Simone Gasparoni

This paper investigates the relationship between immersion, emotion, and imagination in virtual reality (VR), focusing on two seemingly distant domains: Alejandro G. Iñárritu’s installation Carne y Arena (2017) and VR-based workplace safety training. Both cases demonstrate that simulated environments can elicit authentic emotional responses – such as fear, stress, or vulnerability – yet the implications of these experiences diverge sharply. Drawing on theories of presence and the “paradox of fiction”, we argue that VR should be understood not as a substitute for imagination but as a heightened form of fiction that depends on the user’s willingness to engage in make-believe. While Carne y Arena frames affect as an entry point for moral imagination within an explicit artistic and symbolic context, occupational safety training instrumentalizes emotion as a means of behavioral conditioning within a productivist framework. The danger in both domains lies not in immersive experience itself but in mistaking a single simulation for the fullness of lived reality.

This essay explores Bernard Williams’ notion of agent-regret, comparing it with guilt, remorse, and other forms of regret. I first highlight some features of the intentional structure of guilt (also in relation to shame) and remorse, and then proceed to the analysis of regret. I discuss several examples of regret, including Williams’ discussion of the truck driver who accidentally runs over a child. In agreement with Williams, I argue that agent-regret has a moral significance not captured by either guilt or remorse. If we generally feel guilty or remorseful for intentional actions or omissions, regret shows that we are emotionally attached even to the involuntary aspects of what we do. Agent-regret suggests that our concept of responsibility is broader than we think, and its phenomenology (as well as its potential action tendencies) may be indicative of an agent’s morality.