Simone Guidi

One of the hardest challenges in the study of indignation is chiefly terminological. If we take it in its contemporary meaning — “anger about a situation that you think is wrong or not fair”— the concept of ‘indignation’ does not seem to be entirely part of the ancient Greek conceptual arsenal. Rather, it results from the diachronic overlap of two similar but different Greek concepts. One, that of nemesis (‘indignation’), directly reprised from Greek philosophical culture. Another, that of thumos (‘fury’ or ‘anger’), which came to partially coincide with ‘indignation’ via Latin translations and adaptations of this notion. In the course of this paper, we will trace the history of the mutual overlap and dialogue between these different notions of indignation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, until the eventual establishment of its contemporary meaning in the mid-seventeenth century.

Intento di questo numero di «Rivista di storia della filosofia» è offrire un campionario e un network di casi di studio, volti a ricostruire i principali passaggi della storia dell'indignazione dall’antichità all’Ottocento, passando per le sue principali trasformazioni e rimodulazioni / The aim of this issue of "Rivista di storia della filosofia" is to provide a selection of case studies and a network of examples designed to trace the main developments in the history of indignation from antiquity to the nineteenth century, highlighting its key transformations and reinterpretations.

This article examines how Italian physicians between the 16th and 18th centuries developed a logic of ‘intermediate states’ between health and disease. Moving from late Scholastic Galenism to early mechanistic medicine and through a genealogical counter-history of the concept of health as developed by the World Health Organization, it shows how a dynamic view of the body allowed physicians to describe overlapping configurations of healthy and morbid states. Particular attention is given to the concept of neutrum, which helps to frame processes such as falling ill and convalescence. In both qualitative and mechanistic paradigms, medical art emerges as primarily concerned with processes and transitions rather than fixed conditions: health appears as a contingent, time-bound relation (ut nunc), modulated by age, constitution, environment, and the biographical history of alternating episodes of illness and recovery.

In this paper, the author analyzes Descartes’ treatment of indignation in Les passions de l’âme. He puts forth his analysis in light of the diachronic history of the notion of indignation, and in particular of the co-existence of two notions related to this feeling: Aristotle’s nemesis and the Latin indignatio. While Descartes subscribes to a view of indignation that is in continuity with indignatio, thus associating this passion to hatred and anger, he also retains some elements from nemesis, namely its proximity with pity and envy. Furthermore, he redefines envy – one of the passions which indignation is historically related to – based on the definition of nemesis. This article explores this tangled reconfiguration, seeking the gist of Descartes’ position on indignation. Section one provides some general introductory elements on the history of this passion before Descartes, particularly in the sixteenth century. Section two provides a few fundamental remarks about what the author calls “judgemental passions”, a category that includes indignation along with pity, envy, and other similar passions connected to it. In section three, the author analyzes Descartes’ twofold definition of indignation in art. 65 and 195 of Les passions de l’âme. Due to the structural kinship between indignation, anger, and envy, in sections four and five, he engages respectively with Descartes’ treatment of anger and envy. He focuses specifically on the aspects of these passions that help define Cartesian indignation, as well as on the emerging relationship between indignation and generosity. The sixth and final section proffers some conclusions and remarks about indignation in Descartes’ Passions.

By analysing his works from 1634 to 1666, I map out Cureau de La Chambre’s theory of universal extension. I focus in particular on what he borrowed from his contemporaries, especially his synthesis of Scaliger’s doctrine of the extension of spiritual substances and Suárez’s notion of extensio entitativa, a pre-categorial extension attributed to bodily parts prior to categorial continuous quantity. I reconstruct both his overall metaphysical account of extension and his specific positions on the extension of God, angels, and human souls, before outlining the main implications of this theory for his natural philosophy. I conclude with brief remarks on the possible relationship between La Chambre’s view and Henry More’s similar theory, set against Cureau’s anti-Cartesian polemic following the publication of Descartes’s letters in 1657.

In the development of early modern science, Aristotelian-scholastic natural philosophy provided crucial tools for understanding epistemology, logic, and cosmology, including key insights on quantification and mathematics, qualities, force, matter, atomism and corpuscularianism, the material continuum, and infinity. The new natural philosophy drew on philosophical instruments developed by medieval and postmedieval thinkers, often used to conceive of novelties. The technical and scientific vocabulary that condensed around Aristotelianism and its hybridizations with other traditions served as a fundamental vehicle for science in the transition from the late Middle Ages to the early phase of the Scientific Revolution. This special issue of Aristotelica integrates these two aspects by investigating the development and reconceptualization of Aristotelian notions in early modern natural philosophy and emphasizing the role of terminology and its historical shifts. Without claiming to be exhaustive, and by spotlighting a number of relevant case studies from various periods of the Renaissance and early modern natural thought, we attempt to chart some of these overlaps in concepts and vocabulary, focusing particularly on the significant time period from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century.

This special issue of Aristotelica simultaneously integrates two aspects and historiographical perspectives. While investigating the development and reconceptualization of Aristotelian notions in early modern natural philosophy, this collection of papers emphasizes, in particular, the role of terminology and its historical shifts. Without claiming completeness – but in the hope of fostering new research in this combined field of studies – we examined a number of relevant case studies from different moments of the Renaissance and early modern natural thought. Through these studies, we attempted to tentatively chart some of these overlaps in concepts and vocabulary, focusing particularly on the significant time period from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century.

In this paper I grapple with part 2, question 4 of Aquinas’s commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, in order to shed light on understudied textual passages, and to offer an original account of Aquinas’s view of individuation and its relationship to Boethius’s. I focus in particular on his account of Boethius’s claim that otherness is the cause of plurality. I argue that Aquinas definitively overcomes some Neoplatonic elements of Porphyry’s view, which Boethius’s understanding of alteritas still retained. In section one, I provide some introductory elements on the theological, metaphysical and logical issue at stake in Boethius’s De Trinitate, as well as in Aquinas’s commentary. In section two, I introduce what I call the ‘individual form problem’ and endeavour to show how it relates to the remote dialogue between Boethius and Aquinas and, via Boethius, between Porphyry and Aquinas. In section three, I deal more specifically with Porphyry’s model, and with the twofold metaphysical tenet I call the ‘D-E principle’. In section four, I briefly discuss Boethius’s account of otherness, plurality, and individuality, with a special focus on his relationship to Porphyry. In section five, I discuss Aquinas’s own solution by stressing the philosophical significance of his account, and considering the ways in which he departs from Boethius and Porphyry on these points. I also delve into the connections between his account of essential otherness and its involvement in the composition of individual substances, by comparing the opposite cases of angelic and hylomorphic individuations. In section six, I offer some brief concluding remarks.

This article addresses the Aristotelian debate in the 17th century on the incorporeality of light and its extension, focusing especially on the Iberian and Italian contexts. The aim of the essay is to show that, while late Aristotelianism unitedly rejected light’s corporeity, many differences arose regarding the way in which this incorporeality should be understood. Relevant perspectives in all of their discussions were Scotus’ teaching of the intentional nature of light, and the Neoplatonics’ claim of its metaphysical provenance. In the Iberian environment, Jesuit scholars/theologians (the school of Toledo, the Conimbricenses, Francisco Suárez, and Antonio Rubio) were especially characterized by their attempt to save Aristotle’s original explanation in De Anima, although theoretical discrepancies on many significant points divide them. Italian intellectuals such as Zabarella, Dandini, Lagalla and Liceti were instead more willing to seek a reconciliation between Aristotle’s statement and the explanation of light posited by Scotus and the Neoplatonists, and more receptive to the need for a new theory of matter.

In this article, I deal with the role of hypothesis in the scientific methodology of Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon and René Descartes. The first paragraph is about hypothesis in Newton's lexicon, especially trying to understand the meaning of his famous hypotheses non fingo. The second paragraph deals with Bacon's methodology, arguing especially that his epis-temology was the first to propose an artificial way for inductive inferences, also giving up all hypothesis in science. The third paragraph shows how Descartes, following Bacon's traces and reading his methodology in the light of the idea of a Mathesis Universalis based on mental evidence, structures a full hypothetical-deductive methodology, charging metaphysics with the analytical phase and depriving experiments of any role in it. The fourth paragraph, on Newton again, tries to understand Newton's specific account of hypothesis as an auxiliary phase in the scientific discovery, and what really differentiates Newton from his contemporaries, Boyle and Hooke.

This paper delves into a pivotal issue of scholastic angelology, the problem of angelic self-knowledge. It compares positions ranging from Thomas Aquinas’s to João Poinsot’s. I stress in particular what I dub ‘the problem of immanent knowledge in presence’, i.e. the problem of the actual, immanent and presential interplay between the angelic intellect and the angelic substance, which Aquinas sees as the rationale for angelic self-knowledge. I then discuss the perspectives of Cajetan and Vázquez, which revolve around the identity between the angelic intellect and the angelic substance, and how they should interact so to enable self-knowledge in the angelic intellect. I finally deal with Poinsot’s account of the problem and its strong rebuttal to Vázquez. Poinsot’s view champions Aquinas’s original doctrine and is grounded upon the notions of “radical intellect” and “intelligible identity”.

In this paper, I aim to address a specific issue underpinning Cartesian metaphysics since its first public appearance in the Discourse right up until the Meditations, but which definitely came to the surface in the Second and Fifth Replies. It involves the possibility that to be thinking and to be extended do not actually contrast as two entirely different properties; hence, these two essences cannot serve as the basis for a disjunctive, real distinction between two corresponding substances, the mind and the body. I dub this problem the ‘thinking matter issue.’ I suggest that Descartes’s concerns about the ‘thinking matter issue’ characterizes and structures the entirety of Meditation Two and its connection with Meditation Six, especially in the attempt to covertly implement what I refer to as Descartes’s ‘prejudice strategy.’ The core of the ‘prejudice strategy’ lies in the idea that the ‘thinking matter issue’ is just a false problem, one raised by the inadequate notions of the mind and the body that we apply to this problem. In section 1, I set out the way in which the ‘thinking matter issue’ emerged in Descartes’s philosophy after the first exposition of his metaphysics in the Discourse. Section 2 deals with the new argumentative path Descartes draws for the Meditations and with the new role that he assigns to the inference about the mind’s non-physical nature after the cogito. In section 3, I contend that the ‘prejudice strategy’ structures Meditation Two and, partially, Six. Section 4 shows that Descartes himself reveals this in his Replies to the Second and the Fifth Set of Objections. In section 5, I delve into Descartes’s foundational theory of the ‘prejudice strategy,’ i.e. his theory of infancy as set out especially in the Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections.

In this chapter I argue that the general category of 'iatromechanics' conceals different views about how mathematics and mathematical physics should be applied in medicine, and thereby about how physiology should be quantified and mathematized. Mechanism, quantification and mathematization are indeed different, albeit interrelated, notions, which overlap without ever coming to be identical, and all of which depend upon the overall epistemological debate over the method for finding truth in science. This chapter compares the epistemological thought of the Newtonians Archibald Pitcairne (1652-1713), James Keill (1673-1719) and the rationalists Yvo Gaukes (ca. 1660-1738) and Friedrich Hoffman (1660-1742). It contends that, still in the early eighteenth-century, contrasting understandings and uses of quantification in medicine related to different conceptions of the epistemological status of mathematics and its connection with experience especially. The chapter then focuses on how the experimental quantitative approach introduced in physiology by Santorio Santorio (1561-1636) is understood in these different scenarios. I argue that contrasting understandings and uses of quantification in medicine correspond not only to different conceptions about the epistemological status of mathematics, but also of its conjunction with experience.

This volume sets out to chart a path at the intersection between the histories of medicine and philosophy concerning a topic that is prominent in contemporary debates, i.e. the translation of physiology, and accordingly pathology, into numerical terms. In particular, the book discusses and contextualizes issues that are simultaneous of medical and philosophical import, such as the quantification of temperaments and complexions, the quantification of life processes and physiology, the quantification of embryology, the impact of quantified reasoning on the notions of virtue, vice, health, illness, personhood, certainty, as well as the various ways in which philosophers have rejected the reduction of life to a quantitative and numerical approach. This introduction offers an overview on the epistemological challenge of quantification in classical philosophy. It also provides a historical account of the practices and conceptualizations of quantification as applied to the domains of biology, physiology, and pathology.

This edited volume explores the intersection of medicine and philosophy throughout history, calling attention to the role of quantification in understanding the medical body. Retracing current trends and debates to examine the quantification of the body throughout the early modern, modern and early contemporary age, the authors contextualise important issues of both medical and philosophical significance, with chapters focusing on the quantification of temperaments and fluids, complexions, functions of the living body, embryology, and the impact of quantified reasoning on the concepts of health and illness. With insights spanning from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century, this book provides a wide-ranging overview of attempts to ‘quantify’ the human body at various points. Arguing that medicine and philosophy have been constantly in dialogue with each other, the authors discuss how this provided a strategic opportunity both for medical thought and philosophy to refine and further develop. Given today’s fascination with the quantification of the body, represented by the growing profusion of self-tracking devices logging one’s sleep, diet or mood, this collection offers an important and timely contribution to an emerging and interdisciplinary field of study.

This article aims at reassessing a widespread view, according to which Francisco Suárez left behind the scholastic model of truth as adaequatio, founding a new concept of truth based on his metaphysics of objective being. In the first part, I reconstruct the debate on the complex and incomplex truth, focusing especially on the sources of Suárez’s Disputation 8, and presenting the views of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus, Durandus, Capreolus and Fonseca. Especially the latter proposes an eclectic synthesis, blending elements from the Dominican tradition and Henry of Ghent. In the second part, I analyze Suárez’s Disputation 8, showing that his doctrine of truth reprises and mitigates Fonseca’s, thus following most of the Dominican commentators of Aquinas. Here I explain especially the role played by objective being in the constitution of the truth in cognoscendo, also showing that the latter cannot be given without a previous adequation on the level of the truth in significando (the species). In the third part, I discuss three textual passages used by contemporary historiography to legitimate Suárez’s alleged abandonment of adaequatio, pointing out, in the light of the previous reconstruction, some misreadings in these interpretations

What does Descartes's embryology look, if related to the Scholastic theories of his time? In order to reply to this question, the present chapter aims at sketching a portrait of the embryological epigenetics Descartes could find in his recognized Scholastic sources (the Commentaries on Aristotle by Toledo, the Coimbra Jesuits, Suárez, and Rubio, as well as the Summae by Eustachius a Sancto Paulo and Abra de Raçonis), a tradition that received and incorporated in the Aristotelian-Galenic body many novelties from Renaissance medicine, especially Fernel, Paré, and Vallès. It being impossible to deal extensively with the whole of the contents of these works, I picked up three issues in particular, corresponding to the first three paragraphs of this paper: 1) the nature of the semen, and the action of the vis formativa, as well as its relationship with vital heat and temperaments; 2) the problem of the real and/or rational distinction(s) between the generative, the nutritive, and the augmentative powers; 3) the epigenetic order of generation of vital organs, i.e. the right sequence over which the fundamental organs of a living body are generated and then ensouled. In the last paragraph I integrate these reconstructions with some conclusions about Descartes' own theory.

In this paper, I address Francisco Suárez's solution to the problem of the angelic assumption of artificial bodies, dealing in particular with the discussion in his De Angelis (book 4, chapters 33-39). The peculiarity of Suárez's approach lies, in particular, in the fact that it is one of the last major attempts to reformulate scholastic angelology from the ground up, taking into account the new spirit of the Counter-Reformation. Despite this goal, Suárez consistently discusses these issues taking into account Aquinas' earlier discussions, to which I refer presenting the Uncommon Doctor's ideas. I also provide some final remarks on the notion of the body that Suárez's angelology leaves to 17th-century philosophy.

In this paper I focus on the historiographical fate of Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599) in two Iberian journals ran by Jesuits and founded in 1945: the Spanish Pensamiento, and the Portuguese Revista portuguesa de filosofia. I endeavor to show that the discussions of Suárez’s and Fonseca’s ideas on these journal is a two-sided case of constructing the legacies of major figures in late scholasticism, and I emphasize how the demand to identify cultural national heroes intertwines with theoretical and ideological elements, especially the peculiar history of the Iberian Peninsula, and to the historical relationships between Spain and Portugal. With regard to Suárez, the Pensamiento group strives to carve out a specific place for Neo-Suarezianism within Neo-Thomism, also via a substantive reassessment of Suárez’s importance in the history of scholasticism and of philosophy in general. Hence, Suárez’s thought undergoes triumphant reevaluation, which even aims at ousting Aquinas as the ultimate reference of scholasticism, to make Suárez’s Thomism the principal authority of contemporary schools. By contrast, Fonseca remains a rather obscure and neglected figure, dug up by his fellow compatriots on the Revista portuguesa de filosofia, also against this attempt at establishing a Suarezian, Spanish hegemony.

Twenty years before Suárez’s Metaphysicae disputationes, Pedro da Fonseca offered one of the most impressive modern attempts to reorder Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the present chapter, I will endeavour to show how insightful Fonseca’s effort truly was, by dealing with his ousiology. I will focus especially on the Jesuit’s account of three pivotal concepts in the scholastic theory of substance, i.e. Divine Substance, created substance and prime substance, or supposit. These notions are primarily metaphysical, but — according to a long-standing scholastic framework — are also deeply indebted to Patristic Trinitarianism. As I shall argue, this is especially true for Fonseca, who welcomes and defends the idea of a conceptual unity between ontology, ousiology and Trinitarism he received from a centuries-long tradition

This volume is the first collection of essays in English devoted to Pedro da Fonseca SJ (1527-1599), his intellectual endeavour, and thought. The book brings together some of today's leading specialists in early modern scholasticism, Portuguese Aristotelianism, and the history of the Society of Jesus, in order to present a reliable portrait of Fonseca's institutional role, to reconstruct his thought on many important aspects of scholastic metaphysics, and to discuss the reception of his work in the early modern age.

Second Scholasticism greatly developed the medieval theory of continuous quantity as the Aristotelian notion for thematizing spatial extension, paving the way for the idea of space as extension in early modern natural philosophy. The article analyzes the section related to the category of continuous quantity in the Coimbra commentary on the Dialectics (1606), showing that it is indebted to the novel theory of Francisco Suárez on quantity as bestowing extension to a body in a particular sense, something which had been overlooked by previous research. The scholarly debate on quantity was brought to China, and here the Chinese translation is examined of the section on quantity in the fourth volume of the Mingli Tan, published in China in 1636-­1639.

In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness.

Themed Section of Bruniana & Campanelliana 2022/1, pp. 85-198 - Simone Guidi, Introduction; - Andrew W. Arlig, Part-Whole Interdependence and the Presence of Form in Matter According to Some Fifteenth-Century Platonists; - Jean-Pascal Anfray, Aux limites de la métaphysique: parties, indivisibles et contact chez Suárez; - Simone Guidi, Indivisibles, Parts, and Wholes in Rubio’s Treatise on the Composition of Continuum (1605); - Dana Jalobeanu, Dissecting Nature ad vivum: Parts and Wholes in Francis Bacon’s Natural Philosophy; - Carla Rita Palmerino, From Active Matter to Inertia, from Celerity to Slowness: the Motion of Atoms and of Compound Bodies in Gassendi’s Physics.

In this paper I reconstruct and discuss Antonio Rubio (1546-1615)’s theory of the composition of the continuum, as set out in his Tractatus de compositione continui, a part of his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, published in 1605 but rewritten in 1606. Here I attempt especially to show that Rubio’s is a significant case of Scholastic overlapping between Aristotle’s theory of infinitely divisible parts and indivisibilism or ‘Zenonism’, i.e. the theory that allows for indivisibles, extensionless points, lines, and surfaces, which are supposed to take part in the composition of the continuum. Even if such a syncretic tendency was, in many different ways, already developing in the medieval period and then at the end of the sixteenth century, Rubio’s position is indeed peculiar. He maintains that indivisibles are real and actual, infinite in act, really distinct from each other, and that, although they indwell in substance, indivisibles do not contribute directly to the constitution of the continuum. In this reconstruction, I emphasize notably Rubio’s usage of mereological notions like those of part, whole, completeness and incompleteness.