Shozo Kamiya

The question of whether Spinoza's metaphysics qualifies as a version of priority monism is debated in the literature, though the significance of this debate is arguably understated. This article clarifies why it matters for Spinoza scholarship and offers a tentative answer. First, I demonstrate how priority monism is implicitly suggested in the Short Treatise (KV) as a solution to the tension between the unity of substance and the plurality of modes. Second, I propose a new interpretation of Spinoza's mature ontology in the Ethics that explains how and why he distanced himself from this earlier priority monism. Contrary to the prevailing narrative that Spinoza's mature metaphysics is simply not priority monism, I offer a textual defense of the possibility that Spinoza self-consciously abandoned it by discovering a superior solution to the aforementioned metaphysical puzzle that had troubled him in the Short Treatise.

ABSTRACT This paper shows that Spinoza went through a drastic change in his view on divine teleology, and that this change is worth paying attention to. In the Short Treatise (KV), Spinoza endorsed a version of divine teleology. As is widely recognized, however, he explicitly rejects divine teleology in the Ethics. I argue that this marks a significant change in his view. To illustrate the significance, I argue that Spinoza consistently maintains the following two premises in both the KV and the Ethics: (1) human beings act on account of some end; (2) human actions are actions of God. While the endorsement of divine teleology is consistent with these two, the rejection of divine teleology results in a trilemma. The trilemma, to be sure, can be resolved by introducing referential opacity to divine action contexts. I argue, however, that it is worth asking why Spinoza revised his view in this way.

This paper shows that Spinoza went through a drastic change in his view on divine teleology, and that this change is worth paying attention to. In the Short Treatise (KV), Spinoza endorsed a version of divine teleology. As is widely recognized, however, he explicitly rejects divine teleology in the Ethics. I argue that this marks a significant change in his view. To illustrate the significance, I argue that Spinoza consistently maintains the following two premises in both the KV and the Ethics: (1) human beings act on account of some end; (2) human actions are actions of God. While the endorsement of divine teleology is consistent with these two, the rejection of divine teleology results in a trilemma. The trilemma, to be sure, can be resolved by introducing referential opacity to divine action contexts. I argue, however, that it is worth asking why Spinoza revised his view in this way.