Sophie Grace Chappell

This chapter considers the notions of role-compliance and role-recalcitrance by starting from a simple argument-schema for role-reasons: (1) that role-recalcitrance is a human universal; (2) that at least some role-recalcitrance is ethically interesting; (3) that at least some ethically interesting role-recalcitrance is a very good thing. The argument for (1) and (2) examines some well-known claims that Alasdair MacIntyre offers about “heroic societies” in _After Virtue_: in particular, his connected claims (a) that people in those societies cannot “step back” from their roles, and (b) that there are arguments across the Is–Ought Gap that are based on “functional concepts”. A re-examination of the _Iliad_’s central figure of Achilles refutes (a), and suggests an a fortiori argument for (1). Analysis of (b) leads to a distinction—which refutes (b)—between logical and psychological/sociological cogency; to some reflections on analyticity in general; and to the conclusion, which is a rephrasing of (3), that at least sometimes the ability to be role-recalcitrant is precisely “what makes us truly human”.

‘Thin concepts’ are dubious entities. Careful analysis of the usual examples of thick and thin raises serious doubts about both their conceptuality and their thinness. Confusions aside, there is little obvious use for them in ethics or metaethics. The very idea that there could be a naturally-occurring purely evaluative moral concept, with no descriptive content, no cultural setting, and no capacity for distanced or ironic use, is as chimerical as any other ahistorical illusion. Our concentration on thick and thin has distracted us from thinking about other interesting and important ethical distinctions—evidential/ verdictive, evaluative/ prescriptive, determinable/ determinate, Zangwill's because-relation, Anscombe's brute-relative-to relation—which have something genuine and non-illusory on _both_ sides of them.

This introduction situates Sophie Grace Chappell’s Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience within a broader philosophical lineage that treats experience, rather than judgment or theory, as the primary site of value. Drawing on John Dewey’s and William James’s conception of experience as “double-barrelled”—encompassing both what is experienced and how it is experienced—the essay argues that Chappell develops an ethics grounded in the inclusive integrity of lived experience. Epiphanies are presented not as rare mystical events, but as moments in which revelation and what is revealed become one, disclosing value through the full integrity of experience. The introduction emphasizes Chappell’s phenomenological method, her resistance to moral theoreticism, and her account of experience as revelation. It also highlights the existential significance of her “republic of conversation,” an inclusive dialogical space in which moral understanding emerges through shared reflection on experience. The symposium contributions extend this conversation by addressing questions of agency, authority, cultivation, and pluralism in epiphanic ethics.

‘I was four and three-quarters when I asked my mother if, from now on, I could please go to school as a girl instead of as a boy …’ In this extraordinary new book, renowned philosopher Sophie Grace Chappell combines personal memoir, philosophical reflection, open letters, science fiction writing, and poetry to help us all figure out transgender. What is it really like to be transgender? How can we as a society do better to accept the reality of trans lives and to welcome and include trans adults, trans children, and trans families? How can trans people thrive in a cisgendered world? For too long now, clouds of myth, misinformation, alarmism, and wrong-headed ideology have masked the reality of trans people’s lives. By answering questions like these, this book blows away the clouds and gives us the truth instead. Rich, informative, and deeply moving, _Trans Figured_ will be widely read and celebrated for years to come.

What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines Wittgenstein’s epistemology with levinas’s phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us. And it says that what this knowledge consists in is the experience that levinas calls ”the face to face’: direct and unmediated encounter between persons. As levinas says, for there to be persons at all there has, first, to be a relationship, language, and this same encounter: ”the face to face’ comes first, the existence of individual persons only second. I explore some consequences of this conception for how we think about personhood, and also for how we read Descartes and Augustine.

What is the riddle of Oedipus? This paper is an exploration of the philosophy involved in Sophocles’ famous play Oedipus Tyrannus. The play involves a riddler who becomes king, a man who is famously good at understanding what others find obscure, and yet is unable to see it when he is confronted by an obvious set of uncomfortable truths about himself. As well as for Oedipus, the play poses a number of different riddles for us: in particular it is a study of responsibility and shame, and of deliberation and choice. Like any work of art, the play does not tell us what conclusions we should reach; but it does show us some questions that need asking, and indeed some riddles that we face.

I begin this paper by examining what MacIntyre has to tell us about radical disagreements: how they have arisen, and how to deal with them, within a polity. I conclude by radically disagreeing with Macintyre: I shall suggest that he offers no credible alternative to liberalism’s account of radical disagreements and how to deal with them. To put it dilemmatically: insofar as what MacIntyre says is credible, it is not an alternative to liberalism; insofar as he presents a genuine alternative to liberalism, this alternative is not credible. In large part the credibility problems that I see for MacIntyre’s project arise from the history on which he bases it; it is with this history that I begin. Reflection on MacIntyre’s profound and subtle political philosophy thus fails to dislodge liberalism from its contemporary intellectual supremacy-a supremacy which I think liberalism has well earned. If anything, such reflection enhances the hegemony of liberalism still further. And a good thing too.

Phenomenal socialism says that what we actually, directly, literally perceive is only or primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties; this paper argues for phenomenal socialism in the weaker, primarily version. Phenomenal socialism is the philosophy of perception that goes with recognitionalism, which is the metaethics that goes with epiphanies. The first part states the recognitionalist manifesto. The second part situates this manifesto relative to some more global concerns, about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory vs. anti-theory in ethics. The third part rehearses two familiar views about the possible contents of perceptual experience, Phenomenal Conservativism and Phenomenal Liberalism. It notes that the usual catalogue omits two other theoretical possibilities, Phenomenal Socialism and Phenomenal Nihilism, and it defends a watered-down form of Phenomenal Socialism from four main objections. The fourth part makes some connections with the epistemology of modality and with the role of the imagination.

There have only been three articles in mainstream philosophy journals going back at least to the 1970s on generosity. This paper hopes to draw attention to this neglected virtue. By building on what work has already been done, and trying to advance that discussion along several different dimensions, it hopes that others will take a closer look at this important and surprisingly complex virtue. More specifically, it formulates three important necessary conditions for what is involved in possessing the virtue of generosity, and considers other contenders as well. The necessary conditions have to do with whether what is given must be of value to the giver, whether the giver's primary motivation has to be altruistic, and whether the act of giving has to be supererogatory.

I argue that one central resource for ethical thinking, seriously under-explored in contemporary anglophone philosophy, is moral phenomenology, the exploration of the texture and quality of moral experience. Perhaps a barrier that has prevented people from using this resource is that it’s hard to talk about experience. But such knowledge can be communicated, e.g. by poetry and drama. In having such experiences, either in real life or at second-hand through art, we can gain moral knowledge, rather as Mary the colour scientist can gain knowledge of colours; such knowledge is a real cognitive gain, but it is not knowledge of the propositional kind that philosophers have usually focused on.

Developing a British perspective on the abortion debate, I take up some ideas from Patrick Lee’s fine paper, and pursue, in particular, the idea of individual humans as goods in themselves. I argue that this notion helps us to avoid the familiar mistake of making moral value impersonal. It also shows us the way out of consequentialism. Since the most philosophically viable notion of the person, the individual human, is (as Lee argues) a notion of an individual substance that is there from conception, the move has a third effect, which is to rule out abortion.