Stefano Maso

If the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in the Letter 113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with the De ira we can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.

L’autore delle tragedie è da identificare con lo stesso autore delle Lettere a Lucilio e delle altre opere “filosofiche”. Seneca è convinto che anche l’arte drammatica debba essere capace di produrre effetti etici; al centro egli pone infatti la questione del perfezionamento morale. Ci si può chiedere se la posizione di Seneca si sia allontanata dalla prospettiva della dottrina stoica ortodossa e se si possa definirla come un originale approccio neo-stoico. La questione può esser posta (a) in relazione al modo in cui Seneca interpreta l’intreccio di fatum e di responsabilità soggettiva nell’azione; (b) in relazione alla teoria delle passioni; (c) in relazione al modo in cui sono rappresentati l’ambiente e i vitia della società imperiale.

Seneca sembra rileggere la dottrina stoica delle passioni alla luce dell’interpretazione aristotelica; procedendo nell’ottica del- l’alternativa secca che si deve al monismo della versione crisip- pea, Seneca fa delle passioni qualcosa di esterno e alternativo al soggetto agente. Tuttavia, seguendo poi una dinamica prospetti- va di tipo dualistico, evoca il ruolo decisionale e responsabiliz- zante del soggetto agente, il quale ha il compito di optare per la ragione o per l’opinione30 e quindi di mantenere o meno la propria enkrateia. Da ciò dipende che questa si trasformi o meno in uno strumento nelle mani della passione.

This volume presents the results of the ESAP-HYELE conference on "Aristotle, Physics 7.3: What is Alteration?", which took place in Vitznau, Switzerland, 12–15 February 2007. The contributors are part of a team of Aristotelian scholars who came together for the first time in 1995, and have since been meeting every spring. The purpose of their gatherings is to read and interpret line by line a short, but important chapter of Aristotle's works. In this way, attention is focussed on key texts of particular exegetic and theoretical interest. Each session starts with the presentation of a translation and a first analysis of the main problems; these then become the subject of an intense debate which illustrates the different schools of thought and methodological approaches. Over the years, the confrontation of these different points of view has had a beneficiary effect on scholarship and has stimulated research activity worldwide. On the occasion of the Vitznau meeting in 2007, it was decided for the first time to publish the results of the meeting in order to make them accessible to a wider public of scholars and students. The present volume is the fruit of this common effort

Cicero was not only a great Roman politician, lawyer and orator: he also dealt extensively with philosophy, which he believed constituted the surest foundation for his commitment to civic affairs. Not limiting himself to the translation of previous philosophical thought, he critically addressed central theoretical questions, and thereby made a lasting impact on Roman intellectual life. This book offers a modern guide to interpretations of Cicero's philosophical studies, one that ranges across his numerous philosophical works. Addressed to students and scholars of ancient philosophy, and to interested readers in the humanities more generally, the volume aims to break down the boundaries between the philosophical, literary and linguistic dimensions of Cicero's highly influential oeuvre. Stefano Maso is a full professor in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Ca' Foscari - Venice. Among his books are: Grasp and Dissent: Cicero and Epicurean Philosophy (Brepols 2015); Epicurus on Eidola: Peri Phuseos Book II. Update, Proposals, and Discussions (ed. with F. Masi, Hakkert 2015). He is co-editor of "Lexis. Poetica, retorica e comunicazione nella tradizione classica".

I Dissoi Logoi sono presentati in un nuova edizione criticamente rivista, accompagnata da introduzione e commento linguistico e storico-filosofico. Inoltre, il tentativo di definire che cosa siano i Dissoi Logoi e di collocarli all'interno di un quadro di sviluppo storico filosofico affidabile è davvero arduo, poiché oggettivamente poggia su una serie di variabili che purtroppo sono interdipendenti. Nulla da cui partire appare con sicurezza assodato, se si esclude il fatto che lo scritto è anonimo, che è in dialetto dorico e che è incompleto. Questa nuova edizione tiene conto di tutti i progressi effettuati negli ultimi cento anni dalla critica filosofica e dalla filologia.

The theory developed by Leucippus (5th cent. BCE), Democritus (470/460-380 BCE), and later Epicurus (341-271/270 BCE) and his school is commonly defined as atomistic materialism. According to this theory, matter is the fundamental principle of existent and ever-evolving reality, and it is constituted of atoms. But whereas for the first atomists atoms were not so much a substance (ousia) as an ideal form (idea) through which they could explain sensible bodies and their movement, with Epicurus atoms effectively turned into a substance. From a mathematical theory we come to a physical conception.

Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting prob­lem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understand­ing of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming.

If the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in theLetter113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with theDe irawe can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.