The philosophical difficulties presented by self-deception are vexed and multifaceted. One such difficulty is what I call the 'doxastic problem' of self-deception. Solving the doxastic problem involves determining whether someone in a state of self-deception that ~p both believes that P and believes that ~p, simply holds one or the other belief, or, as I will argue, holds neither. This final option, which has been almost entirely overlooked to-date, is what I call 'nondoxasticism' about self-dec…
Read moreThe philosophical difficulties presented by self-deception are vexed and multifaceted. One such difficulty is what I call the 'doxastic problem' of self-deception. Solving the doxastic problem involves determining whether someone in a state of self-deception that ~p both believes that P and believes that ~p, simply holds one or the other belief, or, as I will argue, holds neither. This final option, which has been almost entirely overlooked to-date, is what I call 'nondoxasticism' about self-deception. In this article, I present a negative case for nondoxasticism according to which, in the paradigm case of self-deception, there is no explanatory need to attribute the self-deceived person either their undesired belief that p, or their desired belief that ~p. Folk psychology is replete with concepts other than belief, and if we bear this in mind, it becomes clear that the explanatory roles for which the self-deceived person's purported beliefs have traditionally been enlisted can be comfortably filled without recourse to belief.
