•  20
    The Value of False Theories in Science Education
    Science & Education 28 (1-2): 5-23. 2019.
    Teaching false theories goes against the general pedagogical and philosophical belief that we must only teach and learn what is true. In general, the goal of pedagogy is taken to be epistemic: to gain knowledge and avoid ignorance. In this article, I argue that for realists and antirealists alike, epistemological and pedagogical goals have to come apart. I argue that the falsity of a theory does not automatically make it unfit for being taught. There are several good reasons for teaching false t…Read more
  •  32
    Duhemian good sense and agent reliabilism
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64 22-29. 2017.
    Stump argued for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’…Read more
  •  29
    The rationale behind Pierre Duhem's natural classification
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51 11-21. 2015.
  •  68
    What’s so special about empirical adequacy?
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3): 445-465. 2017.
    Empirical adequacy matters directly - as it does for antirealists - if we aim to get all or most of the observable facts right, or indirectly - as it does for realists - as a symptom that the claims we make about the theoretical facts are right. But why should getting the facts - either theoretical or empirical - right be required of an acceptable theory? Here we endorse two other jobs that good theories are expected to do: helping us with a) understanding and b) managing the world. Both are of …Read more