Sibyl Schwarzenbach

The nature, extent and validity of the modern institution of private ownership remains a major source of contention between libertarian, liberal and socialist positions in political theory. The thesis contributes to current debates by ways of an analysis of historically significant theories of property, viewed in connection with their underlying conceptions of the person. ;The dissertation consists of three parts. Part One is an exposition of J. Locke's natural rights theory, together with Hegel's criticism of it. Chapter One argues that Locke's famous labor theory of property presupposes an essentially "acquisitive" conception of the person. Chapter Two analyzes Hegel's transformation of Locke's basic model within the framework of an argument no longer derived from the paradigm of natural rights; Hegel introduces instead his notion of the historical and cultural achievements of "Geist". Hegel's theory presupposes, we argue, an essentially "purposeful" self. Property is viewed no longer as an incentive to labor, but now primarily as an instrument for the realization of distinctive human capacities. ;Part Two presents Marx's critique of Hegel's conception of ownership. Chapter Three sets forth the early normative critique: in the realm of labor the acquisitive self remains primary in Hegel's theory. Marx, in turn, proposes that the criterion of "care" for the development of human capacities be introduced within the economic realm. Chapter Four argues that his project in the Grundrisse becomes an investigation of the social conditions of the possibility of this new form of ownership. We argue, moreover, that Marx's notion of "communal property" entails a form of Rawl's difference principle, and juxtapose his theory to the utilitarian view of J. S. Mill, on the one hand, and that of Rawls himself, on the other. ;The final part presents the outlines of a new conception of socialist ownership. We conclude that Marx's theory remains utopian given that it lacks an adequate conception of other-directed, socialist motivation. At the same time, we argue that Rawls's scepticism in regard to the possibility of socialist ownership remains unfounded, by way of drawing on yet a third model of personality and labor: that derived from the traditional female realm of child-care. We conclude that Rawls's theory, when taken in conjunction with our analysis of "reproductive labor", presents us with a new conception of socialist property arrangements which is at once highly feasible

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.

In recent years feminists have begun arguing for various political conceptions of ‘care’. I have argued, by contrast, for the intimate connection between the women’s movement of the last half century, and the growing realization of the necessity of civic friendship as a condition for genuine justice. I only repeat the outlines of my argument here, for my goal is to look at various institutions which might help realize not merely ‘public care’ – contemporary theories of which I argue need a far more careful normative account – but a civic friendship between all citizens. Indeed, I argue that the ideal of civic friendship provides that normative account of political care lacking in contemporary theories.