In this dissertation, I address the epistemology and metaphysics of self-knowledge in Classical Sanskrit philosophy. On the epistemology of self-knowledge, I address a debate between the 6th century philosophers Dharmakīrti and Kumārila on the epistemic sources (pramāṇas) of self-knowledge. On the metaphysics of self-knowledge, I address a debate between the 4th century philosopher Vasubandhu and his Buddhist and Brahmanical interlocutors on the possibility of self-knowledge within the framework…
Read moreIn this dissertation, I address the epistemology and metaphysics of self-knowledge in Classical Sanskrit philosophy. On the epistemology of self-knowledge, I address a debate between the 6th century philosophers Dharmakīrti and Kumārila on the epistemic sources (pramāṇas) of self-knowledge. On the metaphysics of self-knowledge, I address a debate between the 4th century philosopher Vasubandhu and his Buddhist and Brahmanical interlocutors on the possibility of self-knowledge within the framework of Buddhist “no-self” metaphysics. The dissertation shows that these two seemingly distinct debates can be united under the same interpretive lens because they converge on one key idea: that any adequate account of self-knowledge must not entail that (i) subjects can self-ascribe as many experiences as there are objects and (ii) self-ascribe experiences that are not in fact their own.
