I defend the containment view—the position that a fetus is (1) merely contained by its mother and (2) an organism during pregnancy. I argue against the parthood view, which states that a fetus is part of its mother. To do so, I bring the personal identity literature—particularly animalism—to bear on the metaphysics of pregnancy literature. I propose that an adequate account of pregnancy must tell a coherent story about what happens at birth. I deploy three thought experiments, each modeled on cl…
Read moreI defend the containment view—the position that a fetus is (1) merely contained by its mother and (2) an organism during pregnancy. I argue against the parthood view, which states that a fetus is part of its mother. To do so, I bring the personal identity literature—particularly animalism—to bear on the metaphysics of pregnancy literature. I propose that an adequate account of pregnancy must tell a coherent story about what happens at birth. I deploy three thought experiments, each modeled on classic remnant, fission, and transplant cases to demonstrate that the parthood view must make unappealing commitments to explain birth. Specifically, it is incompatible with standard accounts of human animal persistence. By contrast, the containment view offers a simple explanation.
