Simon Sihang Luo

In both political science and political theory, democratization has largely been considered a problem for non-liberal democratic countries. Drawing on Chinese political thinker Jiwei Ci’s writings on freedom, democracy, agency, plausibility, and legitimacy, I critically reconstruct Ci’s theory of democratization and his method of theorizing. I argue that a normative account of democratization is embedded in Ci’s political thought, which is based upon a philosophical anthropology of the modern man and focuses on broadening political possibilities in a given society. Ci’s theory allows us to think about democratization beyond the binary of democracy and authoritarianism, as his theory places democratization as an inherent and persistent challenge for all political communities.

Recent political theory has seen a revived interest in theorizing the political party, and, in particular, exploring what the political party can do to address its decline and revitalize itself. This renewed interest, however, draws largely on the political praxis of party politics of established liberal democracies in the United States and Europe. In this article, I bring Chinese thinker Wang Hui’s (Maoist) party theory into the conversation. By engaging Wang’s party theory, I demonstrate how we can understand party decline in nonliberal democratic countries with revolutionary legacies. I then analyze Wang’s solution to the decline of the revolutionary party, which focuses on the intricate relationship between individualistic charismatic politics and party politics. Finally, through reading Wang in and beyond the Chinese context, I show the problems with Wang’s theory and discuss how it can learn from the party-movement relationship in other contexts.

Contemporary political theorists have sought to invoke Judith N. Shklar's liberalism of fear in discussions about human rights across cultural and national boundaries. These discussions would benefit from thinking with Chinese liberal thinker and activist Hu Ping, who considered the liberalism of fear an accurate description of the rediscovery of liberalism in contemporary China after the post-Cultural Revolution. Hu's different uses of memories of the Cultural Revolution not only reflected Shklar's thesis in the liberalism of fear that liberals should speak to memories of cruelty to inspire a liberal politics of cruelty-prevention. They also demonstrated how social and political contexts shaped political needs, which, in turn, changed readings of the past and challenged important assumptions in Shklar's political theory. Hu's uses of memory and fear shed light on the limits of Shklar's approach, revealed the importance of confronting the question of courage in any applications of the liberalism of fear, and called for more nuanced discussions about the conditions upon which memories of cruelty could be considered a pro-liberal force.

Judith Shklar has been invoked by contemporary realists as an example of how history is a better source of political knowledge than abstract philosophy. This emphasis on history challenges the predominant understanding of her political theory that stresses the universality of fear of cruelty. This contrast between history and moral universalism invites a serious investigation of Shklar's historical method. This article takes up this task by reconstructing a Shklarian historical method based on a tripartite relation between historical memory, democratic citizenship, and historically minded political theory. This reconstructed historical method challenges the boundaries of Shklar's liberalism and broadens the possibilities that her political theory can offer.