Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir

Das Konzept der Kritik in Nietzsches Philosophie ist eng mit dem Begriff der Transformation verbunden. Dekonstruktive wie auch rekonstruktive Kritik reagiert auf Probleme und Krisen und zielt darauf, Kultur, Politik, Systeme von Wissen und Macht sowie die Menschen selbst in ihren Beziehungen zu sich und zu anderen zu transformieren. Dieser Band widmet sich den analytischen, transformativen und polemischen Dimensionen der Nietzsche'schen Begriffe der Kritik und der Wirksamkeit seiner Kritik. Was bedeuten die Begriffe der Kritik bei Nietzsche und in welchem Verhältnis stehen sie zu traditionellen Kritik-Begriffen? Ist Nietzsches Kritik emanzipatorisch, romantisch, aristokratisch, reaktionär, liberal, humanistisch, posthumanistisch? Welche kritischen Bewegungen knüpfen an Nietzsche an? In welchem Sinne kommt Nietzsche als Verbündeter feministischer, ökologischer, konservativer, pro- oder antikapitalistischer und anderer Formen der Kritik in Betracht? Namhafte Nietzsche-Forscher wie Luce Irigaray, Babette Babich, Christoph Türcke, Martin Saar, Herman Siemens und viele andere stellen Nietzsches Philosophie in ein Licht, das sein Denken über die Grenzen der Nietzsche-Forschung hinaus hoch relevant macht.

In this paper I reflect my experience of teaching “Ethics of Nature” or environmental ethics for over 15 years. Environmental ethics is the most groundbreaking branch of contemporary ethics because of its environmentally embedded and embodied conception of human beings. For a change towards a more sustainable culture to take place it is however not enough that our understanding of our place in the environment becomes more ecocentric and to realize how human life interconnected with all life. It is also not sufficient that the big economic, financial systems and production systems that constitute an unsustainable economy become less unsustainable. A change in the way we experience and sense ourselves as environmental beings also needs to happen. I respond to voices within environmental ethics that call for anthropocenean“sensibilities” like Nancy Tuana does and Donna Haraway does with her idea of “staying with the trouble.” Deborah Bird Rose also calls for a deeper sense of listening to the non-human environment. For the cultivation of practices of such sensibilities and listening I have been inspired by methodologies of embodied and enviromental thinking developed within enactivist, processual phenomenological and pragmatist philosophies, especially by Eugene Gendlin and by Claire Petitmengin. Such methodologies of embodied thinking and understanding have hence been integrated in my teaching of environmental ethics and I view them as contributing to the “Inner Development Goals” that are seen as complimentary to the UN Sustainability Development Goals.

A mindful and perceptive partnership between the natural, more-than-human world and human culture is crucial for a connected and ethical way forward for life on our planet. The aim and hope of this edited volume is to contribute to ways for restoring our biosocial relationships and elemental sensibilities—and our forgotten ontologico-environmental, embodied, and material being. The contributors are united by a shared sense of commitment to exploring theories and practices of new sensibilities and methodologies for fresh ways of thinking in the times of Anthropocene crisis. The environmental scholars gathered here come out of diverse traditions of embodied, elemental, and indigenous thinking—and are based in phenomenology, enactivism, mindfulness-oriented phenomenological methodologies, experiential approaches of pragmatism, and indigenous philosophies.

This book delves into the embodied ground of thinking, illuminating the transition from theorising about the embodied mind to actively practising embodied thinking in research, teaching, and learning. The authors speak from immersing themselves in novel methods that engage the felt, experiential dimensions of cognition in inquiry. The turn to embodiment has sparked the development of new methodologies within phenomenology, pragmatism, and cognitive science. Drawing on Eugene Gendlin’s philosophical work on felt understanding, and Francesco Varela’s enactivist approach, contributors explore innovative embodied thinking methods such as Focusing, Thinking at the Edge, micro-phenomenology, and mindfulness practices. They demonstrate the practical applications of these methods in research, teaching, and learning, highlighting their liberating and empowering potential for researchers and students. In an age marked by information overload and societal polarisation, methods of embodied thinking provide an innovative edge to critique, complementing more traditional approaches to critical thinking with listening skills and reflexive care. This book shows how heeding the essential, yet often overlooked, embodied grounds of critical and creative thinking can deepen and strengthen each of research, teaching, and learning. It will interest philosophers of education and educators in higher education in particular, as well as researchers and postgraduate students from philosophy, and the cognitive and social sciences, who are curious about how embodied thinking can enrich research, teaching, and learning.

This collection responds to widespread, complex, and current environmental challenges by presenting eleven original essays on a new elemental-embodied approach in environmental humanities. This approach has a special focus on elemental and indigenous philosophies as well as localized experiences of terrestrial forces: from earthquakes and eruptions to pandemics and natural disasters. Representing a shift in modern Western scientific and disembodied thinking of nature, this edited book approaches the question of relationality and intertwining of human and natural being by utilizing the elemental-embodied methodologies within philosophy of embodiment and nature. Supported by research in cognitive sciences, the contributors represent the experiential and affective turn within research into human cognition. As embodied, the human being is embedded and interacting with all there is. The aim of this edited volume is to indicate new paths toward regaining our access to natural being within usand thus toward reconnecting with the natural environment and the things and beings around us in a new, environmentally enhanced way. It appeals to researchers and students working in many fields, predominantly in philosophy, as well as religious and environmental studies.

Luce Irigaray’s writings on Nietzsche’s philosophy belong to the groundbreaking interpretations of his work and they also confirm the continued relevance of his philosophy. Unlike most male-centric philosophers, Nietzsche not only saw that sexual difference was becoming one of the major philosophical issues of our age. He was also keenly aware of how it permeated our philosophical tradition with its dualistic models, which is one reason for Irigaray’s interest in it, as has been widely discussed in feminist/queer philosophical research into her Nietzsche interpretation. Another common denominator of Nietzsche and Irigaray are their philosophies of the body. Interpreters of Irigaray have pointed out how her conception of embodied, sexuate being calls for a new way of philosophical thinking (Grosz), and Stegmaier interprets the liberation from prejudices we encounter in Nietzsche’s works as a “liberation of philosophy.” How can the liberation of philosophy be understood in the way we practice philosophical thinking? In the following interpretation of Irigaray’s book The Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche (1980), I show how it offers a theory and a practice of embodied philosophical thinking, which I will discuss in light of new phenomenological methodologies of embodied thinking (Gendlin, Petitmengin). Irigaray’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy in Marine Lover is both critical and constructive as apparent in her interpretation of Dionysus and Ariadne. On the one hand, this couple represents for her the patriarchal tradition of philosophy that she claims Nietzsche is still stuck in, and on the other hand, it also represents a liberation from resentment and misogyny in relations of the sexes. The notions of listening to oneself and to the other, being touched and tearing, enable such a liberation, both on the level of relations of the sexes and on the level of philosophical dialogues and thinking that Dionysus and Ariadne also represent. The water/ocean in the title of Marine Lover indicates how this is a philosophical text that displays an explicit processing and articulation of feelings, emotions, and affects in philosophical thinking.

In her book To be Born, Luce Irigaray offers a novel philosophy of the child. Instead of viewing the child as a bearer of rights and in need of adequate care as is common in contemporary philosophies of childhood, Irigaray presents the child as a metaphor of a new human being which represents natural belonging. The rearticulation of the human has been ongoing in Irigaray’s philosophy from its beginnings with its efforts to give voice to the excluded, silenced, repressed feminine. Irigaray’s phenomenological restructuring of subjectivity in her philosophy of sexuate difference is taken to a new level with her philosophy of the child. Her conception of the child is interpreted here in light of the experiential and affective turn within phenomenology and cognitive sciences about philosophical thinking as embodied and embedded thinking for a new era. Irigaray sheds light on the silencing and repressing of the child within us in an effort to enable us as adult beings to think from and with it. Philosophical thinking needs to be more consciously connected with the embodied sources of thought that are already present in early infancy and continue to be present in adult thinking as neglected or repressed experiential and affective layers of thought. Irigaray’s philosophy of the child is a basis for a methodology of embodied philosophical thinking such as has been developed within Claire Petitmengin’s microphenomenology and within Eugene Gendlin’s methodology of philosophical thinking from the felt sense.

Recent discussions have connected Nietzsche’s philosophy of masculinity to the return of authoritarian politics. Neoconservative debates about masculinity, and right-wing extremism, explicitly refer back to Nietzsche’s philosophy and often present democratization, a feminization of society, and political correctness as responsible for a weakening of masculinity. One example for this reception of Nietzsche’s writings is Jordan Peterson’s psychological diagnosis of a presumed crisis of masculinity. This article undertakes a comparison of Nietzsche’s philosophy of masculinities with Peterson’s neo-Jungian psychology of masculinity in the context of recent conceptualizations of patriarchy, misogyny, and gendered forms of ressentiment. This comparison will highlight that Nietzsche’s conception of masculinity is more complex, and has philosophically more to offer, than neoconservative ideas about masculinity that onesidedly foreground male strength. Finally it will be pointed out how a Jungian analysis discloses aspects of the Dionysian that are of relevance to contemporary gender studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

Shame in the deep sense of fear of exposure of human vulnerability (and not in the narrower sense of individual transgression or fault) has been identified as one mood or disposition of philosophical thinking. Philosophical imaginary, disciplinary identity and misogynistic vocabulary testify to a collective, underlying, unprocessed shame inherent to the (Western) philosophical tradition like Le Doeuff (1989), Butler (2004) and Murphy (2012) have pointed out. One aspect of collective philosophical shame has to do with disgust of or denial of embodiment insofar as it poses a threat to ideals of sovereignty and rationality (Nussbaum 2006). Embodiment reveals finitude, being dependent and exposed to others (Sartre 1984; Merleau-Ponty 2012; Landweer 1999; Zahavi 2014), and ultimately points to human vulnerability as rooted in an experience of fear of shame (Gilson 2016). If the inability to process shame of embodiment has resulted in disembodied notions of the human being that may lead to defensiveness, aggression or violence, how can a constructive processing of shame based on an embodied notion of the human being result in a way of philosophical thinking that is more vulnerable? And how can philosophical thinking that has its point of departure in vulnerability, neither in the sense of the victim nor the hero but as a self-conscious emotion, lead to philosophical dialogues that can unsettle vicious cycles of shaming and blaming and are productive for deepening philosophical reflection? Susan Brison’s (2002) work on sexual violence will finally be discussed as an example of such a philosophy.

While the emphasis on embodiment and situatedness is strong in contemporary philosophy and cognitive sciences, its implications for the practice of critical thinking are just beginning to be taken seriously. The challenge is to think with the richness and the intricacy that come along with embodiment of situated knowers and on the basis of the experiential turn. Even though the embodied and experiential dimension is operative and continuously present all the time in thought and action, it is hardly acknowledged, cared for, or made transparent in academic philosophical training. In doing philosophy we are actually rather trained to detach ourselves from the experiential basis of our thinking. In this paper we claim that by doing so we cut ourselves off from important sources of what it means to think for oneself. We argue that the more embodied context one dares to include in critical thinking, the more critique becomes personally and politically transformative. This has major methodological implications: one needs to learn “reading” embodied, felt experience as carefully and closely as the texts. The methods of Embodied Critical Thinking presented here are based on the micro-phenomenological approach of Claire Petitmengin and the Thinking at the Edge method developed by Eugene Gendlin and Mary Hendricks.

The fight for emancipation takes place on different levels, and one of them is the level of contemporary financial capitalism as debt-economy. Debt can be a major tool of control and exploitation in that it produces subordinate subjects situated in exchange relations of debt and credit. Recent work on financial debt and the debt-economy has, however, not taken gender adequately into account in philosophical definitions of indebted subjects. Gender analysis discloses how the debtor–creditor relationship is based on a contractarian idea of the indebted subject as an autonomous moral agent, and on a masculine, that is, a-relational understanding of what counts as debt and what does not in the contemporary debt-economy. In contrast to atomistic notions of the subject in liberal, contractarian theories, relational notions of the subject as advanced in care ethics are a better point of departure for capturing the interdependence of subjects within a debt-economy as a core feature of a nonsustainable monetary system. On the basis of such analysis, care ethics also offers means for imagining ways of emancipation from private and public problem credit in order to make financial systems more sustainable and more just