Sigrid Wallaert

Our research describes the experiences, views, and attitudes of participants of mediation dialogue groups involving non-related traffic accidents regarding their participation and related topics, such as responsibility, rehabilitation, and restoration. In Belgium, the criminal law holds that victims and offenders need to be informed about the option of entering a restorative mediation process during criminal proceedings. Mediation is voluntary and provided by an independent state-funded organization. We collected the data through individual semi-structured in-depth interviews with participants of two mediation dialogue groups. The data were analyzed through reflexive thematic analysis. We identified three main themes: (a) the importance of shared stories, (b) blurred boundaries, and (c) opportunities and obstacles for repair. Overall, our analysis suggests that mediation involving similar but non-related incidents may provide the participants with valuable knowledge and insights about one another's lives and thoughts and lead to mutual understanding and support. For some, it may even involve a transformative experience. Importantly, our analysis reveals that (a) the presence of a “shared story” and (b) a group dynamic in which participants feel sufficiently at ease with each other are pivotal to achieving a sense of connection and resonance that allows for such mutual understanding and support. These appear to be prerequisites for enabling any kind of healing.

This article examines the role of eco-anger in climate activism, focusing on Greta Thunberg and other young activists. The article challenges two common arguments against anger as a communicative strategy: that it is inherently retributive and counterproductive, and that it reduces the uptake of the speaker’s message. Instead, the article proposes that anger involves a triad of desires: retributive desires, recognitive desires, and desires for future change. While recognizing the potential for testimonial injustice due to stereotypes surrounding young women expressing anger, the article argues that climate anger functions as an outlaw emotion with the potential to advance testimonial justice. The article argues that climate anger offers several advantages: it can motivate people to join the climate movement, it has revolutionary potential to challenge the status quo, and it is well-suited to building community among activists. Ultimately, the article concludes that anger can be a powerful tool in addressing the climate crisis, particularly when used strategically by activists like Greta Thunberg.

This article starts from the question: how angry should physicians be? Since the literature so far has mostly focused on patient anger, we endeavor to turn bioethical attention to physician anger instead. After specifying our central question in four different ways—in terms of its normativity, its use of the term “physicians,” the implied patient‐directed nature of this anger, and the difference between feeling and behaving angrily—we posit the anger paradox (AP) to help guide our argument. We discuss whether anger might damage the therapeutic relationship, or whether it could be a necessary expression of care. We follow three steps in looking at whether physicians can feel, should feel, or should express anger. We complicate the question of care and its objects by introducing Frankfurt's distinction between first‐ and second‐order desires. Finally, we look at the distinction between apt and appropriate anger, concluding that while physician anger can sometimes be apt, it is never appropriate to express toward patients.

We expand on Della Croce’s ambition to interpret “epistemic injustice” as a specification of non-maleficence in the use of the influential four-principle framework. This is an alluring line of thought for conceptual, moral, and heuristic reasons. Although it is commendable, Della Croce’s attempt remains tentative. So does our critique of it. Yet, we take on the challenge to critically address two interrelated points. First, we broaden the analysis to include deliberations about hermeneutical injustice. We argue that, if due consideration of epistemic injustice is to require more than negative ethical obligations in medicine, dimensions of hermeneutical injustice should be explored as an avenue to arrive at such positive duties. Second, and relatedly, we argue that this may encompass moral responsibilities beyond the individual level, that is: positive obligations to take action on a structural level. Building on Dotson’s concept of “contributory injustice” and Scheman’s concept of “perceptual autonomy,” we suggest that the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutical justice may provide additional content not only to negative prohibitions of action (i.e. non-maleficence) but also to positive requirements of action, like respecting patient autonomy.

We expand on Della Croce’s ambition to interpret “epistemic injustice” as a specification of non-maleficence in the use of the influential four-principle framework. This is an alluring line of thought for conceptual, moral, and heuristic reasons. Although it is commendable, Della Croce’s attempt remains tentative. So does our critique of it. Yet, we take on the challenge to critically address two interrelated points. First, we broaden the analysis to include deliberations about hermeneutical injustice. We argue that, if due consideration of epistemic injustice is to require more than negative ethical obligations in medicine, dimensions of hermeneutical injustice should be explored as an avenue to arrive at such positive duties. Second, and relatedly, we argue that this may encompass moral responsibilities beyond the individual level, that is: positive obligations to take action on a structural level. Building on Dotson’s concept of “contributory injustice” and Scheman’s concept of “perceptual autonomy,” we suggest that the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutical justice may provide additional content not only to negative prohibitions of action (i.e. non-maleficence) but also to positive requirements of action, like respecting patient autonomy.

Niet iedereen die de stem verheft, krijgt evenveel gehoor. Vooral vrouwen die zich uitspreken over een controversieel onderwerp waar ze belang aan hechten, worden vaak niet geloofd. Integendeel: ze worden geridiculiseerd, gepsychologiseerd, gecanceld of zelfs vermoord. Dat laatste overkwam de Griekse filosofe Hypatia. De Britse filosofe Miranda Fricker bedacht de theorie van kennisonrecht om dergelijke situaties te verklaren. In dit boek legt Sigrid Wallaert uit wat Fricker daar precies mee bedoelt. Het is daarmee de eerste inleiding op het concept kennisonrecht in het Nederlandse taalgebied. Wallaert situeert de filosofische theorie tegen de achtergrond van de bredere sociale tendensen van nu. Ze focust op woede, en dan specifiek op vrouwelijke woede. Vrouwen zijn kwaad en hebben daar goede redenen voor. Maar die redenen worden lang niet altijd gehoord. Wallaert gaat dieper in op de twee types van kennisonrecht: getuigenisonrecht en interpretatieonrecht. Ze laat zien hoe deze twee vormen van onrecht ervoor zorgen dat kwade vrouwen niet serieus genomen worden. In haar essay schetst Wallaert het boeiende landschap van de feministische filosofie van onze tijd. Ze toont aan hoe denkers van nu een nieuwe filosofie van de kennis ontwerpen, om met de maatschappelijke uitdagingen van vandaag om te gaan. Ze gaat in op kruispuntdenken, gemarginaliseerde sprekers, niet-standaard manieren van communiceren en het ongelijke kennisspeelveld.

With the #MeToo movement and the Women’s Marches behind us, it has become clear that women are angry. This anger is often criticised for being disruptive or uncommunicative, with calm rationality being praised as a superior alternative. In this article, I use the framework of Fricker’s (2007) Epistemic Injustice to examine the communicative disadvantages and merits of what I call feminist anger. I explain how feminist anger can be subject to both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, but that this does not mean it should not be used to communicate. Importantly, feminist anger can challenge the patriarchal status quo and it can provide an epistemic bridge towards hermeneutical justice. By listening to feminist anger, both our own and others’, we can get one step closer to epistemic equality.

Greta Thunberg has rapidly become a household name due to her passionate involvement in the youth climate movement. However, Thunberg has also received criticism, among other things for her anger. Is such anger really productive, people ask, or is it harming the cause of climate justice? In this article, I examine that question from a philosophical perspective. I look at two commonly mentioned disadvantages of anger, namely that it is a retributive emotion and that it reduces uptake of one’s message, and I provide some reasons why these might not be disadvantageous after all. Then, I look at four different advantages of anger: its motivational power, its revolutionary potential, its use for community building, and its epistemic value. Each of these points is linked back to the climate movement as it is personified by Greta Thunberg, in order to analyse the anger that is at times very prominent in her activist message. While a definite conclusion about the productivity of Thunberg’s anger is difficult to reach, I conclude that her anger should be listened to regardless, since we have much to learn from it.