Shruti Sharma

As propositional attitude reports emerge late in children, some philosophers argue that it is a learned process based on language. However, others take them as the existing structural basis of the human mind. If we assume tentatively that some innate mechanism exists or that such attitudes are the very structural basis of the human mind, then it raises the question: What turns on this mechanism? Or what kind of instantiation is required so that it becomes active? (as opposed to laying passive for some duration). Indeed, language seems to play a considerable role in the activation or emergence of propositional attitudes. The paper revolves around this debate. Part one describes propositional attitudes as special and complex intentional states because of their self-ascriptive nature. The second part analyses the nature of this ability. The third part elaborates on the possible role of ‘conceptual metaphors’ in the development of such ability. We propose the possibility of conceptual metaphors underlying the birth of the robust first-person perspective or unique psychological/inner self as an abstract domain or category in the developmental stage.