Sreenish S

John Campbell, in his influential work (Reference and Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2002), advocates the Relational View of Perception. On this view, perceptual experience must fulfill an epistemic function in enabling reference to or acquiring knowledge about the mind-independent objects and their properties. It asserts that in perception, we epistemically gain (or lack) nothing other than the knowledge of the properties of mind-independent objects. Moreover, to accelerate the epistemic role of perceptual experience the relational view supports rejecting Qualia-Realism and Intentionalism. This paper reflects on Campbell’s relational view of perception, emphasizing the epistemic role of perceptual experience. In opposition to the relational view, the paper promotes the idea that in perception, we gain knowledge other than the properties of mind-independent objects. It then contends that while the rejection of qualia-realism and intentionalism is a deliberate theoretical choice, it may lead to inappropriate consequences for the relational view.

John. R. Searle (2015) argues that the “Commonality thesis” (CT) is a respectable view in the philosophy of perception. According to CT, indistinguishable experiences (veridical perception and corresponding hallucination) can have the same phenomenology and the same intentional content. Searle thinks that to defend CT, one must accept the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). According to CKA, “whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur where one hallucinating.” Recently, CKA received enormous criticism. Therefore, maintaining CT in support of CKA is questionable. This paper aims at a dual purpose: first, to establish that CT is a respectable thesis and second, to defend CT without endorsing CKA.