•  58
    In this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain that this property is individuated by its phenomenal roles, which can be internal – individuating the property per se – and external – determining further phenomenal or physical properties or states. I then argue that this individuation allows phenomenal roles to be organized in a necessarily asymmetrical net, thereby overcoming the circularity objec…Read more
  •  52
    The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties
    Topoi 39 (5): 1045-1055. 2018.
    According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties. Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly …Read more
  •  273
    Necessitarianism and Dispositions
    Metaphysica (1): 1-23. 2020.
    In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibi…Read more
  •  104
    Locating and Representing Pain
    Philosophical Investigations 42 (4): 313-332. 2019.
    Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show…Read more
  •  83
    The virtue of running a marathon
    Think 18 (52): 69-74. 2019.
    Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).
  •  328
    The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence
    In Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation, Routledge. pp. 296-312. 2017.
    In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion …Read more
  • Animali intenzionali
    Rivista di Estetica 40 (14): 16-34. 2000.
  •  23
    Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind (edited book)
    with Francesco Orilia
    Ontos Verlag. 2008.
    Table of Contents; Introduction by Francesco Orilia and Simone Gozzano; Modes and Mind by John Heil; Does Ontology Matter? by Anna-Sofia Maurin; Basic Ontology, Multiple Realizability and Mental Causation by Francesco Orilia; The “Supervenience Argument”:Kim’s Challenge to Nonreductive Physicalism by Ausonio Marras and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri; Tropes’ Simplicity and Mental Causation by Simone Gozzano; Zombies from Below by David Robb; Tropes and Perception by E. Jonathan Lowe; About the authors
  •  83
    Second order properties: Why Kim's reduction does not work
    Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1): 1-15. 2003.
    The paper sets forth an argument against Kim's distinction between levels and orders
  •  42
    Un uomo in cappa e cilindro di fronte a voi promette: “muoverò la materia con la sola forza del pensiero”. Scettici aspettate la prova. Ed ecco che, mirabilmente, egli alza un braccio. Un braccio, il suo braccio! Un pezzo di materia, dotato di massa, carica elettrica, proprietà magnetiche e quant’altro, si è mosso solo grazie alla sua volontà di alzarlo. Con la sola forza del pensiero il braccio si è sollevato! Per quanti sforzi retorici faccia, nessuno riterrà particolarmente sorprendente l’esp…Read more
  •  76
    Emergence: Laws and Properties: Comments on Noordhof
    In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 100. 2010.
    The paper discusses Noordhof' point on emergence, by arguing against an emergentist view of properties
  •  17
    Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 361-366. 2013.
  •  172
    The chinese room argument: Consciousness and understanding
    In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right?, Ios Press. pp. 43--231. 1997.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds…Read more
  •  378
    Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion
    Philosophia 41 (3): 787-794. 2013.
    It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitude. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when …Read more
  •  10
    Mente-corpo: identità e spiegazione
    Rivista di Filosofia 96 (3): 483-496. 2005.
  •  493
    In defence of non-conceptual content
    Axiomathes 18 (1): 117-126. 2008.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative con…Read more
  •  315
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds…Read more
  •  126
    Tropes and Mental Causation
    Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18 587-600. 2007.
    The paper argues that tropes cannot be used to solve the mind-body problem, as advocated by David Robb in some paper
  •  10
    Philosophy of Science in Italy
    Rue Descartes 87 (4): 27. 2015.
  •  413
    Levels, orders and the causal status of mental properties
    European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 347-362. 2009.
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the c…Read more
  •  367
    Functional role semantics and reflective equilibrium
    Acta Analytica 21 (38): 62-76. 2006.
    In this paper it is argued that functional role semantics can be saved from criticisms, such as those raised by Putnam and Fodor and Lepore, by indicating which beliefs and inferences are more constitutive in determining mental content. The Scylla is not to use vague expressions; the Charybdis is not to endorse the analytic/synthetic distinction. The core idea is to use reflective equilibrium as a strategy to pinpoint which are the beliefs and the inferences that constitute the content of a ment…Read more
  •  16
    Filosofia 85 411-37. 1994.
  •  187
    Theory of mind and the ontology of belief
    Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August): 145-156. 1997.
    In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose
  •  30
    Scientific Essentialism and the Mental
    Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2): 201-226. 2012.
    The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomologica…Read more
  •  685
    Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity
    In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science., Springer. pp. 119-127. 2010.
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
  •  102
    Kim on Events
    Metaphysica 16 (2). 2015.
    According to Kim, events are constituted by objects exemplifying property(ies) at a time. In this paper I wish to defend Kim's theory of events from one source of criticism, extending it by taking into account a number of ideas developed by Davidson. In particular, I shall try to avoid events proliferation – one of the most serious problems in Kim's theory – by using a suggestion Kim himself advances, that is, by taking adverbs and the like to be events' rather than properties' modifiers. Keywo…Read more
  •  117
    Conscious Primitives and Their Reality
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2): 247-255. 2016.
    : In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. Keywords : Consciousness; Intro…Read more
  •  388
    The Beliefs of Mute Animals
    In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2007.
    In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does allow for some minimal form of co-referential failure.
  •  11
    Rationality, Animals and Causality
    SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 6 (1). 2007.