Simon Lumsden

Hegel’s examination of habit in his subjective spirit sits at a critical juncture between nature and spirit. This ‘second nature’ has often been interpreted as leaving nature behind. This paper argues that Hegel’s examination of habit should not be understood in this way. While habit bridges the gap between nature and spirit it cannot be understood as a mere transition point. Habit represents a distinct way of considering the spirit-nature relation that challenges the common Kantian inspired distinction between a space of reasons and a space of causes (terms by which the spirit-nature relation is often understood).

In Thinking like a Mall Steven Vogel argues that there is no authoritative nature independent of human standards to which one can appeal to correct damaging environmental practices. Human practices are the only basis for interpreting the environment and our ecologically destructive practices have made our environment into the degraded thing that it is. Revising these flawed practices requires becoming alienated from them; only then can we be responsible for them. Alienation is overcome by a democratic community who chooses the practices that correct deficient ones and that we can recognise as expressions of ourselves and be at home in. This paper argues that there is a key step missing in this process, which is how we become alienated from our practices. It is only by appreciating the broader social and institutional horizon, ‘Ethical Life’, by which norms receive their authority and lose it, that we can understand alienation and the normative change necessary to correct it.

The notion of Bildung comes to prominence in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was originally conceived to capture the cultural conditions by which an individual becomes a moral agent. In Hegel’s thought, it develops a much more expansive role; it is at the heart of his socio-historical project. Bildung is Hegel’s theory of culture, but for Hegel, is not just the way in which individuals are cultivated, the process by which individuals internalise the norms of their society, or develop their autonomy. This paper argues that Bildung is key to understanding normative change and has a critical and underappreciated role in the development of world history. It is also at the heart of Hegel’s challenge to the dualism of nature and culture.

This paper examines the theory of sustainable development presented by Jeffrey Sachs in The Age of Sustainable Development. While Sustainable Development ostensibly seeks to harmonise the conflict between ecological sustainability and human development, the paper argues this is impossible because of the conceptual frame it employs. Rather than allowing for a re-conceptualisation of the human–nature relation, Sustainable Development is simply the latest and possibly last attempt to advance the core idea of western modernity — the notion of self-determination. Drawing upon Hegel's account of historical development it is argued that Sustainable Development and the notion of planetary boundaries cannot break out of a dualism of nature and self-determining agents.

The notion of being-at-home-in-otherness is the distinctive way of thinking of freedom that Hegel develops in his social and political thought. When I am at one with myself in social and political structures they are not external powers to which I am subjected but are rather constitutive of my self-relation, that is my self-conception is mediated andexpandedthrough those objective structures. How successfully Hegel may achieve being-at-home-in-otherness with regard to these objective structures of right in thePhilosophy of Rightis arguable. What is at issue in this paper is however to argue that there is a blind spot in the text with regard to nature. In Ethical Life the rational subject's passions and inclinations are brought into the subject such that she is ‘with herself’ in them; with regard to external nature no such reconciliation is achieved or even attempted. In Abstract Right external nature is effectively dominated by and subsumed into the will and it is never something in which one is with oneself. It remains outside the model of freedom that Hegel develops in thePhilosophy of Right. There is something troubling about this formulation, since it excludes nature from freedom, but also something accurate, as it reflects the unresolved attitude of moderns to the natural world.

After briefly describing the history and significance of the nature–reason dualism for philosophy this article examines why much of the Kantian inspired examination of norms and ethics continues to appeal to this division. It is argued that much of what is claimed to be rationally legitimated norms can, at least in part, be understood as binding on actions and beliefs, not because they are rationally legitimated, but because they are habituated. Drawing on Hegel’s discussion of ethical life and habit it is argued that human subjects identify most practices and norms as their own through self-feeling, not reason. It is on this basis that norms are taken not just as the basis for action but are constitutive of human identity, an identity that is spiritual, embodied and affective. While habit is central to the way Hegel reconfigures ethics and norms, as well as the distinct model of freedom that he develops in his social and political thought, it will be argued that habit has its limits as a model for human freedom, limits of which Hegel is well aware.

This chapter presents the model of subjectivity that Hegel establishes in his _Phenomenology of Spirit_, which requires some examination of the key conceptual problems that he inherited from his predecessors. The development of Hegels subjectivity is set against the views expressed by Fichte and Kant. A particular concern for the Hegelian subjectivity established in the _Phenomenology_ is how Kant conceived the conditions for self-consciousness and his failure to resolve the concept/intuition distinction. In addition, the chapter examines how Hegel tries to reinvent the concept of apperception, and how he attempts to avoid the mind/world dualism involved in the concept/intuition relationship. The self-understanding of the _Phenomenology_ is expressed in and through Hegels development of the notions of reason, community, spirit, law, education, empirical science, and religion.

In thePhilosophy of RightHegel argues that modern life has produced an individualized freedom that conflicts with the communal forms of life constitutive of Greek ethical life. This individualized freedom is fundamentally unsatisfactory, but it is in modernity seemingly resolved into a more adequate form of social freedom in the family, aspects of civil society, and ultimately the state. This article examines whether Hegel’s state can function as a community and by so doing satisfy the need for a substantial ethical life that runs through Hegel’s social thought. The article also examines why Hegel does not provide a detailed analysis of community, as a distinct sphere between the private and the public political sphere in thePhilosophy of Right, and why it is not a key platform of his social freedom.

Robert R. Williams, in Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God, offers an important examination of the notion of absolute spirit, a central but under-examined notion in Hegel’s thought. Williams argues that absolute spirit, along with Hegel’s other core notions such as the concept and the absolute idea, is best conceived as an organic whole. This approach, he claims, best captures the self-determination and dynamism of the whole. What absolute spirit seeks to describe is how spirit can both produce itself and legitimate itself. I argue that the model of the organism, and any onto-theological claim for absolute spirit, misses the post-critical aspiration of this notion.

Abstract:The Anthropocene is distinguished by the knowledge that collective human action is damaging the earth's biophysical systems in a manner that has serious implications for human life and nature. In a recent work, Dale Jamieson has argued that despite this knowledge moral philosophy is limited in its capacity to provide the wholesale re-orientation of human practices that are required if humanity is to respond successfully to the array of ecological crises that have emerged in the Anthropocene. This paper will argue that the role second nature plays in ethical formation provides a better prospect for understanding normative change than moral philosophy, because it allows for an appreciation of the ways in which norms are embodied and for the objective conditions that make such change possible.

This paper draws on the account of second nature in Aristotle, Dewey and Hegel to examine the way in which norms become embodied. It discusses the implications of this for both the authority of norms and how they can be changed. Using the example of veganism it argues that changing norms requires more than just good reasons. The appreciation of the role of second nature in culture allows us to: firstly, better conceive the difficulty and resistance of individuals to changing norms because of the material resilience of norms, habits and customs in a culture. Secondly, it argues that the effective adoption of a new norm such as veganism or the behavioral change necessary to respond to climate change, requires not just more good reasons but the creation of material pathways in the culture in which those revised norms can be inhabited.

There is a simple story to be told about Derridarsquo;s relation to Hegel. He develops his core concepts such as diffeacute;rance and trace through an essentially negative relation to the central notions of the idealist tradition. Derrida has been particularly concerned to undermine what he takes to be the heart of the idealist projectmdash;the self-present subject. This paper examines the influence of Heidegger on the deconstructive critique of idealist subjectivity and presents Derridarsquo;s alternative to the metaphysical subject. It argues that his critique of idealist subjectivity does not accord with Hegelrsquo;s presentation of subjectivity when one conceives that project as a response to problems in the view of subjectivity developed by Fichte and Kant. br /

In Totality and Infinity Levinas presents the 'face to face' as an account of intersubjectivity, but one which maintains the absolute difference of the Other. This essay explores the genesis of the 'face to face' through a discussion of Levinas in relation to Buber. It is argued that Levinas' account of subjectivity shares much in common with Fichte's theory of subjectivity. It is further argued that while the 'face to face' clarifies and opposes traditional problems in social ontology, the 'face to face' is unable to avoid the traditional problems of social ontology that it seeks to avoid

The argument of the book develops through four chapters, all of which are heavily reliant on Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. There is little engagement with Hegel’s systematic works, the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. Instead, Hegel’s thought of god and religion is determined almost entirely by his lectures on religion, and the argument is largely constructed through a detailed use of quotations from these lectures. The first chapter is concerned to position Hegel in relation to the traditional defenses and critiques of the ontological proof of god’s existence. Calton argues that Hegel agrees with many of Kant’s criticisms of the ontological proof, though he transforms them to give his own critique of Anselm’s ontological proof, all of which is leading to his own formulation of the ontological proof, which is outlined in chapter 2. The form that this proof takes is the development of “a self-grounding concept of god”, which would demonstrate that being is necessarily entailed by the concept of god. What distinguishes Hegel’s ontological proof from earlier attempts is the development of an objective concept of god. The concept of an objective god entails being as our knowledge of the world is in fact knowledge of a “creative and self-communicating mind of which the world is an expression”. Being is a type of consciousness writ large of which we have experience and knowledge because we are participants in it. The next two chapters illustrate the nature of that participation. In the third chapter Calton argues that this ontology shows itself to have a Trinitarian structure, as only such a structure allows for knowledge of god, a knowledge which god’s self-expression requires. The fourth chapter discusses various forms of community required for such a knowledge and the developmental stages of human history required for this knowledge and ultimately for the reconciliation of humans with god.

At every point of transition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each shape of consciousness becomes a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction. It is just at these points, however, that the shape of consciousness in question shows itself as a 'higher' or more adequate shape of consciousness that is able to suspend or move beyond [aufheben] these seemingly irreconcilable differences. The transitions in Hegel's systematic works are complicated and often bewildering. One element is constant in all of them, however: a type of one-sided abstraction which Hegel calls Verstand. It expresses itself as the unyielding manner in which the shapes of consciousness or categories of thought adhere to the certainty of their truth claims. This certainty inevitably expresses itself in antinomies; antinomies that the logic of Verstand itself is unable to reconcile; only reason can achieve this. Verstand cannot be conflated with the dialectical movement as a whole; nevertheless, Verstand has a central and important role to play in the dialectical logic of both the PhG and the Science of Logic. It is a limited way of thinking which abstracts and isolates, but it is powerful, initiating and sustaining the dialectical mechanic of conceptual development in Hegel's systematic works.

Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.

Poststructuralists hold Hegel responsible for giving rise to many of modern philosophy's problematic concepts--the authority of reason, self-consciousness, the knowing subject. Yet, according to Simon Lumsden, this animosity is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel's thought, and resolving this tension can not only heal the rift between poststructuralism and German idealism but also point these traditions in exciting new directions. Revisiting the philosopher's key texts, Lumsden calls attention to Hegel's reformulation of liberal and Cartesian conceptions of subjectivity, identifying a critical though unrecognized continuity between poststructuralism and German idealism. Poststructuralism forged its identity in opposition to idealist subjectivity; however, Lumsden argues this model is not found in Hegel's texts but in an uncritical acceptance of Heidegger's characterization of Hegel and Fichte as "metaphysicians of subjectivity." Recasting Hegel as both post-Kantian and postmetaphysical, Lumsden sheds new light on this complex philosopher while revealing the surprising affinities between two supposedly antithetical modes of thought

Hegel’s examination of habit in his subjective spirit sits at a critical juncture between nature and spirit. This ‘second nature’ has often been interpreted as leaving nature behind. This paper argues that Hegel’s examination of habit should not be understood in this way. While habit bridges the gap between nature and spirit it cannot be understood as a mere transition point. Habit represents a distinct way of considering the spirit-nature relation that challenges the common Kantian inspired distinction between a space of reasons and a space of causes (terms by which the spirit-nature relation is often understood).