Silvia Caprioglio Panizza

The category of moral impossibility is ubiquitous, it defines individual moral acts and character, and has far-reaching consequences for central moral concepts such as choice and freedom; hence, it deserves keen philosophical attention. Yet, so far, moral impossibility has been discussed scantily and under separate categories. My aim in this chapter is threefold: first, to make a case for the importance of moral impossibility in ethics; second, to put together its various existing discussions under one conceptual umbrella; third, to sketch the central implications and further questions that arise if we take moral impossibility seriously. In order to achieve these aims, the chapter is structured as follows: after the introduction, I offer a taxonomy of the forms of moral impossibility, highlighting differences and unity; having described the phenomenon, I give two broad reasons for taking moral impossibility as an ethical category in its own right; that requires accepting that impossibility can indeed be an ethical category, a question I address in the following section; in the last section I draw out some of the key implications of moral impossibility, affecting moral identity, the nature of value, and the processes of choice, decision-making, moral debate, and conflict.

What happens when we encounter the real? One of the central and most appealing ideas in Iris Murdoch’s ethics is her invitation to return to reality and ‘stay’ with it. Murdoch the psychologist also knows how extremely difficult it is. But why should encountering the real feel so difficult? Not only difficult; at times—perhaps essentially?—maddening. In Benjamin Labatut’s When We Cease to Understand the World (2020), some of the sharpest minds of the past century struggle with a loss of sanity the closer they get to its sub-atomic dimension, as if encountering the finest structure of the world loosened their grip on what they used to call reality. In this paper, following Murdoch and Labatut, I identify a sense of resistance that emerges when we come to a close and still encounter with a reality that we find we cannot grasp, interpreted as a felt conflict between the self and the real. Through a series of dichotomies found in Murdoch’s philosophy (real and unreal, movement and stillness, ordinary and strange) I explore the possible reasons for this resistance, and suggest that Murdoch’s own thought, while calling for a form of intense attention to the real, is better suited at explaining forms of attention where the real is experienced through joy and the possibility of progressive understanding. The difference in affective response, I argue, has moral and metaphysical roots.

In every choice, action, and act of the imagination, what is possible for us is variously determined and delimited not only by physical and logical limits, but also by moral ones. These limits constitute the domain of ‘moral impossibility’. Moral impossibilities limit what we conceive of, what we consider practically, and what we are capable of doing. They manifest in what is not-thought, what is unthinkable, and what is undoable. They have individual and collective roots, change over time, and have significant consequences for the framing of problems, for the scope of deliberation, and for individual and social worldviews – as well as the conflicts that arise between them. This phenomenon is ubiquitous, yet scarcely discussed. The volume aims to open up and unify a field of inquiry by collecting original contributions that explore both conceptual and applied questions through the moral psychology, meta-ethics, and politics of moral impossibility.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures.

Can we learn how to be better at attending from other animals? The paper argues that we can. While the call for attention to animals is increasingly heard, still few engage with attention by animals, and even fewer with animal attention, both individual and mutual, as an ethical lesson. Working with a concept of attention as inherently ethical, the paper considers four elements of attention which non-human animals can teach humans: unbiased objectivity, creativity, empathetic engagement, and shared/mutual attention. These elements will emerge through four case-studies, each illustrating an aspect of attention which a human can learn from a non-human animal. The first, taken from Iris Murdoch, reports Rainer Maria Rilke's observations of animal attention as unbiased objectivity. The second, from Emmanuel Levinas, shows a dog attending in a way that is ethically responsive and creative, identifying value where no one else sees it. The third, with the horse known as ‘Clever Hans’, observes an empathetic mode of attention in which the horse was superior to humans. The fourth and final case-study describes a cat teaching a human how to engage in shared and mutual attention through touch.

Transforming global food systems is crucial for mitigating environmental degradation, reducing the global disease burden and protecting sentient individuals from harm. Despite overwhelming evidence linking animal-sourced foods to ecological damage, resource depletion and public health challenges, gaps remain in promoting sustainable consumption. This urgency is compounded by the scientific recognition of animal sentience, which elevates animal use to a moral issue. This study combines empirical data from a survey of 500 respondents with a literature review to explore motivations and behaviours driving plant-based eating. Key suggested interventions to foster a responsible food system include: (i) raising awareness of animal rights, (ii) disseminating nutritional and environmental knowledge, (iii) reforming agri-food subsidies, (iv) promoting plant-based food research, commercialisation and consumption and (v) fostering social inclusion and positive recognition of vegan identity. By addressing psychological, social and structural barriers to animal-free diets, this study offers actionable strategies for advancing a sustainable future.

This review paper on the ethical issues surrounding trust in experts focuses on epistemic trust and its ethical implications. The paper is divided into four sections: Section I maps key philosophical discussions of trust; Section II discusses the breakdown of trust; Section III focuses on the core issue of the ethics of trust and is divided into three subsections; Section IV deals with the question of distrust and the democratic deficit of trust in experts. We conclude with some suggestions for creating conditions in which both trust and distrust can play socially, epistemically, and morally useful roles within a broader climate of trust.

Some disagreements seem to find no resolution, despite exchange of arguments and lack of obvious epistemic vices. These ‘deep disagreements’ have puzzled philosophers, who have offered different epistemological explanations for their ‘depth’. Deep disagreements that are moral in nature are more rarely discussed. What explains the ‘depth’ in the moral cases? This paper proposes that most deep moral disagreements can be explained by appealing to mutually unthinkable practical possibilities. Specifically, deep moral disagreements are those where each party demands the actualisation of a possibility that is unthinkable to the other party, and what determines the unthinkability is the structural role of value as ‘hinge commitment’, functioning both as background and as excluder. Using as example the debate on abortion, recently reignited in the US by the overturning of Roe v. Wade, the paper aims to offer a model to understand deep moral disagreements, where value functions not (only) as topic but as structure.

The phenomenon of moral transformation, though important, has received little attention in virtue ethics. In this paper we propose a virtue-ethical model of moral transformation as character transformation by tracking the development of new identity-defining (‘core’) character traits, their expressions, and their priority structure, through the change in what appears as possible or impossible to the moral agent. We propose that character transformation culminates when what previously appeared as morally possible to the agent now appears impossible, i.e. unconceived and unthinkable, moving through stages of transformation where some possibilities gradually disappear while others open up. While we show an example of moral transformation towards virtue, we allow that such transformation can occur in the opposite direction, hence we make claims about ‘character traits’ rather than virtues of vices. Through the example of former slave-trader Rodrigo’s transformation in the film The Mission, we follow the parallel development of new objects of value and ways of valuing (with respect to a group of indigenous people of South America) with the closing down of the possibility of disrespecting and harming them, to the end-point of transformation, where allowing their capture is for Rodrigo both unconceived and, when conceived, unthinkable.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Can literature help us in a time of crisis? Yes, in many and unexpected ways, as Simone Weil’s literary work shows. Reading Weil’s unfinished tragedy Venice Saved in the context of her poetry, philosophy and politics, we argue that it is an example of literary work that can engender transformation, for three reasons: its presentation and encouragement of attention to beauty; its tragic tension, forcing a deeper vision of the world; and its use of the poetic word. These elements, we conclude, make literature a prime tool for inner and outer transformation, especially when everything seems to be lost.

This is a short piece offering a rarely-mentioned reason for ethical veganism, which applies to cases in which not consuming animal products makes no practical difference to the animals (say, they have been bought by someone else and would be thrown away). The reason for not consuming animal products, regardless of the magnitude of the impact, is that doing so would be a betrayal: a betrayal of the animal who had to endure physical and mental pain, or whose life was untimely ended, for making said ‘product’. This reason for not taking part in the consumption of animals, besides explaining these marginal cases, extends further and in fact contributes to the larger reason for veganism as such.

An outstanding reference source to the full span of Murdoch's work, comprising 37 specially commissioned chapters written by an international team of leading scholars. This is the first volume to do justice to the incredibly rich and wide-ranging nature of her work. Divided into five parts, the volume covers the following areas: - A guide to Murdoch's key philosophical texts, including The Sovereignty of Good and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. - Core themes and concepts in Murdoch's philosophy, such as love, moral vision, and attention. - Murdoch's engagement with the history of philosophy, including Plato, Kant, Hegel, Simone Weil, and Wittgenstein. - Interdisciplinary connections with art, literature, and religion, including Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity. - Murdoch and contemporary philosophical debates, including feminism, virtue ethics, and metaethics. - The application of Murdoch’s thought to applied ethics, including animal ethics, psychiatric ethics, and the environment. Although recent years have seen a blossoming of interest in Murdoch’s philosophy, The Murdochian Mind is the first volume to do justice to the incredibly rich and wide-ranging nature of her work. As such it will be of great interest to students of philosophy, especially ethics and aesthetics, as well as those in related disciplines such as literature, religion, and gender studies.

If Annette Baier is right that ‘some degree of trust is … the very basis of morality” (Baier 2004, 180), it is surprising that a philosopher so interested in moral psychology and interpersonal relationships such as Iris Murdoch does not explicitly discuss trust in her work. However, on closer inspection, Murdoch’s proposal of an ethics focused on realism, unselfing and attention crucially depends upon the possibility of trust – trust in reality, and in one’s own capacity for moral vision. Connecting Murdoch's project with feminist philosophy and especially feminist epistemology, and drawing on the philosophy of trust developed by C. Thi Nguyen and Karen Jones, this chapter argues for a vision of 'trust in the world' implicit in Murdoch's work, where trust emerges not in the domain of personal relationships, but in our attitude towards reality, including moral reality, that is not perceived by us as merely something inert.

Simone Weil (1909-1943) was one of the foremost French philosophers of the 20th century; a mystic, activist, and writer whose profound work continues to intrigue and inspire today. Mirror of Obedience collects together Weil's poetry and autobiographical writings translated into English for the first time. It offers a rare glimpse into a more personal and introspective Weil than we usually encounter. She was writing and re-working her poems until the end of her life and in a letter from London to her parents, dated 22 January 1943, she expressed the wish for her verses to appear together in print in chronological order, a wish which this volume honours. Weil was a thinker who wrote with discipline and spareness and cherished the poetic form for its power to compress language and distill meaning. In these poems and literary writings, we see her own efforts to craft poems as essential expressions of thought, bringing into view another aspect of Weil's quest for beauty and truth.

How do we see the world aright? This question is central to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy as well as to that of her great source of inspiration, Simone Weil. For both of them, not only our action, but the very quality of our being depends on the ability to see things as they are, where vision is both a metaphor for immediate understanding and a literal expression of the requirement to train our perception so as to get rid of illusions. For both, too, the method to achieve this goal is attention. For both, finally, attention requires a dethronement of the self, considered as the source of illusion. In this paper I investigate what moral perception means for each of these philosophers and how it operates through attention and its relationship with the self. I will show that, despite many striking similarities, Murdoch’s project does not equal ‘Weil minus God’, but offers a different concept of the self, a different understanding of its removal, and therefore a different picture of attention and moral perception. In evaluating both views, I will gesture towards a third way represented by Zen Buddhism, which both philosophers variously consider but do not embrace.

Among the possible ways of gaining moral knowledge, moral perception figures as a controversial yet fruitful option. If moral perception is possible, moral disagreement is addressed not by appealing to principles but to the process and the objects of perception, and moral progress occurs not through deliberation but by refining one’s perceptual faculties. The possibility of “seeing clearly and justly” is at the heart of Iris Murdoch’s thought, but Murdoch herself does not put forth a systematic argument for this view. In this paper I propose an argument for moral perception based on Murdoch’s philosophy, while engaging with contemporary debates in moral perception. The key idea I take from Murdoch is that perception is conceptually laden, where concepts are understood as ways of grasping the world according to human concerns. Murdoch’s position enables us to solve a difficult tension: explaining the motivating force of perception while maintaining objectivity in ethics. This view of moral perception also constitutes a radical position in the debate, where even the most optimistic defenses appeal to the supervenience of values on facts. If Murdoch is right, however, we perceive complex properties, including values, directly, so that appeal to supervenience becomes unnecessary and some of the grounds for the very distinction between fact and value are put into question.

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established.

This article engages with two fundamental attitudes toward animals who are used for human consumption: attention and ironic detachment. Taken as polarities linked with animal consumption and the refusal thereof, I discuss how these two attitudes are shaped and manifested during moments of encounter with the animals in question. Starting from a striking photograph from the Lychee and Dog Meat Festival in China, I explore the embodiment of these attitudes in the “gaze” of human participants during the encounter with animals who are going to be killed for food.

This book draws on Iris Murdoch's philosophy to explore questions related to the importance of attention in ethics. In doing so, it also engages with Murdoch's ideas about the existence of a moral reality, the importance of love, and the necessity but also the difficulty, for most of us, of fighting against our natural self-centred tendencies. Why is attention important to morality? This book argues that many moral failures and moral achievements can be explained by attention. Not only our actions and choices, but the possibilities we choose among, and even the meaning what we perceive, are to a large extent determined by whether we pay attention, and what we attend do. In this way, the book argues that attention is fundamental, though often overlooked, in morality. While the book's discussion of attention revolves primarily around Murdoch's thought, it also engages significantly with Simone Weil, who introduced the concept of attention in a spiritual context. The book also engages with contemporary debates concerning moral perception and motivation, empirical psychology, animal ethics, and Buddhist philosophy. The Ethics of Attention will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on Iris Murdoch, Simone Weil, ethics and moral psychology, and the philosophy of attention.

An important yet often unacknowledged aspect of moral discourse is the phenomenon of moral impossibility, which challenges more widely accepted models of moral discussion and deliberation as a choice among possible options. Starting from observations of the new possibilities of anti immigrant attitudes and hate crimes which have been described by the press as something being “unleashed,” the paper asks what it means for something to enter or not the sphere of possibility in the moral sense, and whether it is ever desirable for something to remain or be pushed back outside the realm of the morally possible. Three forms of moral impossibility are identified: the unconceived, the unthinkable, and moral incapacity. Through the discussion of a stark fictional example of moral impossibility, the paper concludes that while the category of moral impossibility cannot settle disagreement, it sheds light on some of the most fundamental aspects of moral life.

As attention, in philosophy, is mainly discussed in the philosophy of mind, its ethical aspects have remained relatively unexplored. One notable exception is Iris Murdoch. Another philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considers attention to be central for his phenomenology of perception, with important ethical implications. This paper explores the role of attention in ethics by drawing on both Murdoch and Merleau-Ponty and uses the resources they variously offer to address two questions relating to the enigmatic role of the self in attention: how should we understand agency in the attending subject? And: to what extent is the subject responsible for the quality of her attention? Addressing these difficulties about the self is the key to articulating its ethical value, as well as the main apparent difference between the ethical concept and the one in ordinary language and philosophy of mind.