Simona Vucu

In this paper, I focus on what a female theologian and mystic, Catherine of Siena (1347–1380), says about the role of sociality in ethics. I argue that for Catherine, sociality is understood in terms of dependence, vulnerability, and neediness, and it has a three-fold function in our moral and spiritual development: (1) it functions as a necessary aid to reaching our ultimate end, loving God; (2) it shapes our virtuous behaviour; (3) it allows us to possess the virtues communally, together with other people. In the end, Catherine offers a relational account of morality, which, in the context of medieval ethics, is surprisingly inclusive.

Medieval philosophers such as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus defended the possibility of what I call self-agency, the view that substances bring about in themselves their own necessary and inseparable features. In this paper, I propose that self-agency should be understood as an attempt to clarify the relationship between what is necessary but still accidental, and what is essential. I explore this view in the context of two objections against the possibility of self-agency: a general one, according to which the relationship between what is essential and what is necessary (but accidental) should not be envisaged in causal terms; and a more specific one, namely, that there is no need to consider this relationship to be a case of efficient causation. Against the first objection, I show that in the thirteenth century medieval philosophers envisaged this relationship in causal terms because of the way they conceived the ontological status of accidents. Against the second objection, I show that while Henry admits the possibility of self-agency as a consequence of his view of the nature of causal powers, Scotus thinks that without self-agency one cannot account for why proper and inseparable accidents are necessarily related to their subject of inherence.

In The Treasure of the City of Ladies, Christine de Pizan gives various categories of laywomen advice on how to love God (the teachings about loving God) and to lead their lives (the teachings of worldly prudence). This article explores the connection between the two kinds of teachings focusing on the relevance of manners for spirituality and morality. Worldly prudence is about manners, reputation, and self-discipline—that is, about how people should behave toward one another and present themselves to each other. I argue that for de Pizan, manners are spiritually and morally relevant in two ways. On the one hand, they convey how individuals should practice the teachings about loving God in a way that agrees with these individuals’ status in their communities. On the other hand, by practicing the virtues with good manners, people can make surprising moral and spiritual gains and so deepen the teachings about loving God.

I argue that Thomas Aquinas maintains the view that powers are accidental to their bearers not because powers pertain to bearers with limited essences, but because their bearers have limited actual being. Power tracks not only the essence of something but also its actual existence. Things have powers that are causally relevant when these things exist, that is, the nature of a power is determined by a thing’s essence, but the actual being of the thing of that essence accounts for the limitations of this power and for the extent to which a power can have causal effects.J’interroge dans ce travail le sens dans lequel Thomas d’Aquin estime que les choses dotées de pouvoirs possèdent ceux-ci de manière accidentelle. Cette prise de position s’explique parce que le pouvoir retrace l’existence réelle d’une chose en plus de son essence. Les choses ont des pouvoirs pertinents à l’ordre de la causalité lorsque ces choses-là existent : la nature d’un pouvoir est déterminée par l’essence d’une chose, tandis que l’existence même de la chose ayant cette essence explique les limites de ce pouvoir et la mesure dans laquelle une puissance peut être cause d’effets.