Shunsuke Sugimoto

The rapid development of AI and robotics is compelling us to rethink the meaning of “human dignity” and, more fundamentally, to reconsider what it means to be human. How is dignity institutionalized in law, society, and technology? How do researchers and practitioners in AI and robotics understand dignity, and how do they situate it within their research and business activities? This volume presents dignity as an indispensable framework for thinking about the ethical and social challenges of the age of AI, and explores its scope and potential from a variety of perspectives.

This paper examines ethics in finance, specifically related to responsible investment. In recent years, socially responsible principles are becoming the de facto standard not only for socially responsible but also for profitable investing. For instance, the United Nations developed the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) in 2006, which require institutional investors to incorporate ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. This raises the following question: can responsible investments be justified from an ethical point of view? In this paper I first explain responsible investments. Then, I turn to the ethical foundation of responsible investments. There are two arguments for responsible investments. I argue that both fail. Therefore, my conclusion is that the ethical foundation of responsible investments is not firm.

In my paper, I partially defend Philippa Foot’s view in answering the question ‘why be moral?’ In her book, Natural Goodness(2001) and her final paper, “Rationality and Goodness” (2004), Foot proposes two ideas: Ethical Naturalism and, what I call, the ‘Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality’. In answering the question ‘why be moral?’, I argue that we should abandon the former and adopt the latter. In Section I, I discuss Foot’s Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality. In Section II, I examine Foot’s Ethical Naturalism. I argue that it is no longer defensible. In Section III, I examine other possible ways to integrate the categories of practical rationality. One is to take a utilitarian approach and another is to take a Kantian approach. I argue that the latter approach is in harmony with Foot’s Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality.