Silvia Di Vincenzo

Avicenna’s ground-breaking view of logic as both a tool for other sciences and a science in its own right has already attracted scholars’ attention and has been studied in several different respects. The present paper aims to address a specific issue entailed by considering logic as a science in its own right: that is, assessing the relation in which logic as a science stands to the other sciences, and particularly to metaphysics and psychology. The inquiry will focus on a fundamental, yet tricky, passage of chapter I.4 of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Madḫal, the opening work of his most comprehensive philosophical summa, the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Book of Healing). Due to the obscurity of some of Avicenna’s references, chapter I.4 “on the subject-matter of logic” has stimulated numerous attempts at interpretation from the Middle Ages to today. In this paper, I will attempt to provide a new reading of the chapter in light of Avicenna’s definition of the epistemological status of science in Burhān II.7.

Starting from the 13th century, the question of defining theology as a science gained prominence within a new epistemological reflection on the discipline. It has been hypothesized that the availability of new translations of Aristotelian works significantly contributed to the growing interest among theologians in the theory of science. One of the most prominent intellectuals who recognized the necessity of defining theology as a science and outlining its boundaries and investigative methods in relation to other disciplines, was Albert the Great (d. 1280). Numerous studies have been dedicated to exploring Albert’s treatment of this subject since the 1930s. However, little to no attention has been given to the role played by Arabic sources, particularly the works of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037), the philosopher and polymath of Persian origin, in shaping Albert’s own definition of theology as a science. This contribution concentrates on the analysis of a section of the Summa Theologiae (Treatise I, quaestio V, chapter 3), with particular emphasis on the ‘translation’ of the logical-argumentative method from its domain of application in scientific and philosophical research to the branch of theology dedicated to safeguarding Christian doctrine against the criticisms and the attacks of heretics. The aim is to analyze how Albert accomplished this translation of the method of inquiry by drawing parallels between the defence of the principles of philosophical inquiry, which is a primary concern of metaphysics, and the defence of the articles of faith in theology. It is by reconciling sources from both the Christian and the Arabo-Islamic traditions that Albert claims the use of a form of dialectic argumentation within theology.

RésuméLes oeuvres existantes d’Avicenne préservent-elles une trace de sa première production philosophique, aujourd’hui perdue? Cet article examine un texte jusqu’ici négligé, à savoir le chapitre « Sur les propositions hypothétiques » du « Traité concis sur les principes de la logique d’Avicenne » (Risāla mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq, ci-après RM). Les nouveaux éléments offerts par le chapitre du RM en question conduiront à une lecture différente d’un autre passage bien connu de la réélaboration avicennienne des Analytiques premiers (Qiyās) d’Aristote dans le « Livre de la guérison » (Kitāb al-šifāʾ). Les indices recueillis à partir de l’analyse de ces deux ouvrages nous amèneront finalement à réfléchir à la possibilité qu’Avicenne ait en fait composé un ouvrage (désormais perdu) sur les propositions et les syllogismes hypothétiques. Le RM d’Avicenne n’étant à ce jour pas édité, une édition, ainsi qu’une traduction anglaise du chapitre concerné, sont également fournies en annexe de cet article.