Shogo Tanaka

This paper explores the mutually shaping relationship between embodiment and narrativity in the formation of selfhood. Although previous research has tended to treat the embodied and narrative self as interacting, yet distinct, layers, we argue for a more integrated account in which each is grounded in and shaped by the other, characterizing them as mutually shaping. Drawing on phenomenological concepts such as body schema and habituality, we first demonstrate how bodily dispositions support the temporal continuity and expressive unfolding of the narrative self, including both the “narrated I” and the “narrating I.” In this view, narrative identity emerges from embodied engagement with the world rather than from purely cognitive processes. In the second half of the paper, we reverse the direction of influence, examining how identification with narrative figures can reshape body image and bodily orientation through mechanisms such as the Proteus effect. However, we also show that such narrative-induced transformations are constrained by sociocultural norms and master narratives that delimit which bodies and identities are deemed intelligible or aspirational. Through this analysis, we propose an account of selfhood as fundamentally embodied, narratively structured, and constrained by systems of power, visibility, and cultural representation.

When we collaborate with others to tackle novel problems, we anticipate how they will perform their part of the task to coordinate behavior effectively. We might estimate how well someone else will perform by extrapolating from estimates of how well we ourselves would perform. This account predicts that our metacognitive model should make accurate predictions when projected onto people as good as, or worse than, us but not on those whose abilities exceed our own.We demonstrate just such a pattern and that it leads to worse coordination when working with people more skilled than ourselves. Metacognitive projection is associated with a specific activity pattern in anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC47). Manipulation of alPFC47 activity altered metacognitive projection and impaired interpersonal social coordination. By contrast, monitoring of other individuals’ observable performance and outcomes is associated with a distinct pattern of activity in the posterior temporal parietal junction (TPJp).

This paper introduces narrative imprisonment: the phenomenon whereby a self-narrative becomes detrimental to a person’s well-being by constraining their identity and agency within its boundaries. We argue narrative imprisonment results from two key factors. The first is the sociocultural character of self-narratives, which are never purely individual creations perfectly tailored to personal interests. The second is overidentification, the process of aligning ourselves too rigidly with the character a narrative portrays. Finally, we argue based on this analysis that the relationship between the self and its narrative is best understood as a threefold one, comprising the narrating-I (the narrator), the narrated-I (the protagonist), and the enacting-I (the actor).

Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the body that highlights its habituality. On this account, the body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6).

Body image and body schema refer to two different yet closely related systems. Whereas BI can be defined as a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body, BS is a system of sensory-motor capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring. Studies have demonstrated that applying the concepts of BI and BS enables us to conceptualize complex pathological phenomena such as anorexia, schizophrenia, and depersonalization. Likewise, it has further been argued that these concepts play a crucial role in our ability to grasp our bodily experiences in the socio-cultural world according to various factors, such as gender, social class, and ethnicity. Referring to the insights of Frantz Fanon, the author of Black Skin, White Masks, this paper suggests that under certain conditions the BI can take over and reshape the BS. Based on an examination of Fanon’s writings, the paper suggests that not only the BI can truly remold the BS but that the gaze of the other can directly influence the BI.

So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder. People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.

My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.

© CERN for the benefit of the ATLAS collaboration 2011.We present first measurements of charged and neutral particle-flow correlations in pp collisions using the ATLAS calorimeters.Data were collected in 2009 and 2010 at centre-of-mass energies of 900 GeV and 7 TeV.Events were selected using a minimum-bias trigger which required a charged particle in scintillation counters on either side of the interaction point.Particle flows, sensitive to the underlying event, are measured using clusters of energy in the ATLAS calorimeters, taking advantage of their fine granularity.No Monte Carlo generator used in this analysis can accurately describe the measurements.The results are independent of those based on charged particles measured by the ATLAS tracking systems and can be used to constrain the parameters of Monte Carlo generators.

This work gives insight into the philosophical influence Ernst Mach (1838-1916) has had on leading Viennese physicists and philosophers of his time by relating the ideas and works of these men to Mach's phenomenalism. The relation between Mach and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society is also examined. In the process little-known documents and correspondence from Mach are presented. Additionally, this extensive research helps clarify the conflict between Mach and most physicists over the reality of atoms and places the claim of Mach and his followers to represent science and philosophy of science against the claim of Planck and Einstein that phenomenalism and positivism were not even compatible with science. Audience: This is an ideal book for both graduate students and scholars in the field of history and philosophy of science.