Sofia Piknjac Phillips

Logic and metaphysics are employed to identify and understand the underlying principles of reality, thought, and existence. The goals of these two disciplines appear to overlap in that they both seek implicit principles of reality. However, the debate on their relationship, the question of which presupposes which, has not reached consensus throughout the history of philosophy. Although logic has a seemingly straightforward structure, questions concerning the philosophy of logic have concerned us throughout its history. Where and how do we discover rules of inference and replacement, and how do we dictate how they should be used? These questions open our eyes to the metaphysical reality of logical systems and more questions begin to appear; does this notion of input and output presuppose metaphysics in the sense that we derive these rules from pre-existing laws apparent in the nature of reality? And what is the primacy of importance here, the content and thus the metaphysical objects in the input or the ordered structure of the logical argument itself? I will argue that Aristotle implicitly claims that logic is primary and informs metaphysics by providing it a structure of logical analysis. This structure of logical analysis is able to aid metaphysics by giving her an outline for how to discover first principles as well as how to implement them when investigating demonstrative, scientific, knowledge claims. Whitehead is a prime example for the opposite side of the debate which argues for the primacy of metaphysics over logic. He explicitly claims that logic presupposes metaphysics in his Modes of Thought because logic presupposes the metaphysical concept of identity. The use of both Aristotle and Whitehead allows for an interpretation of the problem from beginning to present and thus encompasses a more complete historical view on the debate.