Sofia Lombardi

We present the first translation into Spanish of the text De tempore, by Alexander of Aphrodisias. We emphasise two aspects of its interpretation. On the one hand, how Alexander understands time as one and multiple through the introduction of the notions of potentiality and actuality. On the other hand, the status he gives to the ‘instant’ qua something that, by occurring in the mind, makes time. We argue that the combination of both arguments allows Alexander to deal with the paradoxes related to the status of time and its parts and the question of how soul and time are related.

Stoic negation is external, since the negative particle is placed before the statement as a whole. This contrasts with Aristotelian internal negation, which affects only a part of the statement, such as the predicate. Moreover, Stoic external negation also has an existential value. The paper argues that these features of Stoic negation were introduced to expand the possibilities of Peripatetic negation, which the Stoics regarded as lacking universality. These features outline a new conception of logic that allows no exceptions to either the principle of non-contradiction or the principle of bivalence. On this view, propositions and their existential import are understood as inseparably connected to a world causally determined by the λόγος.

Ancient sources present mainly two Stoic definitions of passion: as an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, and as an excessive impulse. These definitions hold for the Stoics in general, and undoubtedly for Zeno. However, in other sources, passion is seen as a judgment or as what supervenes on judgment. In this case, some sources refer to Zeno, others to Chrysippus, and still others do not refer to any particular Stoic philosopher, so it is unclear whether the idea of judgment was already present in Zeno or is an innovation of his successor. Starting from this problem, I attempt to reconstruct the meaning of Stoic passion, with a particular interest in the definition of passion as judgment. In this way I will try to show that the apparently different positions of Zeno and Chrysippus are in fact the same when viewed within the framework of the Stoic theory of action.