Songyao Ren

This essay develops an account of resilience, which, combining insights from both the Zhuangzi 莊子 and empirical bereavement research, can shed light on a dilemma about resilience in contemporary philosophical debates. According to the dilemma, grief is a fitting response to the loss of someone that one cares about. If one continues to care for the deceased, resilience is unfitting and fails to reflect the magnitude of the loss. If one no longer cares for the deceased, grief is fitting, but still regrettable, since it indicates an alienation from previous concerns and a death of self. Against this dilemma, I argue that one can continue to care for the deceased without one’s resilience being unfitting. In particular, resilience as the Zhuangists conceive of it is achieved through the reconstitution of the self in response to the death of the beloved. When this happens, one is no longer much attached to the “living and breathing” relationship, which is lost. One can continue to care for the deceased, however, by carrying on and developing other forms of the relationship that remain intact. Thus, one’s care has been transformed so that it no longer depends on the actual existence of the beloved. One no longer experiences the death of the beloved as an important loss of self, and it is no longer fitting for one to grieve.

This paper defends resilience in bereavement by way of responding to two prominent objections in the contemporary philosophical literature. Resilience in bereavement pertains to the ability to return to one’s functional and emotional baselines in a comparatively short period after the death of a loved one. Contrary to what Moller thinks, resilience is compatible with having a deep appreciation for the deceased loved one. Appealing to the example of Zhuangzi’s grieving of his wife, I argue that the agony of grief is assuaged as one comes to terms with one’s loss through a realization of the universality and inevitability of death. This can be so even as one continues to appreciate the significance of what one has lost. Also, contrary to Smuts’ view, resilience does not indicate a failure to care. Although the resilient is free from prolonged and intense grief, she could continue to care for the deceased by constructing a new relationship with her and contributing to this relationship in ways that are appropriate to it. This view is further corroborated by empirical bereavement research. According to the continuing bonds theory, healthy grief is resolved by establishing changed ties with the deceased rather than detaching ourselves from them.

I examine LeDoux’s cognitive account of emotions in The Deep History of Ourselves and raise two questions about it. First, LeDoux argues that emotions are autonoetic conscious experiences grounded in episodic memories. I argue that this overlooks the existential emotions, which represent facts about human conditions in a general rather than an episodic fashion. Second, LeDoux suggests that emotions engage the self-schemas and are concerned with one’s own flourishing. I argue that this overlooks the non-eudaimonistic emotions, such as surprise, wonder, and awe, which respond to the pull of the objects but do not view them through the lens of one’s own scheme of ends.

The “happiness agenda” is a worldwide movement that claims that happiness is the highest good, happiness can be measured, and public policy should promote happiness. Against Happiness is a thorough and powerful critique of this program, revealing the flaws of its concept of happiness and advocating a renewed focus on equality and justice. Written by an interdisciplinary team of authors, this book provides both theoretical and empirical analysis of the limitations of the happiness agenda. The authors emphasize that this movement draws on a parochial, Western-centric philosophical basis and demographic sample. They show that happiness defined as subjective satisfaction or a surplus of positive emotions bears little resemblance to the richer and more nuanced concepts of the good life found in many world traditions. Cross-cultural philosophy, comparative theology, and social and cultural psychology all teach that cultures and subcultures vary in how much value they place on life satisfaction or feeling happy. Furthermore, the ideas promoted by the happiness agenda can compete with rights, justice, sustainability, and equality—and even conceal racial and gender injustice. Against Happiness argues that a better way forward requires integration of cross-cultural philosophical, ethical, and political thought with critical social science. Ultimately, the authors contend, happiness should be a secondary goal—worth pursuing only if it is contingent on the demands of justice.

The Zhuangist ideal of wandering is characterized by the navigation of the plurality of daos in response to changing circumstances. In practice, this is achieved through a series of flows in skilled activities that have goals built into them, which are prescribed by objective constraints of the circumstances in relation to the agent’s own desires. Since flow cannot go on without interruption, detached reflection is called for when challenges interrupt an episode of flow. The emotion essential to moments of detachment is wonder—a cognitive emotion that prompts creative engagement with the novel, peculiar, and strange.

In this article, I will look into the Zhuangist views on emotions. I will argue that the psychological state of the Zhuangist wise person is characterized by emotional equanimity accompanied by a general sense of calmness, ease, and joy. This psychological state is constitutive of and instrumental to leading a good life, one in which one wanders the world and explores the plurality of daos. To do so, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debate on this issue and unveil the disconcerting disagreement that underlies it. Then, I will survey some passages in the Zhuangzi and sketch my interpretation of the Zhuangist views on emotions. Next, I will examine the theoretical foundation for this interpretation by referencing the Zhuangist pluralism and their conception of the good life. Finally, I will look into some potential objections to the Zhuangist views on emotions and attempt responses to them.