-
130Dynamic all the way downRatio 37 (1): 14-25. 2023.In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathem…Read more
-
135Dispositions, Mereology and Panpsychism: The Case for Phenomenal PropertiesIn Christopher J. Austin, Anna Marmodoro & Andrea Roselli (eds.), Powers, Parts, and Wholes, Routledge. 2023.My interest in this chapter is to investigate this crossroad as applied to mental properties, considered powers. In particular, I scrutinize the possibility of taking the phenomenal property of feeling pain as a complex power or disposition. This possibility comes in handy in discussing panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, which would ground physical properties as well.
-
27Ethical Preferences in the Digital World: The EXOSOUL QuestionnaireIn Paul Lukowicz, Sven Mayer, Janin Koch, John Shawe-Taylor & Ilaria Tiddi (eds.), Ebook: HHAI 2023: Augmenting Human Intellect, Ios Press. pp. 290-99. 2023.
-
7The Eternal Quarrel on TimeIn Alessandra Campo & Simone Gozzano (eds.), Einstein Vs. Bergson: An Enduring Quarrel on Time, De Gruyter. pp. 55-64. 2021.
-
364Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of MindActa Analytica 38 (3): 371-391. 2023.In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in _Naming and Necessity_. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the po…Read more
-
909Einstein Vs. Bergson: An Enduring Quarrel on Time (edited book)De Gruyter. 2021.This book brings together papers from a conference that took place in the city of L'Aquila, 4–6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009. Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson: the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however, believes that scientific time is derived by …Read more
-
434Phenomenal roles: a dispositional account of bodily painSynthese 199 (3-4): 8091-8112. 2021.In this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain that this property is individuated by its phenomenal roles, which can be internal -individuating the property per se- and external -determining further phenomenal or physical properties or states. I then argue that this individuation allows phenomenal roles to be organized in a necessarily asymmetrical net, thereby overcoming the circularity objectio…Read more
-
82The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal PropertiesTopoi 39 (5): 1045-1055. 2018.According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties. Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly …Read more
-
702Necessitarianism and DispositionsMetaphysica (1): 1-23. 2020.In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibi…Read more
-
539Locating and Representing PainPhilosophical Investigations 42 (4): 313-332. 2019.Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show…Read more
-
291The virtue of running a marathonThink 18 (52): 69-74. 2019.Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).
-
626The Compatibility of Downward Causation and EmergenceIn Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation, Routledge. pp. 296-312. 2017.In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion …Read more
-
293Tropes and Mental CausationDocumenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18 587-600. 2007.The paper argues that tropes cannot be used to solve the mind-body problem, as advocated by David Robb in some paper
-
209Emergence: Laws and Properties: Comments on NoordhofIn Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 100. 2010.The paper discusses Noordhof' point on emergence, by arguing against an emergentist view of properties
-
318Theory of mind and the ontology of beliefIl Cannocchiale 2 (May-August): 145-156. 1997.In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose
-
42Scientific Essentialism and the MentalRivista di Filosofia 103 (2): 201-226. 2012.The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomologica…Read more
-
937Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body IdentityIn Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science., Springer. pp. 119-127. 2010.In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
-
787In defence of non-conceptual contentAxiomathes 18 (1): 117-126. 2008.In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative con…Read more
-
530Consciousness and understanding in the chinese roomInformatica 19 653-56. 1995.In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds…Read more
-
558The Beliefs of Mute AnimalsIn Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2007.In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does allow for some minimal form of co-referential failure.
-
738Levels, orders and the causal status of mental propertiesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 347-362. 2008.In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the c…Read more
-
714Functional role semantics and reflective equilibriumActa Analytica 21 (38): 62-76. 2006.In this paper it is argued that functional role semantics can be saved from criticisms, such as those raised by Putnam and Fodor and Lepore, by indicating which beliefs and inferences are more constitutive in determining mental content. The Scylla is not to use vague expressions; the Charybdis is not to endorse the analytic/synthetic distinction. The core idea is to use reflective equilibrium as a strategy to pinpoint which are the beliefs and the inferences that constitute the content of a ment…Read more
-
848Tropes' simplicity and mental causationIn Simone Gozzano & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind, Ontos Verlag. 2008.In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem of mental causation is evaluated. It is ar…Read more
-
24Linguaggio, pensiero, intenzionalità: la controversia sugli animaliRivista di Filosofia 85 (3): 411-37. 1994.Si sostiene che esiste una basa sufficiente per attribuire intenzionalità alle creature prive di linguaggio.
Università degli Studi di Genova
PhD, 1995
L'Aquila, Italy
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |
Philosophy of Language |