Sotoudeh Rad

Public inquiries have become pivotal arenas in which the ethical responsibilities of digital platforms are publicly constructed and contested. Yet scholarship has paid limited attention to the linguistic mechanisms through which these contests unfold. This paper examines the 2024 Australian Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society as a high-stakes moral forum in which technology firms, regulators, and civil society actors engage in discursive struggles over adolescent harm and platform responsibility. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of more than 3000 pages of submissions and hearing transcripts, we show that accountability in this setting is not simply revealed but actively produced through language. Extending prior research on dialogic accountability, we incorporate Searle’s speech act theory to identify how presuppositions and indirect speech acts function as micro-level tools for shaping epistemic contests about what harms occur and responsibility contests about who ought to be held to account. Our findings demonstrate that corporate actors often deploy these linguistic devices to maintain ambiguity, diffuse blame, or perform symbolic responsibility, while legislators and advocates use them to assert duties, establish harms, and press for substantive accountability. We argue that “digital responsibility” emerges as a contingent discursive accomplishment rather than an intrinsic organizational property, highlighting the performative and strategic nature of ethical claims in contemporary platform governance. By theorizing accountability as a linguistically mediated moral practice, the paper advances business ethics scholarship on discursive legitimation, contributing to ongoing debates about how societies should evaluate and regulate the conduct of powerful digital firms.

This paper investigates the key drivers behind the origins of value-for-money (VFM) audit in Canada and the aims, intents, and logics ascribed by the original proponents. Drawing on insights from governmentality and New Public Management, the paper utilizes analysis methods adapted from case study research to review a wide range of primary documentation (e.g., Hansards from the Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons debates, the so-called Wilson report and the FMCS study) and secondary documentation (newspaper articles, Office of the Auditor General internal publications, journal articles). Major findings indicate a rise of a management consulting culture within the Auditor General’s office following the appointment of James Johnson Macdonell. VFM legislation effectively operationalized practices drawn from management consulting expertise by invitation of the consultant. It was offered as an answer to the growing scope and size of government, which had become problematized by the Auditor General in terms of parliament losing control over the public purse. The Auditor General’s invocation of financial crisis led to a substantial broadening of mandate and increase in resources for that office

For much of the last 50 years, a key platform animating public sector reform in Canada and elsewhere has been that efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved by adapting private sector financial management methods and practices. We argue that the recent re-establishment of the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) of Canada represents a key element of a program of strengthening financial accountability that has emerged within the Canadian Federal Government. Although this program is longstanding and is associated Canada’s implementation of new public management initiatives, it has recently drawn particular sustenance from the sponsorship scandal in Canada. We demonstrate that the reincarnated OCG, re-established amid a rhetoric of “modernization” and of “strengthening” accountability, has a wide-ranging mandate to enhance financial and audit controls, create financial standards, nurture professional development, and oversee government spending. We explore some of the consequences of this development and of the broader financial accountability mechanisms introduced in response to the Sponsorship scandal within the Canadian public sector.

Technology used in online marketing has advanced to a state where collection, enhancement and aggregation of information are instantaneous. This proliferation of customer information focused technology brings with it a host of issues surrounding customer privacy. This article makes two key contributions to the debate concerning digital privacy. First, we use theories of justice to help understand the way consumers conceive of, and react to, privacy concerns. Specifically, it is argued that an important component of consumers' privacy concerns relates to fairness judgments, which in turn comprise of the two primary components of distributive and procedural justice. Second, we make a number of prescriptions, aimed at both firms and regulators, based on the notion that consumers respond to perceived privacy violations in much the same way they would respond to an unfair exchange.

Many jurisdictions have put regulatory strategies in place to provide incentives and safeguards to whistleblowers to encourage whistleblowing on corporate wrongdoings. One such strategy is the provision of a financial incentive to the whistleblower if the complaint leads to a successful regulatory enforcement action against the offending organization. We conducted an experiment using professional accountants as participants to examine whether such an incentive encourages potential whistleblowers to report an observed financial reporting fraud to a relevant external authority. We also examine the effect of perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on accountants’ intention to whistleblow. We find that a financial incentive results in a higher intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We also find that perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing are significantly and positively associated with accountants’ intention to whistleblow to a relevant external authority. We find a significant interaction between the provision of a financial incentive and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing on the intention to report the wrongdoing externally. The intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally is higher when the level of perceived seriousness is higher, regardless of the availability of a financial incentive. However, when the perceived level of seriousness is lower, the presence of financial incentive results in a higher intention to report the financial reporting fraud externally. These findings indicate that the impact of a financial incentive on the intention to whistleblow is moderated by perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing.