Stefan Gosepath

Welche Theorie(n) bzw. Auffassungen eines Rechts auf Eigentum werden im gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Egalitarismus vertreten? Spezifischer stellt sich die Frage: Lässt der Egalitarismus als eine Theorie der Gleichverteilung Eigentumsrechte überhaupt zu oder schränkt er sie nur stark ein, um Umverteilung zu ermöglichen? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird zuerst der Egalitarismus näher bestimmt. Sodann wird zweitens bestimmt, was Eigentum ausmacht, um dann auf die eigentumstheoretischen Aspekte im Egalitarismus eingehen zu können. Dazu wird drittens gezeigt, dass und warum es für die dominante Rawls’sche Version des Egalitarismus keine moralischen Ansprüche auf Eigentum vor den Ergebnissen der Umsetzung (s)einer übergeordneten Gerechtigkeitstheorie gibt. Anschließend wird auf zwei egalitäre Alternativen zur Rawls’schen Verteilungsgerechtigkeit eingegangen, nämlich die linkslibertäre (im vierten Abschnitt) sowie die linksliberale Eigentumstheorie (im fünften Abschnitt). Die linkslibertäre Auffassung argumentiert mittels einer naturrechtlichen und die (links-)liberale Auffassung mittels einer moralischen Begründung für Freiheits- und Eigentumsrechte als grundlegend. So gelangen beide auf unterschiedlichen Wegen zu egalitaristischen Implikationen für ihre Eigentumsauffassungen. What theory or conception of property rights does egalitarianism as a theory of justice advocate? More specifically, as a theory of equal distribution, does egalitarianism allow for property rights at all, or does it severely restrict them in order to allow for redistribution? To answer this question, we first need to define egalitarianism. Second, it is necessary to determine what constitutes property in order to be able to address the property-theoretical aspects of egalitarianism. Third, it will be shown for the dominant Rawlsian version of egalitarianism that and why there are no moral claims to property before the results of the implementation of a higher ranking theory of justice. Two egalitarian alternatives to Rawlsian distributive justice are then discussed, namely the left-libertarian (in the fourth section) and the left-liberal (in the fifth section) theories of property. The libertarian view argues for freedom and property rights on the basis of natural law, while the (left) liberal view does so on the basis of morality. In this way, both arrive at egalitarian implications for their concepts of property by different routes.

Liberal ideas, institutions, and orders are being challenged globally and in diverse ways. Based on cluster analysis, this paper identifies four clusters of contestants challenging the liberal script: “Fundamentalists“, „Authoritarian Populists“, „Market-Sceptic Egalitarians“, and „Identity-Focused Contestants“. These clusters group diverse actors based on their critiques of liberal principles, epistemological standpoints, intensity of their contestation, identities and emotions. The Fundamentalists pose the greatest challenge to the liberal script, rejecting most liberal principles and endorsing alternative scripts. The Authoritarian Populists instead predominantly contest equal moral weight and civil rights. The Market- Sceptic Egalitarians critique the capitalist market economy for producing material inequalities. Lastly, the Identity-Focused Contestants focus on either constructing national identities or challenging the oppression of minority groups, often criticising liberal authorities for being “hypocritical”. The paper contributes to a nuanced understanding of the diversity of contestants that is useful for researching the causes and consequences of contestations within liberal societies.

Mit der Idee eines grundlegenden »Rechts auf Rechtfertigung« hat Rainer Forst eine kraftvolle Denkfigur entwickelt, deren Fruchtbarkeit für das konkrete Geschäft einer kritischen Analyse des Sozialen immer deutlicher wird. Sein Werk hat tiefe Spuren in der Philosophie und Sozialtheorie, aber auch in der politischen Diskussion der Gegenwart hinterlassen und umfasst pointierte Stellungnahmen zu Fragen der Moral und Gerechtigkeit, zu Macht, Toleranz und Freiheit. Der Band versammelt Beiträge namhafter internationaler Denker:innen, die sich mit den vielfältigen Aspekten von Forsts Werk auseinandersetzen und damit zugleich einen Einblick in die neuesten Entwicklungen innerhalb der Kritischen Theorie geben.

Meritocracy is a key feature of liberal scripts, but it is problematic for a number of reasons. One major line of criticism is that of broken promises: Meritocracies de facto fail to live up to their own promises, leading to the claim that meritocracy is a myth. Another important line of criticism concerns the idea of merit itself. The objection is that merit and meritocracy do not make sense on their own terms and are incoherent with other liberal principles: It is unclear how to impartially assess subjective efforts and deprivations and material contributions. Moreover, one’s actual productive achievements depend to a large extent on social circumstances and genetic endowment, both of which are brute luck and, from a moral point of view, arbitrary. Finally, the criteria of merit that are usually put forward in the economy can be in conflict with the principle of the free market.

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). First published Tue Mar 27, 2001; substantive revision Mon Apr 26, 2021

What are the purposes or aims of education in general and of democratic education in particular? And what are the appropriate ways and means of such an education? This chapter offers an overview of some of the more important approaches to these questions in contemporary, mostly anglophone, conceptions of educational justice in primary and secondary education. Section 16.2 starts with some provisions of some important goals of education. Section 16.3 turns to educational justice in gerneral. Section 16.4 asks about the spheres of educational justice: Is it education and socialization in general, or the school system in particular? Section 16.5 distinguishes three different levels of education: (i) basic education for all; (ii) the cultivation of individual talents and capacities; and (iii) selection for higher education and the job market. Section 16.6 outlines the differences between five principles of justice and equality in the field of education: (i) strict equality, (ii) a conception of fair equality of opportunity, (iii) a conception of luck-egalitarian equality of opportunity, (iv) a prioritarian conception of educational justice, and (v) democratic adequacy as a conception of educational justice.

This chapter is concerned with the fundamental question of whether it is just that people inherit property. Should a property owner be entitled to transfer that property after their death to a person of their choosing? Is the right to posthumous transfer a part of the right to private property? I will defend the thesis that the common social practice of inheritance, embodied in law and institutions, is actually pro tanto unjust, since it confers an unjust advantage on the beneficiary. To establish this thesis, I shall first consider the main arguments against inheritance from a justice perspective, then defend these positions against four of the main normative arguments offered in favour of inheritance: the right to property objection, the gift objection, the value of the family objection, and the double tax objection.

In this paper I would like to suggest that we should distinguish between three levels of education in schools: basic education for all, the cultivation of individual talents and capacities; and the selection for higher education and the job market. On each level egalitarians should in my view demand a different kind of equality and a different kind of metric. Since for the selection for higher education and the job market equality of opportunity seems the approriate metric of justice in education, I turn to an analysis of four different conceptions of equality of opportunity.

Hannah Arendt ist längst von einer umstrittenen Denkerin zu einer Klassikerin der modernen politischen Theorie geworden. In unnachahmlicher Weise hat sie den Bruch des deutschen philosophischen Denkens in den 20er Jahren in ihren weiteren intellektuellen Lebensweg aufgenommen und in eine politische Theorie des 20. Jahrhunderts übertragen - eine Theorie, die aus den Erfahrungen von Flucht und Staatenlosigkeit schöpfte und zugleich zentrale Phänomene des 21. Jahrhunderts, die Fluchtbewegungen und die Krise der institutionellen nationalen Politik vorwegnahm. Mit Beiträgen von: Etienne Balibar, Peg Birmingham, Matthias Bormuth, Micha Brumlik, Jean L. Cohen, Rainer Forst, Volker Gerhardt, Peter Eli Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Antonia Grunenberg, Wolfgang Heuer, Rahel Jaeggi, Dominic Kaegi, Jerome Kohn, Martine Leibovici, Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, Oliver Marchart, Waltraud Meints-Stender, Ingeborg Nordmann, Manfred Riedel, Stefanie Rosenmüller, Michael P. Steinberg, Dana Villa, Marianne Zepp und Idith Zertal.

When ‘we’ in the West talk about philosophy, we most often mean ‘Western Philosophy’, i. e. philosophy with ancient roots in Greece from the pre-Socratic period onwards until today, thereby neglecting other cultures and traditions, whose history of philosophical thinking is at least as old and important. This neglect of other philosophical traditions is a problem in general, since it is unfair, hegemonic, ignorant, and imprudent. The article argues that there are instrumental as well as intrinsic reasons to diversify and globalize the philosophical canon. Different philosophical traditions should engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our respective cultural traditions to improve on our current approach of solving philosophical problems by our own lights.

This paper addresses one particular controversy that has recently received much attention in political theory broadly, and in justice theory in particular: it concerns the role of distributive justice. The proponents of the so-called distributive paradigm argue that just distribution is the most basic aspect of justice. Their opponents claim that this is a misleading “picture” of justice. Instead, they argue for a concept of justice that is primarily concerned with the social status of persons. The distributive paradigm is confronted with several different objections, which the Gosepath attempts to refute. At the same time, he further elucidates the function of distributive justice. The paper addressing the three most central differences/challenges, namely (i) the contested concept of goods, (ii) the contested concept of social relations, and (iii) the contested significance of political justice.