Two entities are weakly discernible when they share every single one of their intrinsic and relational properties, but a symmetric and irreflexive relation holds between them. The theory of arbitrary reference, first proposed by Breckenridge and Magidor in 2012, states that some semantic facts are brute. And, in this paper, I argue that this theory is inconsistent with the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. For the advocates of arbitrary reference, this result i…
Read moreTwo entities are weakly discernible when they share every single one of their intrinsic and relational properties, but a symmetric and irreflexive relation holds between them. The theory of arbitrary reference, first proposed by Breckenridge and Magidor in 2012, states that some semantic facts are brute. And, in this paper, I argue that this theory is inconsistent with the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. For the advocates of arbitrary reference, this result is problematic for two independent reasons. First: the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible is strikingly plausible and supported by a variety of compelling arguments. If it is true, though, then the theory of arbitrary reference is false. And second: some of the applications that the theory of arbitrary reference has been claimed to have depend on the assumption that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. Those who have tried to take advantage of said applications (e.g., ante rem structuralists) will find, consequently, that their projects are doomed to fail.
