Stanislas Richard

If it is better to be exploited rather than neglected, how can it be impermissible to exploit if it is permissible to neglect? This puzzle has been identified by Benjamin Ferguson in the pages of this journal as the ‘paradox of exploitation’. The present paper takes stock of the various solutions that have been proposed since then and argues that they either misidentify the nature of the paradox or run into implausible implications. By contrast, it will make the case for the following unpleasant solution: The permissibility of neglect makes exploitation permissible as well; and if exploitation is impermissible, then so was neglect. By implication, no impermissible exploitation can follow permissible neglect. The solution is unpleasant, nevertheless, it is all-things-considered more plausible and crucially more parsimonious than existing alternatives.

The intuition that some mutually beneficial transactions can be impermissibly exploitative is very powerful. However, it is also notoriously difficult to make sense of. Intuitively, the wrongness of an exploitative offer seems to be that it is a less-than-best in terms of how much it furthers the exploited party’s interests. But how can this be wrong if there is no duty to make the best offer in the first place? Various attempts have recently been made to solve this problem by arguing that the wrongness of exploitation is indeed to be explained by a duty to offer the best option. The present paper argues that no positive duty, however, can be discharged through the terms of a mutually beneficial transaction, which renders such duty-based explanations inadequate. The paper then explains what implications this has for what corporations owe the global poor.

The paradox of exploitation emerges from the contradiction between the reasonable view that some consensual, mutually beneficial transactions can nonetheless impermissible and the non-worseness claim, which holds that no mutually beneficial transaction can be worse than its absence. This paper dissolves the tension by attacking the intuition on which the reasonable view rests. I argue that this intuition is best explained as an adaptive response to the collective action problems of hunter-gatherer economies, where ill-defined property rights made egalitarian sharing norms essential for cooperative survival. Emerging for reasons independent of its capacity to track moral truth, the intuition carries no evidential weight in economic ethics. I further vindicate non-worseness by showing it lacks any plausible adaptive explanation. Debunking the fairness intuition removes the sole basis for the Reasonable view and dissolves the exploitation problem, while providing a novel application of local evolutionary debunking arguments to economic ethics.

The present article develops an account of the moral value of pity sex on the basis of the three main schools of ethics – consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. I show that offering pity sex to the sexually excluded is morally valuable and praiseworthy as it respectively takes into consideration the moral reasons that the harm of sexual deprivation generates, satisfies imperfect duties of beneficence, and shows a virtuous, moral character. I also show that common objections to a positive evaluation of pity sex can be easily deflated.

Many North American and British universities have recently prohibited all sexual and romantic relationships between students and teachers, even when they are consensual. This paper shows that such strict prohibitions are difficult to justify. While some aspects of the relationships they target may be troubling, they are usually sufficiently mitigated by standard anti-harassment policies. Common objections to such relationships, based on anti-discrimination or fiduciary law also fail to show that they are impermissible, as they rely on unwarranted empirical assumptions or on an unjustified petition of principle regarding the students’ interests.

Cet article démontre que du fait de son acception d’une théorie marginale de la valeur, le libéralisme est incapable de concevoir une théorie de l’exploitation indépendamment de toute conception de la justice distributive. Or, c’est là ce qu’une théorie de l’exploitation ne doit pas faire, car cela rend le concept redondant. Toute théorie libérale de l’exploitation se terminera donc par ce paradoxe : si c’est libéral, ce n’est pas de l’exploitation, et si c’est de l’exploitation, alors ça n’est pas libéral. Pour illustrer son propos, l’article discute deux théories libérales de l’exploitation – celles d’Alan Wertheimer et de Hillel Steiner – dont les travaux sur ce sujet restent peu discutés dans la philosophie francophone.

This contribution lays out five criteria for a successful argument proving that employers impermissibly exploit their workers when they pay them an unfairly low wage. Michael Kates has recently provided two metrics of fairness which satisfy the first two. The contribution argues that while Kates has significantly advanced the discussion, the final three criteria have yet to be satisfied. The contribution then identifies several difficulties posed by such an endeavour, and questions whether it is worth the trouble. It may indeed be unnecessary to prove that workers are exploited by their employers to justify higher wages.

A prominent defence of compulsory voting is based on the negative effects of a low turnout on democracy, which leads to an unequal representation of the most vulnerable citizens of our societies, since they are the least likely to vote voluntarily. This paper shows that this justification relies on the truth of an added premise – that voting is a proxy for use of political influence and power. However, the inclusion of this premise weakens the entire argument, which regains consistency only through the adoption of a narrow understanding of what representation is. Introduction

This conceptual paper contributes to the critique of a body of literature that will be named ‘deliberative corporate governance’ by defending non-deliberative acts performed by stakeholders. It first argues that this literature introduces to the corporation a decision-making process where it does not belong, given the corporation's economic role. This leads to an ‘efficiency constraint’ on any attempt to justify deliberation – deliberative governance theorists must show that it is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the issues that concern them. A real case example where deliberation would have been counter-productive in that regard will show that this is not the case. Building on this example, the paper uses the theory of democratic agonism to argue that non-deliberative acts should be part of governance. A sketch of managerial duties vis-à-vis such acts is attempted as well. The paper does not seek to reject deliberative corporate governance entirely, but rather to defend the importance of non-deliberative practices in addressing its theoretical concern. It makes a conceptual contribution to corporate governance theory, from which it draws practical implications for stakeholders-oriented management.

The most influential justification of individual property rights is the Propertarian Argument. It is the idea that the institution of private property renders everyone better off, and crucially, even the worst-off members of society. A recent critique of the Argument is that it relies on an anthropologically false hypothesis – the idea, following Thomas Hobbes, that life in the state of nature is one of widespread scarcity and violence to which property rights are a solution. The present article seeks to reformulate this Anthropological Objection in a way that more directly addresses Hobbes’ original argument. It then shows that private property is justified to the extent that it allows anyone to reclaim their free time.

This paper clarifies the usage of Albert Hirschman’s categories of market behaviour as of exit and voice in debates about workplace democracy by taking seriously his critique of the neoclassical analysis of competition. Pro-market liberals are generally hostile to the idea of workplace democracy and tend to favour top-down hierarchies as a way of organising labour. This hostility is generally inspired by the neoclassical analysis of exploitation and efficiency, which leads them to defend distributions achieved through exit-based competitive equilibria. Following Hirschman, I propose to consider a hypothetical alternative: a democratic equilibrium, reached through the use of voice. I show that it would present the same appealing characteristics than its competitive counterpart while also accounting for the non-ideal conditions in which markets operate. Support for free markets should entail support for workplace democracy minimally understood as a strengthening of voice.

There are two opposing views concerning intuitive cases of wage exploitation. The first denies that they are cases of exploitation at all. It is based on the nonworseness claim: there is nothing wrong with a discretionary mutually beneficial employment relationship. The second is the reasonable view: some employment relationships can be exploitative even if employers have no duty towards their employees. This article argues that the reasonable view does not completely defeat defences of wage exploitation, because these do not rely solely on the nonworseness claim. They also rely on the idea, popularised by Alan Wertheimer, that exploitation is a form of disequilibrium price occurring in defective markets. The article then proceeds to criticise Wertheimer’s account through neoclassical, new institutional, and Austrian economics. It concludes that considerations for economic efficiency are irrelevant to assessing intuitions regarding exploitation.

Mark Reiff’s book In the Name of Liberty: The Argument for Universal Unionization successfully delivers the promise contained in the title—the case for a version of liberal capitalism where every worker would belong to a union. The argument, based on the greater freedom unions bring to workers, clearly seeks an overlapping consensus, for virtually all major contemporary political philosophies defend freedom. The book especially tries to be appealing to right-libertarians. This review will argue, however, that Reiff takes the ‘liberty’ in ‘libertarianism’ way too seriously. Right-libertarians do not defend liberty; they defend property rights. Reiff’s argument will certainly be convincing to anyone who believes liberty is the main currency of justice. The problem is precisely that not everyone believes that.

Sean Irving’s book Hayek’s Market Republicanism: The Limits of Liberty shows that the commonly accepted reading of Hayek as a liberal thinker is mistaken, and that his political writings are best understood as belonging to the broader tradition of republicanism. The distinction is important for understanding many aspects of Hayek’s thought, and especially his rejection of social justice and majoritarian democracy. In that sense, one of the book’s more general merits is its implicit contribution to ongoing debates between republican ‘freedom as non-domination’ and liberal ‘freedom as non-interference’. Irving focuses on what he sees as a contradiction between Hayek’s chief concerns about the state as the main source of domination and his disregard for private forms of power, and especially within the capitalist firm. I argue, however, that the example of Hayek should lead us to consider a more prosaic conclusion: freedom as non-domination is a concept less useful for criticising the free market than Irving and left-leaning Republicans seem to assume.

Work occupies a central place in most people’s lives, yet a secondary one in most of political philosophy. This article attempts to show the negative theoretical consequences of this neglect by taking the example of the concept of constituent power as it appears in the writings of Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes and Karl Marx. Both authors conceived it as made up of the working classes. This, however, makes them both run into the same paradox: how to politically represent a class that is characterised by a non-political activity – work? I argue that neither of them gives a satisfactory response since both rely on an implausible account of objective class interests based on fragile grounds. I conclude by showing that the political representation of workers is a theoretical and practical problem that the concept of constituent power is unable to resolve.