Sonya Charles

Whether children have a right to know that they were created via “donated” gametes has generated debate for a quarter of a century. Pro-transparency theorists use policies and attitudes concerning adoption to argue for changes in regulations related to “donor” gametes. Anti-transparency theorists claim that discussions about whether children have a right to know their genetic origins must consider natural reproduction (and not just adoption). They argue that if we use an analogy to natural reproduction instead, we begin to see the problems with requiring transparency. I will argue that adoption is the more appropriate analogy for this debate and that we can make an argument for a strong right to know. I end with some further reasons that we can apply stronger regulation to the use of “donor” gametes than we would to natural reproduction.

The author's goal in this article is to develop an argument for why women should have a right to abortion-as-termination even if some form of ectogenesis is created. First, the author shows why ectogenesis as an alternative to abortion does not protect women's bodily autonomy because women are being forced to submit to coerced medical treatment and perform reproductive labor for others. Second, the author considers a further implication of her argument: If abortion-as-termination is kept, how far into gestation should this right extend? Third, and finally, the author considers whether people have the right to refuse genetic parenthood.

As the field of assisted-reproductive technology progresses, bioethicists continue to debate whether and how the availability of this technology creates new moral duties for parents-to-be. It is rare for these debates to seriously engage with questions related to race and class. Camisha Russell asks us to move race from the margins to the center of our discussions of reproductive ethics. She argues that this shift can work as a kind of corrective that will lead to better theory. In this paper, I build on Russell’s work by considering two proposals related to prenatal genetic diagnosis [PGD] that received a lot of attention and debate—Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane’s argument in favor of a “principle of procreative beneficence” and Janet Malak and Judith Daar’s argument in favor of a legal duty, in certain cases, to use PGD. My analysis of each of these arguments shows how a lack of diverse viewpoints leads to bad theory. I end the paper by showing how including a diversity of perspectives shifts our focus from rights to justice.

In this article, we discuss decision making during labor and delivery, specifically focusing on decision making around offering women a trial of labor after cesarean section. Many have discussed how humans are notoriously bad at assessing risks and how we often distort the nature of various risks surrounding childbirth. We will build on this discussion by showing that physicians make decisions around TOLAC not only based on distortions of risk, but also based on personal values rather than medical data. As a result of this, we will further suggest that the party who is best epistemically situated to make decisions about TOLAC is the woman herself.

Despite the fact that the requirement to obtain informed consent for medical procedures is deeply enshrined in both U.S. moral and legal doctrine, empirical studies and anecdotal accounts show that women's rights to informed consent and refusal of treatment are routinely undermined and ignored during childbirth. For example, citing the most recent Listening to Mothers survey, Marianne Nieuwenhuijze and Lisa Kane Low state that "a significant number of women said they felt pressure from a caregiver to agree to having an intervention that they did not want during birth". Specifically, Nieuwenhuijze and Low cite that "19% of women who did not have epidural analgesia felt...

In this essay, I argue that the daily practice of expert nurses goes far toward enacting the kind of patient autonomy feminist bioethicists envision. Nursing theorists often utilize philosophical theories in their work, but bioethicists have not paid much attention to nursing theory and what it means to be an expert nurse. This is unfortunate because expert nurses do much in their daily practice to make the ideals for autonomy put forth by feminist bioethicists a reality. With this in mind, I bring these two literatures together in what I hope is a fruitful dialogue.

In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” Natalie Stoljar asks whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for addressing feminist concerns. In this paper, I build on Stoljar’s argument that feminists should adopt a strong substantive approach to autonomy. After briefly reviewing the problems with a purely procedural approach, I begin to articulate my own strong substantive theory by focusing specifically on the problem of internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the concerns raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive approach.

The decline in providers and facilities that will allow a trial of labor after cesarean forces many women to choose a repeat cesarean. The choice is frequently not much of a choice, however, since the full range of options are often not on the table. This limited “choice” violates obstetricians' obligations both to respect patients' autonomy and to offer them good care. There has been a vigorous but so far not very fruitful debate in the last few years about the lack of access to a trial of labor after cesarean. Some recently released documents express concern about the limited access women have to clinicians and facilities willing to offer a trial of labor after cesarean. But access is likely to remain a problem for the foreseeable future.

I argue that the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), as an organization and through its individual members, can and should be a far greater ally in the prevention of violence against women. Specifically, I argue that we need to pay attention to obstetrical practices that inadvertently contribute to the problem of violence against women. While intimate partner violence is a complex phenomenon, I focus on the coercive control of women and adherence to oppressive gender norms. Using physician response to alcohol use during pregnancy and court-ordered medical treatment as examples, I show how some obstetrical practices mirror the attitudes of abusive men insofar as they try to coercively control women's behavior through manipulation and violence. To be greater allies in the prevention of violence against women, obstetricians should stop participating in practices that inadvertently perpetuate violence against women.

Using the moral work on trust and lying, I argue that allowing or encouraging children to believe you are their biological parent when you are not is a breach of trust in the parent-child relationship. While other approaches focus on specific harms or the rights of the child, I make a virtue theory argument based on our understanding of trust, lies, and the nature of the parent-child relationship. Drawing heavily on Nancy Potter's virtue theory of trustworthiness, I consider the nature of trust in the parent-child relationship and what this means for being a trustworthy parent.