Simon Gansinger

This paper offers a novel perspective on Hegel’s theory of punishment by reconstructing his notion of political justice. Adopting a vertical reading of the Philosophy of Right, I show how Hegel’s treatment of crime and punishment changes as the concept of right develops from abstract right through civil society to the state. Within ethical life (Sittlichkeit), the annulment of criminal wrongs serves the political end of restoring unity among citizens rather than merely repaying injury with injury. This reading aligns with recent efforts to move beyond retributivist interpretations while pressing their insights to their logical conclusion, thereby opening Hegel’s political philosophy to restorative approaches in criminal justice.

The article develops a psychoanalytic theory of antisemitism as a specific form of paranoia rooted in an unresolved conflict under late-capitalist conditions. Drawing on Adorno and Horkheimer's "Dialectic of Enlightenment" and on clinical case studies, it argues that antisemitic patients project incompatible demands of inhibition and disinhibition onto “the Jew,” who becomes a paradoxical imago uniting moral law and forbidden desire. This projection both externalises intrapsychic conflict and offers a fantasy of its harmonious resolution, which then fuels alternating movements of idealising identification and murderous hatred. The article links these dynamics to the contradictory social meanings of money as both limitless gratification and coercive capitalist power, suggesting that modern society structurally fosters the very ambivalence antisemitism seeks to deny. Antisemites thus “love the delusion as themselves,” preferring paranoid resolution to tolerating psychic and social contradiction.

The literature on G. W. F. Hegel’s theory of punishment is marked by persistent scholarly disagreement. Instead of taking this interpretive diversity as a defect of the debate, we should think of it as a helpful piece of meta-exegetical evidence that points to a structural feature of Hegel’s account: there are multiple justifications of punishment that correspond to different spheres of right, such as the family, civil society, and the state. For Hegel, punishment is justified objectively when it coheres with the multifarious normative logic of Ethical Life. And it is justified subjectively when justice is seen to be done. Overall, Hegel does not offer us a conventional normative argument for when the state ought to punish wrongdoers. Rather, he is concerned with the question of how punishment fits into a rationally ordered social world.

We summarise and reflect on the symposium ‘Let me explain: Reason-giving across disciplines’, held at the University of Warwick's Institute of Advanced Study in June 2024. The event brought together scholars from four faculties to discuss the concept of explanation and its relationship to interdisciplinarity. We pick out four questions that participants found especially stimulating: Is a good explanation really more than a good description? How does agency change the structure of explanations? Who explains to whom? And what does interdisciplinarity mean for the practice of explaining? We end by highlighting the refreshingly disruptive potential of genuinely interdisciplinary forums of knowledge-exchange.

Deep legal change occurs when, without legal justification, one legal rule is replaced by another. While often ignored in legal theory, these rule-breaking normative transformations are common and significant enough to warrant careful attention. In this thesis, I analyse the structure of deep legal change and discuss how a philosophically rigorous jurisprudence should approach a legal phenomenon that appears to be legally inexplicable. In particular, I focus on the implications of rule-breaking rule-changes for our conception of courts and legal reasoning. To understand why deep legal change occurs, we need to provide a normative explanation that clarifies why courts, as courts, have reasons to break the law. My solution takes me to G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Hegel invites us to think of the judicial process as being grounded in two institutional values: the establishment of legal security and the protection of the “universal interest” of the state. Sometimes, these two values come into conflict. In these moments, established legal rules give way to fundamental state-interests. With Hegel, we can say that it is inevitable that political reasons periodically override legal reasons. In deep legal change, the fundamentally political character of law becomes visible. While reminiscent of Carl Schmitt and the literature on emergency powers, this theory of law is much closer to the reason-of-state tradition. Against the background of several historical case studies and contemporary scholarship, I demonstrate the novelty, coherence, and explanatory power of a Hegelian account of deep legal change.

The law maintains, rather than challenges, the powers that be – or so it is commonly thought. In ‘Rackets and Spirit,’ a little known and untranslated essay, Max Horkheimer complicates this notion by attributing to law a ‘force of resistance’. He contends that, under certain conditions, the legal process develops a logic of its own, one that can become disjointed from the rationale of power. In this Critical Reflection, I look closely at the paragraph in which Horkheimer introduces the notion of a ‘force of resistance’. I argue that Horkheimer develops a theme that he and Theodor W. Adorno return to in the Dialectic of Enlightenment: the spiritual instruments of domination, among them law, have the potential to turn against domination. At the same time, Horkheimer is clear that law does not resist automatically: it takes human agents to put the legal sphere into opposition to the political sphere. I illustrate this thought with respect to the recent history of federal abortion rights in the United States.