Stefan Lang

Zusammenfassung Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik prägt die Philosophie im deutschen Sprachraum im 18. Jahrhundert. Ihr Einfluss auf J. G. Fichte ist in der Forschung bislang vergleichsweise wenig untersucht worden. In diesem Aufsatz wird dargelegt, dass Fichte vermittelt durch seine Auseinandersetzung mit K. L. Reinholds Elementarphilosophie von der Grundsatzdebatte in der deutschen Schulmetaphysik beeinflusst worden ist. Fichte gibt mit seiner Grundsatzlehre in der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre originäre Antworten auf Fragen, die in der deutschen Schulmetaphysik diskutiert worden sind.

There exist many crucial relations between the self, self-awareness, and affect. While all three themes have been central subjects within contemporary philosophy of mind in their own right, comparatively little attention has been paid to the various relationships between them. The anthology is dedicated to these relations. This introductory chapter roughly outlines the theoretical territory we are about to enter. To this end, we will provide in the first two sections very short (and unsatisfying) answers to the following two questions: What is the relation between selves and self-consciousness? What is an affect? The question of what relations may hold between selves and their affective mental states will be addressed in the third section when we engage with the contributions to this volume. The chapters are loosely organized around different explanatory directions that an approach to the relations between the topics might want to examine. The first exploratory route is to ask whether a theory of self-awareness can contribute to a theory of emotion, that is to ask how different aspects and kinds of self-awareness are involved in different kinds of emotions. Another approach takes the opposite direction and investigates how central issues debated in emotion research help us to understand self-consciousness more appropriately. Finally, we will address questions concerning the nature and development of selves and how emotions are involved in these phenomena.

Within philosophy, it is disputed what the characteristic properties of a self and paradigmatic examples of a self are. It is equally controversial whether a self exists at all. The first task that a theory of the self should solve is therefore to determine the starting point of an investigation of the self, in view of which it can be well justified that a self exists. This starting point should also make it possible to realize what the self is and to determine properties of the self. This chapter presents a proposed solution to this task and goes some way to answering the question of what a self is and what its properties are. In addition, the concept of affect is discussed in relation to the following questions: Is the self affective? What significance do affects have for the self?

In this introduction, central questions of the anthology are examined. The questions are: What is performativity? What is the hermeneutical and systematic significance of performative interpretations of theories developed within classical German Philosophy? Accordingly, the first section will explain to some extent what is meant by performativity. In the second section, an example of a performative interpretation of an important concept in F.W.J. Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) is presented with regard to Schelling’s concept of intellectual intuition. Following on from this, the systematic and hermeneutic relevance of performative interpretations is explained. Finally, the third section briefly presents the contributions to the volume, focusing on the volume’s central questions.

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an established treatment for movement disorders, epilepsy, and some neuropsychiatric conditions. The technology of DBS is rapidly advancing, and with these technological innovations, it is anticipated that the efficacy of DBS for current clinical indications will improve, and new indications will emerge. To meet these expectations, DBS technology has to overcome several challenges related to hardware design, safety, ethical considerations, and global access. This chapter discusses these future challenges and the strategies to address them.

This volume provides a comprehensive account of Friedrich Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion. The contributors cover the historical context of Schleiermacher's work, specific aspects of his philosophy of religion, and the ways that his work can contribute to contemporary debates. Friedrich Schleiermacher is considered one of the outstanding representatives of 19th-century Protestant theology. This volume brings together scholars from both continental and analytic traditions to explore Schleiermacher's preeminent role in post-Kantian philosophy of religion. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first section situates Schleiermacher in the context of the 19th-century philosophy of religion. These chapters analyse his relation to thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, as well as to prominent theologians in the Protestant and Catholic traditions. The second section explores different aspects of Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion such as absolute dependence or religious feelings. Finally, section three addresses how Schleiermacher's insights can contribute to contemporary philosophy of religion. These chapters address current debates, particularly on religious experience, feminism, and philosophy of emotions. Friedrich Schleiermacher's Philosophy of Religion will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, and 19th-century religious thought.

Performativity plays a significant role avant la lettre in Classical German Philosophy. It is, among other things, a central component of original interpretations of the Absolute, the Subject, and Knowledge. Since the 2010s, there has been an increasing number of studies examining the performative in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Hölderlin, Novalis, Schliermacher, and Schlegel. This anthology picks up on this development. Through interdisciplinary contributions, performativity within Classical German Philosophy is explained and discussed, highlighting the hermeneutic and systematic insights gained from performative interpretations. [In German: Performativität spielt avant la lettre in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie eine bedeutende Rolle. Sie ist u.a. ein zentraler Bestandteil originärer Interpretationen des Absoluten, des Subjekts oder auch des Wissens. Seit den 2010er Jahren mehren sich daher Untersuchungen, die dem Performativen bei Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Hölderlin, Novalis, Schliermacher, und Schlegel. Dieser Sammelband greift diese Entwicklung auf. Anhand interdisziplinärer Beiträge wird Performativität innerhalb der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie erläutert und diskutiert. Dabei wird der hermeneutische und systematische Ertrag performativer Interpretationen dargestellt.]

The self, self-awareness and emotions are central subjects within contemporary philosophy of mind but comparatively little attention has been paid to the relationships between them. This volume brings together philosophers from different specialisms to explore these relationships from three different angles. First, whether a theory of self-awareness can contribute to a theory of emotion, including how different aspects and kinds of self-awareness are related to different emotions. Second, from the opposite direction, whether research into emotions can help achieve a better understanding of self-consciousness. Finally, the book considers how emotions are involved in the nature and development of selves. Self and Affect is essential reading for all scholars and researchers of the philosophy of mind, especially those focussing on emotions and self-awareness. Stefan Lang is Lecturer (Privatdozent) at MLU Halle-Wittenberg. Maik Niemeck is Post Doctoral Researcher and Lecturer (wiss. Mitarbeiter/Habilitand) at Philipps-Universität Marburg.

In recent years, interest in pre-reflective self-consciousness has increased significantly. One of the central points of inquiry is whether pre-reflective self-consciousness ubiquitously accompanies phenomenal consciousness. This paper explores a phenomenological justification for the thesis that pre-reflective self-consciousness ubiquitously accompanies phenomenal consciousness. Allegedly, the ubiquity of pre-reflective self-consciousness can be proved on the basis of phenomenological description. The aim of this paper is to develop a new objection against this justification of the ubiquity thesis.

Among the central debates within the classical German philosophy after I. Kant is the question of how intentional self-consciousness is possible. In the following discourse, Schelling's concept of self-consciousness in System of Transcendental Idealism will be examined and critically discussed. The central theses are, first of all, that for Schelling self-consciousness is a case of intentional consciousness; secondly, that Schelling develops a performative interpretation of intentional self-consciousness; and thirdly, Schelling fails to completely explain intentional self-consciousness.

This essay develops a new interpretation of Moses Mendelssohn’s ontological argument in the Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence. At the beginning, Immanuel Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological proof of God’s existence in the Critique of Pure Reason is presented. Then I offer an in-depth analysis of Mendelssohn’s original ontological argument in the Morning Hours. It is shown that with Mendelssohn’s new proof of God, Kant’s objections are answered. Finally, it is explained why Mendelssohn does not succeed in completely refuting Kant’s objections.

K.L. Reinhold’s interpretation of deduction plays a seminal role in the development of German Idealism. However, as yet Reinhold’s concept of deduction has not been sufficiently explained. The goals of this paper are (i) to analyze Reinhold’s notion of deduction in his Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie, (ii) to reconstruct his deduction of a priori forms of representation and (iii) to discuss his deduction critically. In doing so, I will present Reinhold’s objections against Immanuel Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason.

This essay argues that persons not only have nonconceptual bodily self-awareness and nonconceptual mental anonymous self-awareness but also, at least if they produce the expression ‘I’, nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. It contains information of ‘I’ being produced by oneself. It is argued that this can be seen if we examine the constitution of referential self-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of being the referent of ‘I’ oneself. The main argument is: A. It is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is not assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. B. It is possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. C. Thus it is reasonable to assume that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. The justification of the thesis that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness is presented while discussing Tomis Kapitan’s analysis of conceptual egological self-consciousness. Conceptual egological self-consciousness contains infor­mation of being a subject oneself. It is argued that it is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness with the help of Kapitan’s interpretation of conceptual self-consciousness. However, it is possible to ex­plain the constitution of referential self-consciousness within the framework of Kapitan’s account if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness.