prikazan u ToN bio problematičan. Motivacija i metodologija lokaliziranja ili modificiranja Božje prirode ili atributa kako bi odgovarali današnjoj znanosti smatrala bi se teološki vrlo spronim oblikom scijentizma.

There have been many developments in the field of science and religion over the past few decades. One such development is referred to as ‘theology of nature’ (ToN), which is the activity of building or revising theological frameworks in light of contemporary scientific developments, e.g., evolution, chaos theory, and quantum mechanics. Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne, and Arthur Peacocke, all of whom are Christian thinkers, are the most well-known advocates of this kind of thinking. However, this discourse has not been examined from an Islamic perspective. Given this gap, in this article, we view this strand of thinking from the Ashʿarī school of thought that is part of the Sunnī Islamic kalām tradition. We first review how ToN manifests in the works of the thinkers mentioned earlier. Following this, we highlight the essential principles in Ashʿarism relevant to God, His interaction with the created world, and science. These are then compared with the ideas of the said thinkers. Two conclusions are reached. First, we demonstrate that atomism, which is generally understood as a long-held position in the Ashʿarī tradition, should not be held as a theological position but rather a philosophical or a scientific one. Second, an important distinction is made between science-informed theology (SIT) and contingency-informed theology (CIT). For Ashʿarīs, a CIT is sufficient for understanding God, but they would find the SIT displayed in ToN problematic. The motivation and methodology of localising or modifying God’s nature or attributes to fit the science of the day would be seen as theologically very costly and a form of scientism.

Drawing on a range of scholars from the Ashʿarī tradition, this article offers a systematic presentation of their understanding of miracles, beginning with the general metaphysical principles such as God’s omnipotence, occasionalism, and the contingent nature of creation. From this metaphysical foundation, the article explores the seven types of miracles recognized within the Ashʿarī tradition: (1) prophetic miracles (muʿjizāt), (2) pre-prophetic indicators (irhāṣ), (3) divine graces (karāmāt), (4) miraculous aid (maʿūna), (5) divine debasement (istidrāj), (6) debasement of false claimants (ihāna), and (7) black magic (siḥr). Given the variety of miraculous phenomena, the need to clearly distinguish prophetic miracles from other types becomes essential for validating prophetic authority. To address this, the article focuses on three key conditions—(C1) a break of custom (kharq li-l-ʿāda), (C2) a claim to prophethood (taḥaddī), and (C3) an unmet challenge (sālim min al-muʿāraḍa)—which collectively affirm the authenticity and uniqueness of prophetic miracles within the Ashʿarī framework. By clarifying these distinctions, the article contributes to a comprehensive understanding of miracles and prophetic authority in Ashʿarī theology.

This article reviews al‐Ghazālī's conception of Divine Command Theory (DCT) in light of contemporary philosophical developments. There are two well‐known objections against DCT. These include the problem of arbitrariness (PoA), which states that God randomly chose our moral framework for no reason given His capability to choose any moral commands; and the problem of God's goodness (PoGG), which questions God's goodness if morality could be other than what it is. Modern defenders of DCT have attempted to counter these objections through various strategies. This article juxtaposes al‐Ghazālī's interpretation of DCT with modern strategies to illustrate how these two issues are untroubling concerns in al‐Ghazālī's framework. In doing so, it highlights where and how they differ in their approaches. Additionally, it critiques interpretations suggested by some contemporary thinkers who suggest that al‐Ghazālī may not be a strict proponent of DCT.

Nuh Ha Mim Keller, a contemporary Muslim theologian, argues against the compatibility of evolution and Islam. In this article we intend to critically evaluate his position in which he advances three separate arguments. First, he criticizes the science of evolution. Second, he demonstrates the metaphysical problems with naturalism and the role of chance in the enterprise of evolution. Third, he contends that evolution and the creationist narrative in Islamic scripture is irresolvable. Given these points, Keller concludes that believing in human evolution takes one outside the fold of Islam (kufr). After reviewing each of these points we argue that his claims are unwarranted because of other possibilities which Keller may have not considered. In effect, we argue that believing in evolution doesn't necessarily or definitively entail kufr.

This article intends to review William Dembski's recent monograph entitledBeing as Communion: A Metaphysics of Information, in which he establishes an entire information-centric metaphysics. This viewpoint is compared with al-Ghazālī’s perspective, a Muslim philosophical theologian from the Medieval period. It is concluded that what Dembski defines as information, which for him is the ontological basis of the natural world, seems remarkably close to al-Ghazālī’s notion of God's will and omnipotence. This article is an explorative comparison of their metaphysical frameworks that are discussed in light of modern scientific developments, highlighting their differences and similarities.

In this paper I demonstrate how certain contemporary atheists have problematically conflatedatheismwithagnosticism(knowingly or unknowingly). The first type of conflation issemantic fusion, where the lack of belief in God is combined with the outright denial of God, under the single label of ‘atheism’. The second ismorphological fissionwhich involves the separation of atheism into two subcategories where lack of belief in God is labelled asnegativeatheism and outright denial of God aspositiveatheism – and while here they are more explicitly demarcated, they are still positioned under the broad notion of atheism. I argue in this paper that atheism should be better used as thepropositional denialof God and thatuncertaintyandunknowability about Godshould be reserved to characterise agnosticism. Conflating these positions under the single term ‘atheism’ mischaracterises agnostics and inflates the territory of atheists. In clarifying these terms, I review how the nuances in the prefixa-in atheism have potentially contributed towards these misnomers. I also suggest the use of the categories ‘local atheism’ and ‘global atheism’ to clarify on whom the burden of proof lies within the discourse.

With the increasing interest in Islam and evolution, some Islamic thinkers have vehemently rejected evolution, while others have eagerly embraced it. However, those seeking to embrace evolution sometimes err in their interpretation of historical writings. Indeed, there are texts written by famous historical scholars of Islam who seem to suggest that humans have evolved from lower forms of species. These include Ibn Khaldūn, Jalāl ad‐Dīn Rūmī, al‐Jāhiz, and The Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al Safā). Although this may be true, such readings are a mistaken interpretation of the aforementioned authors who are actually referring to some form of the scalae naturae (the Great Chain of Being). This reference to the Great Chain of Being is unknown to some contemporary readers who mistakenly believe these writers to be discussing an evolutionary or a proto‐evolutionary theory. This article demonstrates how and why these historical records do not actually represent any notion of evolution as it is currently understood, in the hope of avoiding any further erroneous claims that seem to be proliferating among modern thinkers.