Sonia Maria Pavel

Reification is a social pathology that occurs when we treat social relations as things independent of our collective agency. It is not simply a category mistake, nor is it an isolated error that any single individual can correct. Rather, reification involves a collective and systematic reflexivity deficit caused by the unjust, oppressive, or unhealthy character of our social relations. In this paper, I present my own account of reification as a social pathology and demonstrate its uses—and potential abuses—for ethical critique. Reification distorts individual agency by obscuring our collective powers. I argue that the concept can play three roles in our analyses: diagnostic, etiological, and prescriptive. In relation to each of these functions, I show that the notion is both under‐ and overutilized. First, reification has yet to enter mainstream discourse in Anglophone moral and political philosophy, especially when compared with concepts of similar pedigree, such as ideology and alienation. I seek to rectify this neglect by showing that reification is a valuable addition to analyses of structural injustice, domination, value capture, and inauthenticity. Second, for critical theorists already immersed in historical debates over reification, I warn against the concept's overuse by more clearly circumscribing its critical reach. I propose ways to distinguish reification more carefully from objectification and commodification.

Merit and meritocracy are the targets of a wide range of critiques from across the ideological spectrum. This chapter proposes a reconceptualization of the two notions. Merit is defined as an open-ended, functional principle of distributive justice that necessarily attaches to the values and conceptions of the good operative in a given social practice or institution. The idea of meritocracy refers to social arrangements in which valued goods are distributed primarily or even exclusively in accordance with judgments of merit. Given the open-endedness of merit and its attachment to other norms and goals, meritocracies themselves come in a variety of forms. Meritocracy is a spectrum, not a monolith. The chapter introduces the distinction between two polar opposite models of meritocracy: telic and procedural. After offering a brief critique of the familiar procedural ideal of a free market of careers open to talents, the chapter develops a third conception of substantive meritocracy that lies between the procedural and telic extremes. A model of substantive meritocracy is illustrated in the context of college and university admissions.

Homeschooling is on the rise. It appeals to very different perspectives and ideologies that tend not to have common ground, from classical conservative to radical progressive. But the justifications for the practice are weak. In this paper, we build a case against the “home school” as a political practice using the existing commitments of liberal, conservative, and democratic theories of education. Whether education should aim at the cultivation of children's autonomy, their formation as members of cultural communities, or their training as democratic citizens, there are reasons to doubt that the practice of homeschooling can fulfill our educational goals. As such, we argue that liberals, conservatives, and democrats each have their own motivations to oppose homeschooling as an institutional alternative to traditional schools. Through our critiques, we also advance a metatheoretical argument in favor of centering the aims of education in our philosophical and political debates.

Most critics of our contemporary meritocratic practices and institutions believe their arguments speak to the defects of the ideal of meritocracy itself. I argue that this is a misguided generalization because meritocracy can take many forms depending on the conception of the good and broader theory of justice to which the distributive principle of merit it is attached. To illustrate, I contrast two radically different forms of meritocracy – a telic or end-oriented model based on Plato’s Kallipolis and a procedural model inherent in our free market of careers open to talents. Far from being a unified ideal, meritocracy is a spectrum of social and political arrangements, ranging between the telic and the procedural poles. Thus, identifying ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’ as the main sources of injustice in our contemporary societies further conceals the background conditions and underlying commitments that should be subject to our critical scrutiny.

This paper develops a critical normative analysis of charter schools. It categorizes and evaluates the main arguments in defense of charters: market competition, improved learning outcomes, autonomy and innovation, and their potential to function as “counterpublics.”After finding each argument wanting, the paper proposes a tripartite critique of charters based on (i) their deleterious effects on social solidarity, (ii) the procedural injustice involved in access, and (iii) their substantively unjust outcomes. We show how charter schools under-mine social and political solidarity by fragmenting communities into more homogenous subsets. Although they purport to be equally open to all, charters covertly rely on morally arbitrary characteristics such as class, race, and disability in admissions. Finally, we argue that they unfairly reduce the quality of education for some students, thus resulting in substantively unjust outcomes.

The authors argue that from the perspective of distributive justice, school district fragmentation—meaning both the existing reality of hyper-proliferated school districts and the practice of further breaking larger districts into smaller ones—produces three distinct injustices. First, it undermines racial solidarity and the bonds of community. Second, it violates the demands of procedural justice. And third, it leads to substantively unfair outcomes. Taken together, these concerns suggest that to create a more just educational system we ought to resist further fragmentation and push for larger, more consolidated school districts coupled with progressive redistributive funding. To support this central normative argument, the article provides two justifications for conceptualizing education as a fundamental entitlement and its provision as a form of mutual aid.