The revelation thesis, namely the claim that introspection or phenomenal concepts reveal the full essence of conscious states, has recently become a central topic in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, many argue that the plausibility of anti-physicalist arguments (such as conceivability arguments) depends on it. On the other hand, the revival of panpsychism has also invoked the revelation thesis against physicalism. However, physicalists have pointed out that if the revelation thesis is tr…
Read moreThe revelation thesis, namely the claim that introspection or phenomenal concepts reveal the full essence of conscious states, has recently become a central topic in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, many argue that the plausibility of anti-physicalist arguments (such as conceivability arguments) depends on it. On the other hand, the revival of panpsychism has also invoked the revelation thesis against physicalism. However, physicalists have pointed out that if the revelation thesis is true, panpsychism faces a parallel difficulty. David Chalmers has proposed a strategy, which I call the distinction strategy (DS) that seeks to defend panpsychism by distinguishing between the essence of phenomenal properties and their grounds. However, this proposal faces a dilemma: either it fails to genuinely rescue panpsychism, or it can equally be used to rescue physicalism. Consequently, Chalmers's proposal does not render panpsychism superior to physicalism, and the revelation thesis cannot serve as a reliable weapon for panpsychists against physicalism. Finally, this paper will offer further reflections on this debate.
