Stefan Sean Gordon Storrie

Irish philosophy is typically characterized in terms of the engagement with a small subset of issues connected to Locke’s view of language. This chapter has two aims. First is to show that the concerns and approaches taken by those included in the category of Irish philosophy is broader and more diverse that is commonly thought. Three issues were at the heart of Irish philosophy: cognitivism, knowledge of spiritual substance, and the validity of a concept of self-determination in moral philosophy. The second aim is to present how Berkeley developed his views on these issues, how it relates to his compatriots’ views, and what his settled approach to these topics amounted to.

In Alciphron (1732) Berkeley engages in extensive criticism of the Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Berkeley’s criticism of the Earl is remarkably aggressive. It culminates in §§12-14 of the Third Dialogue, where Berkeley launches a vicious personal attack against Shaftesbury, under the name of ‘Cratylus’. In this way the third dialogue differs radically in tone from Berkeley’s other philosophical works and has been viewed with shock and derision. In this paper I will show that Berkeley names Shaftesbury ‘Cratylus’ because he wants to impute the kind of self-deception against the Earl that Plato vividly describes in the dialogue Cratylus. This, moreover, is the key to correctly understanding Berkeley’s argument against Shaftesbury’s moral theory, which is an attack on a pernicious form of moral subjectivism, rather than an attack on virtue ethics, as is commonly thought.

: This paper examines two features of Kant’s 1768 critique of Leibniz’ conception of space. Firstly, Leibniz’ proposed geometrical calculus called ‘analysis situs’; secondly, Leibniz’ relational conception of space. The main thesis of the paper is that Kant’s arguments are more powerful than generally recognized. With regard to the analysis situs, I will show that Kant was quite well informed about this proposed science and that his arguments severely undermine Leibniz’ claims to what it could perform. With regard to the relational theory of space, Kant’s argument would require Leibniz to present a complex story about the relation between God’s act of creation and our spatial experience to defend his relational view, rather than using the simple principle of sufficient reason.

Daniel Garber has put forward an argument that aims to show that Kant’s understanding of Leibniz’ metaphysics should be discounted because he could only have had access to a small and narrow sample of Leibniz’ works from around 1710–1714. In particular, Garber argues that as Kant could not have read Leibniz’ correspondence with Arnauld or his correspondence with Des Bosses he could not have had an adequate conception of Leibniz’ understanding of the relation between substance and body. I will show that Kant could have read some of the Arnauld correspondence and practically all of the Des Bosses correspondence, as well as a number of other related texts that are important for understanding Leibniz’ metaphysics, over a decade before writing the Critique of Pure Reason. Garber’s historical-textual argument for dismissing Kant’s account of Leibniz’ metaphysics is therefore seriously misleading

This essay provides some historical background for, and considers the philosophical importance of, the collection of Anne Berkeley’s (George Berkeley’s wife) letters to Adam Gordon. The primary philosophical significance of the letters is her arguments against the so-called “free thinkers.” She discusses the philosophical view and the behavior of five prominent free-thinkers: Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume. Her discussion of Shaftesbury is particularly illuminating and can be read as a commentary on Alciphron III.13-14. Because the work of the other four were published mainly after the Bishop’s death, the letters also show Anne’s independent lifelong interest in matters theological, philosophical, and moral.

"The Routledge Guidebook to Berkeley's Three Dialogues is an engaging introduction to the last of a trio of works that cemented Berkeley's position as one of the truly great philosophers of the western canon. Berkeley's distinctive idealist philosophy has been a challenge and inspiration for thinkers ever since. Written for readers approaching this seminal work for the first time, this book: - Provides the philosophical context in which Three Dialogues was written - Critically discusses the arguments in each of the Three Dialogues - Examines some of the principle disputes concerning the interpretation of his work The Routledge Guidebook to Berkeley's Three Dialogues offers a clear and comprehensive guide to this ground-breaking volume and includes further reading sections at the end of each chapter. This is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand this influential work"--

In ?155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ?unbodied spirit? ?cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle?.1The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ?the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.? This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools. 1All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y