Stefan Rinner

As Chalmers himself notes, his two-dimensional semantics leads to the problem of how scenarios, i.e. epistemically possible worlds, can best represent the information who I am, where I am, and what time it is now. For Chalmers, the natural solution to this problem of indexicality is to identify scenarios with centered worlds: ordered tuples of (possible) worlds, individuals, times, and places. According to such a solution, two arbitrary tokens of ‘now’ and ‘here’ (respectively) have the same primary (or epistemic) intension, picking out the time/place marked at the center of any given scenario. Against this, I will object that there are a posteriori true, i.e. epistemically contingent, utterances of both ‘Now = now’ and ‘Here = here’. Since identifying scenarios with centered worlds seems to be the natural solution to the problem of indexicality, this will undermine Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantics.

Recent philosophy of language has seen a growing interest in what is often called the dynamics of conversation or conversational scorekeeping, that is, the ways in which speech and context mutually interact in the course of a conversation. This paper provides an introduction to the scorekeeping approach to linguistic interaction and its different developments and applications. Starting from the seminal work of Stalnaker and Lewis in the 1970s, it looks at subsequent proposals for enriching and extending their conceptions of context or conversational score to account for various linguistic phenomena. In addition, it discusses different, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations of the idea of conversational scorekeeping; the prospects for integrating the scorekeeping approach with two other prominent frameworks in pragmatics, namely, Grice's theory of conversational implicatures and speech act theory; and applications of the approach in the area of social and political philosophy of language.

In his ‘On the Explanation of Intentionality’, Tim Crane (2024) disputes an influential argument for the claim that mental representations must represent via some non-intrinsic connection, which he ascribes to Putnam. Putnam's argument would establish what Crane calls ‘the aboutness assumption’, that is, that the question what makes it the case that any mental state is about something has to be answered without using any intentional notions. Crane disputes this assumption by arguing that arguments in its favour, such as Putnam's argument, have hidden premises which for themselves would establish the conclusion. For instance, according to Crane, one of the reasons why we believe that Putnam's argument is sound is physicalism.In this paper, I will strengthen Crane’s objection to Putnam’s argument by arguing that even physicalism is compatible with the claim that (at least some) mental representations represent intrinsically. For example, I will argue that Recanati’s theory which takes Fregean modes of representation to be mental files not only entails that mental files represent intrinsically, but also that they are physically realised in the brains of the agents. I will then further challenge Putnam's claim that mental representations must represent via some non-intrinsic connection by arguing that independent of whether we conceive of modes of presentation as mental files, the existence of modes of presentation would speak against Putnam's thesis.

It has been argued that since we cannot rule out that we are eternal brains in vats (BIVs) whose sensory impressions are generated by a supercomputer and who can thus be assumed to exist in a world where (almost) nothing is as it seems, most (or almost all) of our empirical beliefs are such that we cannot rule out that they are false. Since fallible knowledge seems to be a contradiction in terms, it has been concluded that we have much less empirical knowledge than we would normally assume and that sound empirical knowledge might even be impossible. This is the skeptical argument. Starting from semantic externalism, various arguments have been proposed to rule out the possibility that we are BIVs. In this paper, I will argue that trying to rule out the possibility of being a BIV is a very weak response to the skeptical argument, as it accepts the challenge raised by the skeptic, i.e. that in order to have empirical knowledge, we have to exclude the possibility that we are BIVs. In fact, we will see that starting from semantic externalism, a much stronger response is possible. Accordingly, we do not have to rule out that we are BIVs in order for the skeptical argument to contain a false premise.

In her chapter “Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography”, Rae Langton proposes a development of David Lewis’ scorekeeping model, according to which speakers can not only presuppose certain beliefs on the part of the hearers but also certain desires and feelings. This should then explain how speech, and in particular hate speech, can change the hearers’ desires and feelings about the group targeted for hate using presupposition accommodation. Against Langton’s proposal, I will object that, although we have a good understanding of what it means for an utterance to presuppose certain beliefs on the part of the hearers, we basically have no understanding of what it means to presuppose certain desires or feelings. What is even more problematic is that Langton does not provide any concrete examples of utterances presupposing a desire or feeling. This leads to the question of whether there is such a thing as presupposed desires and feelings. Although I will answer this question affirmatively, contrary to Langton’s explanation, this will not require that, in addition to common beliefs, conversational score also includes common desires or feelings. Rather, presupposed desires and feelings will be reduced to presupposed beliefs. Thus, to adjust their beliefs, hearers may sometimes be forced to adjust their desires and feelings. This will provide an explanation of the fact that, in addition to the hearers’ beliefs, hate speech also changes their desires and feelings.

In ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game’, David Lewis famously compares conversations to playing baseball. Just like baseball, conversations have a score which, together with rules for correct play, determines which utterances are acceptable or even true in the course of a conversation. For all similarities, however, there is a crucial difference between conversations and baseball games. Unlike the score of a baseball game, conversational score adjusts in such a way that the utterances made in the course of a conversation count as correct play. This is also known as accommodation. Starting from this scorekeeping approach to language use, the overall aim of the present paper is to provide a better understanding of how the methods and interventions of talking therapies work from a linguistic point of view. According to the scorekeeping model, the methods and interventions of talking therapies are effective by changing the score of the therapeutic conversation, in particular in the form of accommodation. This has significant implications for the therapeutic practice, as it highlights the importance of training therapists in the linguistic aspects of therapeutic methods, in particular in the use of accommodation.

Sprache kann auf äußerst destruktive Weise verwendet werden. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist die Verwendung so genannter Slurs. Slurs sind sprachliche Ausdrücke, die Gruppen und deren individuelle Mitglieder aufgrund ihrer Herkunft, Ethnizität, Religion, sexueller Orientierung etc. abwerten. In den letzten 20 Jahren haben sich Sprachphilosoph*innen zunehmend mit den Fragen beschäftigt, wie anhand von Slurs abgewertet und was dadurch bewirkt wird. Die Beschäftigung mit diesen Fragen ist nicht nur theoretisch-sprachphilosophisch relevant. Ein besseres Verständnis davon, wie anhand von Slurs abgewertet wird, ist auch von praktisch-ethischer Relevanz. Wenn wir verstehen, wie Slurs funktionieren, dann können wir auch verstehen, wie wir die negativen Konsequenzen ihrer Verwendung verhindern bzw. zumindest eindämmen können. In diesem Beitrag werden wir die abwertende Kraft von Slurs sowohl von theoretisch-sprachphilosophischer Seite her als auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt ethisch-praktischer Fragen beleuchten.

Philosophers have studied various ways in which things can be said implicitly, and how this can be exploited in both derogatory and political speech. The present paper follows this tradition by focussing on a linguistic phenomenon which has so far received little attention from philosophers, i.e. (linguistic) false friends. In linguistics, false friends are understood as bilingual homographs or homophones which differ (significantly) in some kind of conventional linguistic meaning. We will argue that such false friends can be used for (political) dogwhistling. Hence, by providing a better understanding of the linguistic phenomenon of false friends, the present paper aims to provide a better understanding of dogwhistling, possibly opening up new ways of preventing or at least containing the negative consequences of these speech acts.

Using a variant of Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de re belief, I recently presented a new argument against the so-called Naive Russellian theory, consisting of the following theses: (NR1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{1}$$\end{document}) The propositions we say and believe are Russellian propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about; (NR2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{2}$$\end{document}) Names (and other singular terms) are directly referential terms, i.e., the propositional content of a name is just its referent; (NR3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{3}$$\end{document}) A sentence of the form ‘A believes/disbelieves that S’ is true in a context c if and only if the referent of A in c believes/disbelieves the proposition expressed by S in c. In this paper, I will argue that my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle is not only a problem for the Naive Russellian theory, but for every theory of belief ascriptions entailing (NR3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{3}$$\end{document}). Such theories are also called relational analyses of belief ascriptions. Here the main alternative to a Neo-Russellian theory, consisting of (NR1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{1}$$\end{document}) and (NR2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$NR_{2}$$\end{document}), is a Fregean theory, according to which the propositions we say and believe are Fregean propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of ways the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to the speaker or agent. I will argue that such variants of the relational analysis are committed to principles very similar to the principles used by my Schiffer puzzle. Concluding, I will discuss Fregean and Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis, and I will argue that, although there are Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis which provide a solution to my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle, there seem to be no such Fregean alternatives.

So-called Neo-Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘ n is F ’ in a context c is the singular proposition ⟨ o, P ⟩, where o is the referent of the name n in c, and P is the property expressed by the predicate F in c. This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo-Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo-Russellian theory.

In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke, and Elbourne (HKE), there are circumstances in which (1) is true and (2) is false. Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.Hans wants there to be exactly one ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet tonight. After all, the argument goes, unlike (2), (1) can be true without Hans wanting there to be exactly one ghost in his attic. Kaplan and Neale famously reply that the HKE objection presupposes that non-doxastic attitudes are closed under entailment, which they are not. For Rostworowski, on the other hand, the problematic principle used by the HKE objection is a substitutivity principle for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. This is further supported by the fact that, as Elbourne points out, Russell’s analysis already leads to a problem similar to the HKE objection together with substitutivity alone. By questioning substitutivity for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, Rostworowski tries to block both the HKE objection and Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection. In this paper, I will argue that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions leads to a variant of the HKE objection even in the context of doxastic attitude ascriptions. Since, as we will see, doxastic attitude ascriptions do not seem to suffer from the substitutivity problems discussed by Rostworowski in the context of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, this will further exacerbate the problem for Russell’s analysis. I will then discuss the possibility to reject substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions using a contextualist analysis of attitude ascriptions. However, we will see that, independent of whether we accept substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions, a complete solution of the doxastic problem has to reject Russell’s analysis of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘The F is G’. Concluding, I will show that, unlike Russell’s analysis, the Frege–Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, according to which a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ presupposes that there is exactly one F, rather than asserting it, provides an explanation of the HKE objection, Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection, and the doxastic problem presented in this paper. This will speak not only in favor of a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, but also of a Fregean conception of propositions.

A very common argument against restrictions on hate speech says that since such restrictions curtail freedom of speech, they cause more harm than they prevent. A no less common reply has it that the harms caused by hate speech are sufficiently great to justify legal restrictions on free speech. In ‘Freedom of Expression and Derogatory Words’, West questions a common assumption of both arguments concerning the use of slurs, i.e. that restricting the use of slurs necessarily curtails freedom of speech. According to West, everything that can be said with a slur can be said with its neutral counterpart. Given the psychological and social harms of slurs, this would give us a compelling reason to put legal restrictions on their use. However, in this article, I will argue that, according to the main theories of slurs, slurs can be used to express derogatory information which cannot be expressed by their neutral counterparts. This will leave us with two options when it comes to avoiding the negative effects of slurs: (i) to restrict freedom of speech or (ii) to argue that the derogatory information expressed by slurs is not covered by free speech. Both options will depart significantly from West's argument.

A central method of systemic therapy is the use of so called systemic questions. With these questions the therapist provides the client with an alternative and possibly less problematic description of reality. Since clients tend to tacitly accept these implicit offers by the therapist, systemic questions are often ascribed a "hypnotic" effect. In this paper, I will explain the "hypnotic" effect of systemic questions with the linguistic phenomenon of presupposition accommodation. For instance, in "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", David Lewis points out that speakers tend to tacitly accept the presuppositions of an utterance, because an utterance is only appropriate if its presuppositions are already part of common ground. Starting from this, I will argue with von Fintel's 'Hey, wait a minute' test that the implicit offers of systemic questions are nothing more than presuppositions of these questions. First, this will provide an explanation of the "hypnotic" effect of systemic question via the phenomenon of presupposition accommodation. In addition, it will explain how the implicit offers of systemic questions enable a new description of reality on the part of the client. In this way, the present paper is an example of how philosophy of language can be applied to problems outside of philosophy, providing further evidence that the research area of applied philosophy of language is real.

Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: the semantic contents of sentences are structured propositions whose basic components are objects and properties, names are directly referential terms, and a sentence of the form ‘n believes that S’ is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Naive Russellian theory’. In this talk, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle as an argument against the Naive Russellian theory. Schiffer’s argument proceeds in two steps. In step one, Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to two principles regarding de re belief; the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint. Then, in step two, Schiffer argues that the special-case consequence is not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Salmon and Braun reply to Schiffer’s argument that although the Naive Russellian theory is committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to the special-case consequence. However, in this paper, I will argue with a new Schiffer-case that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to the special-case consequence, it is still not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Concluding, I will discuss the possibility to reject Frege’s constraint within the Naive Russellian theory.

In this paper, we will present an analysis of the Oswald example that takes a closer look at the antecedents of the Oswald minimal pair. We will argue that diverging foci in the antecedents of the Oswald example result in different truth conditions of the conditionals, explaining the difference in truth values between the two sentences. Although the explanation will incorporate aspects of Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals, it will go beyond Stalnaker’s analysis of the Oswald example on one crucial point. The difference in focus assignments between the two sentences will not be explained by a difference in appropriateness conditions between indicative and subjunctive mood. Instead, the diverging foci will stem from pragmatic requirements imposed on the presuppositions of indicative and subjunctive antecedents. This analysis will be further confirmed by extending it to similar examples with ascriptions of hopes and wishes, pointing towards a more clear-cut separation of and the effect of the Oswald example conditionality.

Following Russell, philosophers like Moltmann, Jubien, Boër, and Newman analyse ‘John believes that Mary is French’ as ‘R ’, instead of analysing it as ‘R ’. Thus, for these philosophers, instead of relations holding between agents and truth-bearing entities, propositional attitude verbs, like ‘belief’, express relations holding between agents and the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about. This is also known as the Multiple Relation Theory. In this paper, I will discuss the Multiple Relation Theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle to argue against the so called direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated, among others, by Salmon and Braun. I will argue that, unlike the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the Multiple Relation Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. In this connection, I will also discuss a slight modification of the Multiple Relation Theory according to which the ways the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to us are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like ‘John believes that Mary is French’. We will see that prima facie such a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory provides a solution to Schiffer’s puzzle. However, concluding, I will argue with new Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory cannot explain all instances of Schiffer’s puzzle. This will undermine the Multiple Relation Theory in general.

Against content theories of slurs, according to which slurs have some kind of derogatory content, Anderson and Lepore have objected that they cannot explain that even slurs under quotation can cause offense. If slurs had some kind of derogatory content, the argument goes, quotation would render this content inert and, thus, quoted slurs should not be offensive. Following this, Anderson and Lepore propose that slurs are offensive because they are prohibited words. In this paper, we will show that, pace Anderson and Lepore, content theories of slurs do provide an explanation of the fact that quoted slurs can cause offense: even under quotation, the explanation goes, the derogatory content of a slur can still be psychologically efficacious. We will go one step further by pointing out that offensiveness is not the only function of slurs, but that slurs can also be used to create and reinforce negative attitudes towards the target group. While content theories can easily explain this by referring to some kind of derogatory content, Anderson and Lepore’s prohibitionism will lack a satisfactory explanation of this second function of slurs. Concluding, we will argue that, unlike uses of slurs, uses of quoted slurs normally do not derogate the target group. This will again speak in favor of content theories. Accordingly, uses of quoted slurs are not derogatory because quotation renders the derogatory content inert. Hence, rather than speaking against content theories, quoted slurs speak in their favor.

In this paper, I will present a puzzle for logical analyses, such as Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions and Recanati’s analysis of ‘that’-clauses. I will argue that together with Kripke’s disquotational principles connecting sincere assent and belief such non-trivial logical analyses lead to contradictions. Following this, I will compare the puzzle about logical analysis with Frege’s puzzle about belief ascriptions. We will see that although the two puzzles do have similarities, the solutions to Frege’s puzzle cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the puzzle about logical analysis. Hence, to say it with Kripke, the main thesis of this paper is that the puzzle is a puzzle. A complete solution to the puzzle promises a better understanding of both logical analyses and belief ascriptions.