Shuqing Zhang

Can nonexistence be perceived? While the answer may seem obviously negative, proving this is not straightforward. This article extracts several arguments for the claim that "non-existence cannot be an object of perception" from the reasoning provided by Saṃghabhadra regarding "non-existence cannot be an object of *buddhi." Two main arguments are reconstructed, and both are reductio ad absurdum. The first suggests that if any nonexistence could be perceived, all instances of nonexistence would be perceived. Combined with Saṃghabhadra's causal theory of perception, this implies that one perception could perceive all instances of nonexistence. The second posits that if nonexistence were an object of perception, it would result in no perception occurring at all. As a problem-oriented study, this article reconstructs and evaluates Saṃghabhadra's arguments, demonstrating that "non-existence cannot be perceived" is not as easily proved as it appears, and Saṃghabhadra's insightful arguments, though vulnerable to challenges, hold promise for further defense.

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types.

Can non-existence be perceived? While the answer may seem obviously negative, proving this is not straightforward. This article extracts several arguments for the claim that "non-existence cannot be an object of perception" from the reasoning provided by Saṃghabhadra regarding "non-existence cannot be an object of *buddhi. Two main arguments are reconstructed and both are reductio ad absurdum. The first suggests that if any non-existence could be perceived, all instances of non-existence would be perceived. Combined with Saṃghabhadra's causal theory of perception, this implies that one perception could perceive all instances of non-existence. The second posits that if non-existence were an object of perception, it would result in no perception occurring at all. As a problem-oriented study, this article reconstructs and evaluates Saṃghabhadra's arguments, demonstrating that "non-existence cannot be perceived" is not as easily proved as it appears, and Saṃghabhadra’s insightful arguments, though vulnerable to challenges, hold promise for further defense.