Stefano Caputo

This paper puts forward an argument against realist views of grounding, which hinges on explanations based on so-called ‘real definitions’. I will provide some essential background, then phrase the argument, and show some anti-realist conclusions that can be drawn from it. Finally, I will deal with some potential objections, and I will discuss Correia’s [2017] view of real definitions, in order to show that despite appearances, the notion of grounding does not have any actual theoretical role within it.

Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form “the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that y is F” cannot be grounded in claims of existential dependence of the form “x existentially depends on y” and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded, via a definition of existential dependence, in the former. I will firstly argue that Schnieder’s main point against the claim that existential grounding is grounded in existential dependence is not conclusive; I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existential dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki which, although accepting the former’s definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter’s idea that existential dependence does the real job in structuring reality.

Nell’introdurre questo volume chiariamo come il concetto dell’altro sia suscettibile di essere declinato in modi così variegati che, a proposito di esso, dovrebbe piuttosto parlarsi di una galassia concettuale. I dieci saggi presenti nel volume ambiscono proprio a fare luce su tale galassia. Dopo aver presentato le idee centrali di ciascuno dei saggi sottolineiamo come essi costituiscano un episodio di pensiero paradigmatico di come filosofi cosiddetti “analitici” e “continentali” possano cooperare, nelle loro diverse prospettive, al chiarimento di un problema di interesse non solo per la filosofia ma per la società in cui ci muoviamo. Ecco solo un campione delle questioni, che si muovono intorno al concetto dell’Altro, che i saggi contenuti nel volume contribuiscono ad affrontare. Il relativismo culturale coglie nel segno? È realmente possibile istituire una rigida demarcazione fra “noi” e gli “altri”? Quanto profondamente le relazioni con gli altri formano il nostro Sé? L’istantaneità, che nell’età di Internet caratterizza sempre più le nostre relazioni con gli altri, pone una minaccia all’integrità dei nostri Sé? Che valore dovrebbe essere assegnato all’eccentricità in una società altamente stereotipata come la nostra? Come e in che misura è possibile una relazione comunicativa razionale non distorta e non violenta con l’altro da noi? L’ammissione di una radicale alterità è realmente in contrasto con quella di una realtà indipendente dalla nostra mente oppure è la realtà stessa nella sua indipendenza dalla mente a costituire l’alterità irriducibile con cui siamo confrontati? Che cosa c’è alla base della sensazione, che è così centrale della nostra esperienza della letteratura, di essere di fronte a qualcosa di radicalmente altro da noi (un mondo di finzione) ma anche di estremamente simile (le storie non parlano in fondo di noi stessi?). E cosa può rivelarci sulla nostra esperienza percettiva delle opere figurative quel fenomeno tipico del sentirsi seguiti dallo sguardo di un volto dipinto? Che ruolo retorico ha, e ha avuto, l’attribuzione di una radicale, e negativa, alterità nelle contrapposizioni teologiche e religiose?

The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word “true”, on the one hand when it is used to refer to a property of what we say or believe, here called “words’ truth”, on the other when it is used to refer to a feature of things in general (as when we say “he is a true friend”), here called “things’ truth”. I will point out how such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called “transparency” which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words’ truth. The upshot of the paper will be that Aquinas was right in considering the two kinds of truth as species of the unique genus “adaequatio rei et intellectus”, but that this conclusion can be reached without any commitment to the ideology (in the Quinean sense) of the correspondence theory of truth.

The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word “true”, on the one hand when it is used to refer to a specific characteristic of what we say or think about, here called “words’ truth”, on the other when it is used to refer to a characteristic of whatever (as when we say “he is a true friend”), here called “things’ truth”. The main thesis here defended is that such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called “transparency” which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words’ truth.

This volume brings together a number of previously unpublished essays that will advance the reader's philosophical understanding of specific aspects of causation, agency and moral responsibility. These are deeply intertwined notions, and a large proportion of the volume is taken up by papers that shed light on their mutual connections or defend certain claims concerning them. The volume investigates several important questions, including: Can causation be perceived? If it can, can it be perceived in any way other than visually? Can the interventionist theory developed by James Woodward offer an adequate account of causation? Is a causal relation a necessary condition for moral responsibility? Can there be a responsibility difference without a causal difference? Are causal ascriptions based on the more primitive language game of blame ascriptions? What can be learnt from the analogy between causal interference and unbreakable processes, on one side, and motivational interferences and "unbreakable" resolutions, on the other side? How can humans be routinely considered responsible for non-deliberated omissions? Should the connection between moral responsibility and the epistemic conditions usually required for moral responsibility to be obtained be weakened? What is the connection between awareness of one's doing and intentional action? These essays constitute a valid contribution towards the discovery of reasonable answers to such deep questions as the metaphysics of causal relations, the epistemology of causal explanations, the interventionist theory of causation, and the relationship among causality and moral responsibility, willpower, agency and intentional action.

The focus of Maurizio Ferraris’ reflection, at least from Il mondo esterno (Ferraris 2001) onwards, is criticism towards postmodern, constructivist anti-realism. Radical forms of constructivism, however, were defended even outside postmodernism both in the tradition of analytical philosophy and, more recently, in cognitive sciences. The article first presents and then criticizes a constructivist statement made by Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff in one of the most influential articles appeared, in recent years, in the debate about the nature of concepts: The Brain's Concepts (Gallese, Lakoff 2005). This position is then linked to a form of constructivist anti-realism also called conceptual relativism. This form was defended, in different ways and with different results, by philosophers such as Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. It is, therefore, claimed that all these forms of constructivist anti-realism face a dilemma: either they embrace the problematic metaphysical thesis of a causal efficacy of our minds over the world, or they are reduced to a plausible, but ontologically harmless, affirmation of the existence, in principle, of multiple ways to categorize reality and - in the case of the so-called theories of embodied cognition - of the dependence of these ways on the forms taken by the sensorimotor interaction of an organism with its environment. Finally, it is demonstrated how, staring from the observation of the multiple ways in which it is possible to categorize reality, it is possible to draw metaphysical conclusions opposed to the constructivist anti-realism.

According to Lynch’s aletich functionalism truth is manifested by/immanent in different properties in different domains of discourse; so a core concept of Alethic Functionalism is the concept of the relation of manifestation holding between truth and other properties. The claim I’m going to defend is that Lynch makes too many theoretical demands on the manifestation relation and this makes it a metaphysical monster, that is to say a relation with mutually inconsistent features. In order to make manifestation a coherent notion one should give up some of its original features, but this makes Alethic Functionalism a much less appealing theory than it was supposed to be.

Although philosophers have been concerned with truth since at least the age of Plato, the last thirty years have witnessed a veritable explosion of the philosophical debate on this topic. The touchpaper which lit the fuse for this was undoubtedly the Deflationist Renaissance (half a century after the seminal work of F.P. Ramsey) due, in the Seventies, both to the Quinean disquotational interpretation of the Tarskian truth definitions and to the development of the prosentential theory of truth by D. Grover, J. Kamp and N. Belnap, and, from the second half of the Eighties onwards, to the forceful defences of deflationary conceptions provided by H. Field and P. Horwich. The philosophical struggle on deflationism has been thought-provoking: by arguing on the merits and shortcomings of such a conception, philosophers have come to broaden and deepen the discussion on truth beyond the boundaries of deflationism. The varieties of problems tackled by the essays in this book highlight how the land of Truth is still far from having been totally explored, and how, in this intellectual endeavour, real progresses can be achieved.