Sofia Lombardi

We present the first translation into Spanish of the text De tempore, by Alexander of Aphrodisias. We emphasise two aspects of its interpretation. On the one hand, how Alexander understands time as one and multiple through the introduction of the notions of potentiality and actuality. On the other hand, the status he gives to the ‘instant’ qua something that, by occurring in the mind, makes time. We argue that the combination of both arguments allows Alexander to deal with the paradoxes related to the status of time and its parts and the question of how soul and time are related.

La negación estoica es externa porque la partícula negativa se antepone al enunciado en su conjunto. Esto contrasta con la negación interna aristotélica, que afecta solo a una parte del enunciado, como el predicado. Además, la negación externa estoica posee también un valor existencial. El artículo propone que estas características de la negación estoica, orientadas a ampliar las posibilidades de la negación peripatética –considerada por los estoicos carente de universalidad–, reflejan una nueva perspectiva de lógica que no admite excepciones ni al principio de no contradicción ni al de bivalencia, y que concibe los enunciados como estrechamente vinculados a su importe existencial en un mundo determinado causalmente por el λόγος.

Ancient sources present mainly two Stoic definitions of passion: as an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, and as an excessive impulse. These definitions hold for the Stoics in general, and undoubtedly for Zeno. However, in other sources, passion is seen as a judgment or as what supervenes on judgment. In this case, some sources refer to Zeno, others to Chrysippus, and still others do not refer to any particular Stoic philosopher, so it is unclear whether the idea of judgment was already present in Zeno or is an innovation of his successor. Starting from this problem, I attempt to reconstruct the meaning of Stoic passion, with a particular interest in the definition of passion as judgment. In this way I will try to show that the apparently different positions of Zeno and Chrysippus are in fact the same when viewed within the framework of the Stoic theory of action.