Shuk Chan

Recent critics of relational equality as an ideal of justice have questioned whether the ideal has any implications for justice between non-overlapping generations. In this paper, I argue that relational equality does have something important to say about what we owe to future generations, which is not captured by an exclusive focus on distributive equality: we owe future generations the capacity to relate to each other as equals. This capacity is undermined not only when resources or savings are significantly depleted by the present generation, but also when the present generation fails to transform the oppressive social categories by which we relate to others. While these categories were not set up by the present generation, I argue that we still have a duty to contribute to changing them, and failing to do so can result in a double wrong: a wrong against our fellow contemporaries, as well as future persons who are ascribed membership in these categories.

This essay introduces the main arguments in Lucia Rafanelli’s Promoting Justice Across Borders: The Ethics of Reform Intervention (Oxford University Press, 2021). I place the book within the context of literatures on foreign intervention and global justice more broadly, review the major arguments Rafanelli develops in her book, and foreshadow some of the main points of critique and appreciation put forth by four engaging responses from: Paulina Ochoa Espejo, David Owen, Jennifer Rubenstein, and Arash Abizadeh.

All parties involved in researching, developing, manufacturing, and distributing COVID-19 vaccines need guidance on their ethical obligations. We focus on pharmaceutical companies' obligations because their capacities to research, develop, manufacture, and distribute vaccines make them uniquely placed for stemming the pandemic. We argue that an ethical approach to COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution should satisfy four uncontroversial principles: optimising vaccine production, including development, testing, and manufacturing; fair distribution; sustainability; and accountability. All parties' obligations should be coordinated and mutually consistent. For instance, companies should not be obligated to provide host countries with additional booster shots at the expense of fulfilling bilateral contracts with countries in which there are surges. Finally, any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. This assurance enables countries, pharmaceutical companies, global organisations, and others to verify compliance with the chosen approach and protect ethically compliant stakeholders from being unfairly exploited by unethical behaviour of others.

COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This “flu-risk standard” is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: having developed a vaccine, raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions.