Stefan Rapp

I am an independent researcher working in epistemology, philosophy of science, and the theory of model formation. My work develops Epistemics as a framework for understanding how finite cognitive systems form, stabilize, use, and revise models under finite conditions.

The project begins from a basic epistemological problem: reality cannot simply be presupposed as a positively determinable outside. Every statement about reality, world, matter, experience, or science already appears within a context in which something is distinguished, stabilized, and made meaningful. This does not lead to dogmatic solipsism, but to a more precise form of realism: reality is understood as cognition-relative, that is, as a stable, resistant, corrigible, and orientationally effective form within a cognitive system.

This starting point is developed most directly in Realism Without an Outside: Cognition-Relative Realism and the Limit of Positive Determinability. The paper argues that the problem lies not only in the assertion of an external world, but already in the concept of the “outside” itself. The so-called outside is not a positively determinable domain, but a stabilized interpretation of the limit of positive determinability as a counter-domain. Realism is therefore not rejected, but reconstructed as the form in which a cognitive system stabilizes an external order and subsequently reconstructs itself from the perspective of that order.

On this basis, the broader project asks how finite systems generate stable orders at all. Contingency Mechanics: Variation, Stabilization Tension, and the Emergence of Viable Order in Finite Systems develops the general dynamic frame for this question. It describes how open possibility spaces are transformed into viable continuations through variation, stabilization tension, e₀-proximate stabilization, immanentization, actualization, friction, and reorganization.

Epistemics then specifies this broader logic for explicit model management. In Epistemics: Model Management Under Finite Conditions, models are not treated as passive copies of a ready-made world, but as selective, structured, limited, and revisable forms of orientation. The central questions are how models become stable, within which domains they remain valid, where they begin to generate friction, and how they must be revised when they no longer carry their explanatory or practical load.

Several papers develop this framework further. From the Field of Experience to the Model examines the transition from experiential fields to model-capable orders. Ontologization as an Epistemic Basic Operation reconstructs ontologization not as a metaphysical claim, but as a functional stabilization process through which dynamic experiential fields become manageable and referable. Domains, Boundaries, and Transition Functions analyzes domain-relative validity, model migration, and the conditions under which models can or cannot be transferred between different spaces of validity.

The operational dynamics of model management are developed through papers on friction, falsification, search, and revision. Friction: Boundary Signal of Finite Load-Bearing Capacity treats friction as a diagnostic signal indicating where stabilization becomes overextended or too costly. Contextual and Global Falsification of Scientific Models develops a model-theoretic account of falsification beyond a narrow Popperian conception by distinguishing contextual and global model failure within domain-specific conditions of validity. Efficient Search under Finite Conditions reconstructs search as a controlled alternation between stabilization and exploratory opening. Revision under Finite Conditions develops revision as a basic epistemic operation mediating between friction, falsification, search, and renewed stabilization.

A further group of papers examines reality orders and domains of validity. Relative Reality Theory analyzes degrees of reality, validity, and stability in fragmented knowledge environments. Beyond Physics and Metaphysics proposes a differentiation of reality into subjective, intersubjective, and functional-empirical orders of stability, without treating these as metaphysical hierarchies. Together, these works aim to clarify how reality claims become meaningful, robust, corrigible, and limited under finite conditions.

The paper Why a Cosmological World Model Is Not Enough applies this broader framework to cosmology. It argues that persistent cosmological tensions may indicate not merely local anomalies, but architectural overextension and the need for domain-sensitive model reorganization.

In addition to this core research program, I have contributed to the debate on personal identity with The Limits of the Self in Ontological Materialism: On the Indeterminacy of Exclusive Personal Identity. The paper argues that a strictly materialist framework cannot ground exclusive personal identity over time without additional assumptions.

Across these contributions, the aim is not to formulate ultimate ontological claims, but to clarify the conditions under which reality claims, models, and scientific frameworks become stable, valid, corrigible, and revisable. Epistemics.de serves as the central project website and provides an overview of the papers, concepts, and developing architecture of the research program.

Over the course of the project, my work has increasingly moved from classical epistemological analysis toward what may be described as a form of epistemic engineering. By this I do not mean a technical replacement of philosophy, but the constructive investigation of how reality-forms, models, domains, and revision procedures can be deliberately shaped, tested, stabilized, and reorganized under finite conditions. From this perspective, the project may become more understandable not merely as a theory about knowledge, but as an attempt to develop tools for the design, diagnosis, and transformation of epistemic orders.