Sirui Fan

Whether moral knowledge is necessary for moral worth is a matter of current debate. Neil Sinhababu (2024) argues that the two prominent knowledge accounts of moral worth are false because Gettier cases show that the kind of non-accidental condition for moral worth is different from those required by knowledge. That is, in Gettier cases where one is equipped with justified true belief rather than the relative moral knowledge required for moral worth, it appears that the agent’s action is morally worthy. Huang (2025) argues that the Gettier case given by Sinhababu cannot support the claim that moral knowledge is unnecessary for moral worth. This paper aims to defend Sinhababu’s Gettier objection to the knowledge account of moral worth from Huang.

We are used to forming beliefs through adopting others’ testimonies, but why does deferring to others on moral issues seem intuitively worrying? In moral epistemology, a central question concerns whether moral testimonial beliefs are problematic. Some theorists are pessimistic and claim that moral deference is intuitively problematic. Later, optimists put forward counterexamples to the pessimistic view, arguing that not all kinds of moral deference are problematic. Lewis (2020) recently offered a pessimistic account in response, clarifying that the so-called “moral advice argument” offered by optimists should be understood as moral deference to two distinct aspects: the practical issue and the weighing of moral reasons. He believes that after proper clarification, pessimists can account for the wrongness of full moral deference in different aspects. This paper challenges his pessimistic defenses against the optimistic argument.