Sophie Kikkert

We have a lot of knowledge of our own abilities. Explaining how we acquire such knowledge raises a number of interesting challenges. In particular, it is difficult to explain how we begin to learn about our robust abilities to perform intentional actions without initial access to evidence in the form of intentional performances. We propose a solution to this problem: we gain elementary evidence of our own abilities by engaging in unintentional behaviours (in particular, exploration and imitation) in the process of developing those very abilities. We develop a three-stage theory that explicates how we get from evidence in the form of such unintentional behaviours to knowledge of our own robust abilities.

We learn about our own abilities from various sources. I argue that an agent’s social identity may interact with the reliability of some of these sources. In effect, some agents are in a worse position than others to learn about their own abilities in certain domains. I discuss three ways in which an agent’s social background may affect their available evidence - i.e., it may influence (i) feedback from others; (ii) their affordance landscape; and (iii) the availability of representative attempts by agents who are similar to them -, and argue that this can lead even epistemically rational agents to foster inaccurate beliefs about their own abilities. I further assess several ways to remedy the fact that some (often already socially disadvantaged) agents are at an (additional) disadvantage when it comes to acquiring knowledge of their own abilities and propose that ‘playful’ environments that create space for low-stakes trial-and-error can facilitate the development of more accurate self-assessments.

In the accounts we give of one another, claims about our abilities appear to be indispensable. Some abilities are so widespread that many who have them take them for granted, such as the ability to walk, or to write one's name, or to tell a hawk from a handsaw. Others are comparatively rare and notable, such as the ability to hit a Major League fastball, or to compose a symphony, or to tell an elm from a beech. In either case, however, when we ascribe such abilities to one another we have the impression that we are making claims that, whether they are worth saying or not, are at least sometimes true. The impression of truth exerts a pressure towards giving a philosophical theory of ability. It is not an option, at least at the outset, to dismiss all our talk of ability as fiction or outright falsehood. A theory of ability can be reasonably expected to say what it is to have an ability in a way that vindicates the appearance of truth. Such a theory will deserve the name “philosophical” insofar as it gives an account, not of this or that range of abilities, but of abilities generally.

Recent years have seen increased interest among 4E cognition scholars in physical disability, leading to the development of the EE-model of disability. This paper contributes to the literature on disability and 4E cognition in three key ways. First, it examines the relationship between the EE-model and social constructivist views that address the bodily reality of disablement, highlighting commonalities and distinctions. Second, it critiques the EE-model’s focus on individual strategies for expanding disabled persons’ affordance landscapes, arguing that disability policy should integrate insights from both the EE-model and social constructivist approaches. Finally, it assesses the EE-model against the 'dogma of harmony'. We argue that while the EE-model’s focus on active human-environment collaboration is valuable, it can inadvertently perpetuate this dogma. We contend that integrating certain social constructivist insights can help the EE-model avoid the dogma of harmony.

The actions of able agents are often reliably successful. I argue that their success may be modally robust along two dimensions. The first dimension helps distinguish the exercise of abilities, which requires local control, from lucky success. The second concerns the global availability of acts: agents with the ability to φ can φ across a variety of circumstances. I introduce a framework that captures the two dimensions and their interaction, and show how it bears on a disagreement about the modal force the robustness of ability requires: while local control involves a kind of local necessity, global availability does not.