In this paper, we introduce a novel type of hermeneutical injustice. Traditional renderings of hermeneutical injustice describe situations in which marginalised groups encounter gaps in collective epistemic resources or find that such resources do not address their specific experiences. Conversely, the phenomenon we trace arises when certain concepts are polysemous – they mean something different for different groups. This constitutes a hermeneutical injustice when, along a gradient of power/opp…
Read moreIn this paper, we introduce a novel type of hermeneutical injustice. Traditional renderings of hermeneutical injustice describe situations in which marginalised groups encounter gaps in collective epistemic resources or find that such resources do not address their specific experiences. Conversely, the phenomenon we trace arises when certain concepts are polysemous – they mean something different for different groups. This constitutes a hermeneutical injustice when, along a gradient of power/oppression, the dominant understanding of a particular term impedes marginalised groups from being understood. In this paper, we develop a meaning finitist model to capture the dynamics of polysemy-based hermeneutical injustice. We exemplify the process through the example of ‘detransitioning’. We explore the harms generated by this type of hermeneutical injustice and discuss concept pluralism and concept eliminativism as possible ways to address these harms.
