Simone Luigi Migliaro

This essay aims to deepen the semantic doctrine of John Buridan, in the light of the first three conclusions that he formulates in the first chapter of his 'Sophismata'. In particular, it shows how in the thought of the Parisian master the notion of signification is conceived as a transitive attitude, which spreads between the different levels of language and determines their relations of subordination. Particular attention is paid to the 'evidentiae' proposed by the author in support of his theses. These arguments, in fact, turn out to be relevant not only for their theoretical pertinence, but also for their feature of fixing unequivocally the characteristics, as well as the speculative scope of some fundamental notions of scholastic logical doctrine. Eventually, the article tries to show how at the basis of Buridan's theories lies the attention he devotes to the cognitive function performed by language, which justifies the passage from signifying ('significare') to conceiving ('concipere'), as soon as the discursive dynamic reaches the mental level.

In the 1980s, S. Ebbesen proposed, under the name of OXYNAT, a set of postulates that could explain the peculiar history of logica modernorum in the University of Paris in the period between the 13th and 14th centuries. According to that scholar, the generalized disappearance of terminist doctrine in continental context be tween 1270-1310 is directly related to the dominance achieved by Modist theories. Conversely, the revival of logic in Paris itself from 1310-20 onwards stems from an importation of content from Oxford, where the “summulistic” tradition never knew a moment of stagnation. The present contribution seeks to supplement OXYNAT with some additional working hypotheses. The contents of Oxonian logic do not seem to have been passively received in Paris, but rather reworked in such a way as to adapt to what had long been dominant in the European context. This may have generated two new avenues: on the one hand, a realist terminism ready to draw from the doctrine of modi significandi an additional basis for giving legitimacy to the theories of logica modernorum; on the other hand, the attitude of those who, in order to defend them selves against the exaggerations of the grammarians, tended to give new form to the nominalist-inspired approach. From this point of view, the interesting similarities between the logical-semantic theories of Buridan and Aurifaber suggest the existence of a common background, still largely to be explored.

The manuscript Tortosa, Archivo de la Catedral, 108 preserves, together with other texts, two commentaries on the Ars vetus: the first structured per modum quaestionis, the second written in the form of an expositio. The attribution of both works has been debated in secondary literature. Building on Harald Berger's reflections, this contribution provides new evidence supporting John Buridan's authorship. In this perspective, the article first seeks to clarify the nature of the two commentaries, hypothesising an origin ex reportatione. Then it examines the quaestio secunda of the Commentary on Peri hermeneias, which offers doctrinal and terminological solutions similar to those of Buridan and divergent, on relevant points, from those of Albert of Saxony, the alternative author proposed in the literature. The article concludes with two appendices: the first provides an edition of the quaestio examined, while the second presents comparative tables between this text and Buridan's writings.

This paper explores some of Albert of Saxony’s original reflections on the internal status of mental language and on imposition, which have so far received little scholarly attention. Departing from more rigid lines of interpretation, the author maintains that concepts can ad placitum acquire additional semantic functions beyond their natural signification. At the same time, he sets clear limits to the act of impositio, which apply across all levels of language: transcendental terms can never be re-instituted to signify something different. For all their novelty, Albert’s insights display significant ambiguities and risk internal contradictions when compared with other aspects of his logical doctrine. This study seeks to overcome these challenges by uncovering the foundational assumptions of his approach and proposing conjectural refinements to achieve a more coherent and comprehensive semantic theory.

ENG: The question of the relationship between the semantic doctrines of William of Ockham and John Buridan remains a subject of debate in the secondary literature. According to a traditional interpretation, the Parisian master is seen as a staunch defender of Ockhamist orthodoxy. An alternative interpretation, however, identifies a difference in the primacy that Ockham attributes to mental language, whereas Buridan attributes it to conventional language. This study challenges both interpretations. It shows how the differences between the two authors are profound and affect the very meaning of their nominalisms. However, the trajectory of this divergence suggests that Ockham is close to a form of conventionalism, while Buridan emerges as an uncompromising mentalist. ITA: La questione dei rapporti tra le dottrine semantiche di Guglielmo d’Ockham e Giovanni Buridano è tutt’ora oggetto di dibattito nella letteratura secondaria. Secondo una lettura tradizionale, il maestro parigino sarebbe un convinto difensore del “credo” ockhamista. Un’interpretazione alternativa individua invece una differenza nella primarietà che Ockham attribuisce al linguaggio mentale, mentre Buridano a quello convenzionale. Questo studio contesta entrambe le letture, mostrando come le differenze tra i due autori siano profonde e investano il senso stesso dei loro nominalismi. Tuttavia, seguendo la traiettoria di questo divario, Ockham appare vicino a una forma di convenzionalismo, mentre Buridano si configura come un mentalista intransigente.

This essay intends to provide an in-depth introduction to some fundamental premises of John Buridan’s semantics, the famous master who taught at the University of Paris in the 14th century. At first, attention is paid to the doctrine of the “three levels of language” and to the semantical (and not syntactical) parallelisms among them. Following this path, the difference between terms signifying ad placitum and naturaliter is dealt with, and one reflects on the various impositional mechanisms described by the Parisian master. Subsequently, the focus is set on the original redefinition – proposed in the first paragraphs of the De suppositionibus – of the notion of significatio, which not only assumes cognitive-intensional features, but is conceived as a process that can be considered fulfilled exclusively when there is a real understanding among the parties involved. In the final pages, one tries to show the deep coherence of much of the Buridanian semantics contents with this basic framework.

This paper aims to reconstruct the earliest origins of the debate on the signification of spoken words, which arose in the second half of the 13th century. this topic is approached with a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy, through which I try to show that the problem of signification is intertwined with issues from other philosophical fields. the birth of the celebrated magna altercatio can be fully understood in the light of the discussions on the function performed by the species in the cognitive processes. At the same time, in the background of epistemological and psychological issues concerning the species, metaphysical considerations also play a decisive role in guiding the semantic choices of medieval authors. this paper consists of two parts. Part I opens with an overview of Aristotle’s semantics, or more specifically, the psychologizing reading that Boethius gives of Peri hermeneias. then, I discuss the arrival of the De anima in the Latin West and focus on how the notion of species is introduced into Aristotelian logic. Subsequently, I take Albert the Great as an emblematic example and attempt to show the connections between his semantics and his psychological doctrine. At the end of Part I, my attention focuses on Thomas Aquinas and his innovations. In part II, I consider some of the very first examples of an ‘extensional notion’ of signification, that is Roger Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Peter of Auvergne, Peter of Cornwall, and Richard Clive.

This article aims to elucidate the distinct roles that mental language occupies in the theories of William of Ockham and John Buridan, focusing on their differing approaches to the problem of truth. The Venerabilis Inceptor believes that both mental propositions and spoken or written propositions can be properly true or false. Conversely, Buridan contends that only concepts can be true, whereas spoken and written languages possess truth merely in a metaphorical sense. This divergence underscores a fundamental difference in their nominalist frameworks. Ockham views semantic functions as sufficient to bridge language and reality. For this reason, he sees no need for a strict separation between concepts and other linguistic signs. Buridan, however, argues that semantics must be grounded in something intrinsic to the mind. Concepts, indeed, denote things only insofar as they enable us to know them in a specific way. In this epistemological-semantic duality, mental language assumes functions that spoken and written language cannot replicate.

Scholarly literature has identified two 14th-century masters of the arts named ‘John Aurifaber’: the earlier one was active around 1330 in the city of Erfurt; the later one was a pupil of Lawrence of Lindores and graduated from the University of Paris around 1397. The homonymy between these two Aurifaber has complicated the attribution of a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, preserved in the manuscript Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1423. This paper reassesses the issue in light of L. Tomanek’s recent identification of the Quaestio de eventu necessario rerum quarumlibet, an Averroist-inspired text by the earlier Aurifaber, which defends a deterministic view of future contingents. Notably, similar themes appear in the Leipzig commentary, particularly in Book II, questions 8 (Utrum propositio de futuro contingenti sit determinate vera vel falsa) and 9 (Utrum omnia quae eveniunt eveniunt ex necessitate). Through a philosophical and textual analysis of these questions, this paper aims to: (1) demonstrate that the solutions in the Quaestio de eventu necessario differ from those in the Questions on the Physics, suggesting distinct authorship; and (2) highlight how the Questions on the Physics present innovative philosophical approaches to the issues of future contingents and divine foreknowledge, proposing a compatibilist solution in a form potentially uncommon in the late medieval period. The article concludes with a critical edition of these two questions.