Stefano Oliverio

The authors describe the organization of a review of research literature on the relationship between Philosophy for/with Children (P4/wC) and religious education/education for spirituality (RE-EfS). They summarize a debate about whether the two are mutually enhancing or incompatible. They explain delimiting the scope of the project and present a grid of research questions used to analyze the literature. They summarize findings on how P4/wC is relevant to five categories of aims of RE-EfS: hermeneutical, cultural, socio-political, moral/spiritual, and epistemological. Many papers in the latter category promote P4/wC as a method for children’s epistemic agency in constructing their religious beliefs. Some respond to objections that children may reject traditional beliefs. Few address potential confusion and angst of children asked to question and defend their religious views. The authors conclude that the pragmatic thrust of P4/wC in resisting a dichotomy between religious and scientific thinking is a value to post-secular society.

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”

In her recent much-debated manifesto for Socratic education, Martha Nussbaum (2010) makes two statements seemingly dissonant with each other: on the one hand, she recognizes in Dewey "a thinker who brought Socrates into virtually every American classroom" (p. 64); on the other hand, she points out that "Dewey, however, never addressed systematically the question of how Socratic critical reasoning might be taught to children of various ages" (p. 73). The latter remark works as a sort of springboard to the introduction of Matthew Lipman's curriculum as a "source of practical guidance" for teachers "who want to teach Socratically" (p. 73).We could rephrase such a double position in the evaluation of Dewey's ..

In this paper, I will endeavour to revisit a central theme of Dewey’s Experience and Education and show its continuing relevance by contextualizing it within a momentous issue in education today. More specifically, I will attempt to proceed along the path of Dewey’s engagement with progressive education by marshalling some of his arguments in discussing what I will call—with a touch of irony—a techno-revolutionary tone recently adopted in education. It is appropriate to specify in advance what I mean by this expression. Nobody can gainsay that we are facing major developments in technology and in the human ways of producing, organizing, and disseminating knowledge, and that we must draw important..

In this paper I take my cue from what I suggest calling “the Adamitic modernity.” By this phrase I endeavor to capture a specific ‘removal’ of childhood that occurs in the Cartesian gesture of the enthroning of Reason. By drawing upon a reading of the major philosophical works of Descartes, I will argue that one of the main thrusts of his conceptual device is a deep-seated, and even anguished, mistrust of childhood and its errors. To put it in a nutshell: in the Cartesian modernity philosophy/science and childhood are at odds with each other. In the second step of my argumentation, I will show in what sense Dewey rehabilitates childhood and its form of experience by, thus, healing the rift between childhood and science. This notwithstanding, Dewey was not ready to take the decisive step of thinking of a philosophy for children. Precisely by activating and developing the significance of qualitative thought, Matthew Lipman was able, instead, to progress beyond Dewey. In this perspective, I will show how Lipman and Ann Sharp, while walking in Dewey’s footsteps as far as their non-Cartesian interpretation of childhood is concerned, part company with him in their educational take on philosophy and on how this results in a revamping of the way of construing the Deweyan relationship between the child and the curriculum.

The paper takes its cue from the emergence in our society of a new view of the adolescent, which a branch of the psychological literature has spelled out in terms of a passage from Oedipus to Narcissus. It is argued that pre-college ethics education should engage with this passage by deploying educational strategies modelled according to the Care of the Self paradigm but revisiting it through Kierkegaard’s idea of repetition. The latter prevents that paradigm from fostering a sort of aestheticization of ethical life and allows us to mobilize it in ethics education. Against this backdrop two pedagogical methods—autobiographical writing and essay writing—are discussed as possible tools for a Care-of-the-Self-oriented education.

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I will establish a conversation between Rorty and the recent proposal of post-critical pedagogy. The assumption is that through this dialogue some tenets of the latter could find a Rortyan redescription that avoids the risk of ‘metaphysical’ formulations, whereas Rorty’s ideas can increase in their relevance with respect to education thanks to the post-critical perspective. In particular, the conversation will develop by focusing on the shared attitude towards the critical-negative attitude of poststructuralist thought, the significance of the subject-matter in education and an interpretation of pedagogical hermeneutics through the lens of the Rortyan idea of edification. In the conclusion, by distinguishing two views of hope – an eventist and a transitionalist – it is argued that it is precisely in this theme, which seems to be a privileged meeting ground for Rorty and post-critical pedagogy, that there may lie a major fault line.

In this paper the question of note-taking is addressed in reference to a specific educational approach, that of the community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) in the tradition of Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp’s Philosophy for Children (P4C). After emphasizing the pivotal role that this activity plays within a typical session of P4C, its specific status (in comparison with what happens in a classic lecture) is explored, insofar as it could be interpreted as a gesture distributed among and between the teacher and the students. The argumentation is animated and sustained by three intimately interwoven questions: first, how can we construe note-taking in reference to the two philosophical-educational matrices (the Socratic-Platonic and the pragmatist) presiding over CPI? Secondly, who actually takes notes in a P4C session? Could we venture to say that it is CPI as an “intersubject”? And, thirdly, what is the status of the notes taken and written on the flip-chart as a text? Through the analyses developed, note-taking is interpreted as the ‘inscription’ of the co-philosophizing and a kind of self-writing and its significance for the emergence of CPI as such is shown

Starting from two passages of the autobiography of Lipman, which represent the description of a sort of ‘primary scene’ of P4C, the presented paper shows how the Deweyan notion of qualitative thought is pivotal for the entire Lipmanian undertaking. Dewey’s distinction between ‘situation’ and ‘object’ in thinking is read into the Lipman differentiation of schemata and concepts and used to analyze the reasons for which narrative comes to play a crucial role in the project of education for thinking. The mobilization of narrative entails a movement of turning the history of philosophy inside out, which may be considered the major achievement of Lipman. This movement is opposite to that of mere historicization and can also be construed in terms of ‘dramatization,’ culminating in the Bildung

In this paper, the endeavour to understand how to think of education ‘after progress’, viz. in an age in which progress has become problematic, is undertaken by focusing on the theme of time. Dovetailing Klaus Mollenhauer’s reflections on the rise of the Bildungszeit at the dawn of modernity with Thomas Popkewitz’s analyses of ‘cosmopolitan time’ presiding over pedagogical reform from the 19th century to the present, I shall, first, explore this temporal configuration of modern schooling (which goes hand in hand with a specific understanding of the child). Against this backdrop, I shall, second, advance an interpretive hypothesis, that of substituting what will be called the ‘child-as-migrant’ for the ‘cosmopolitan child’, by appropriating, in an educational key, some insights of Thomas Nail’s ‘migrant cosmopolitanism’. I shall thereby suggest an alternative view of ‘progressivity’, construed not along modern-developmentalist lines but as a form of non-conservativeness, linked with a recognition of the ekstatikon (that is, destabilizing) character of time. This will require a revisiting of some Aristotelian intuitions about time as the rhythm of movement, reinterpreted as the affective experience of that ek-statikon without which there is no potential for the new. Accordingly, ‘progressive’ education (in the different interpretation investigated here) is the concern to allow all of us as ‘migrants’ to live actively in the abode of our ek-static and unpredictable condition and, therefore, to be vulnerable to the new, without merely remaining in a taken-for-granted ethos, cosmopolitan, inclusive, and progress-oriented though it may be. (Editor's note: This paper forms part of the suite entitled ‘Education After Progress’.)

In this paper, I will explore Rorty’s recommendation to shift from a philosophical to a literary culture by addressing this theme through a philosophical-educational lens and in reference to the question of what kind of education we need in order to foster democratic ethos. In this perspective, I will establish a comparison/contrast between Rorty’s idea of sentimental education and Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children understood as two (alternative?) ways of recontextualizing Dewey’s heritage. After discussing Rorty’s understanding of a need for an end (instead of a “Deweyan” recovery) of philosophy starting from his dialogue with Castoriadis and by reconstructing his appeal to a poeticized culture, I will present Lipman’s case for education for philosophical inquiry in order to cultivate a democratic ethos in primary and secondary schools. I will contrast it with Rorty’s education as socialization and, contextually, I will illustrate their different stances towards Hirsch’s cultural literacy and his core curriculum approach to civic education. Finally, after problematizing Rorty’s views on the use of literature for a democratic culture, I will indicate the need to combine the Rortyan and Lipmanian thrusts and will claim that an aspect of the novel-driven education advocated by Rorty maintains a constitutive Socratic-inquiring dimension.

After outlining the renascent interest in teaching within contemporary educational theory, the present paper engages with a reflection on teaching beyond the predominant learnification and the related emphasis on efficacy as a primary value. In this endeavour, the theme of teachers’ demoralization is introduced in a philosophical-educational key, by deploying an existential perspective. Within this horizon, a special focus is on failure construed as intimately linked with the ‘essence’ of education qua an encounter of free beings and as a possibility inherent to the dignity of teaching. In conclusion, some implications of this recognition of the ‘significance’ of failure are indicated in regard to teacher education.

The proposed paper situates the question about the ‘success’ of the P4C program within the ‘what works’ debate which has taken place in the Anglo-American educational community over the last 15 years. Against this backdrop, the cultural significance of P4C is highlighted and a special focus is devoted to how P4C has changed (or should have changed) the practice of teaching. Finally, the P4C-oriented teaching of disciplines is indicated as a possible promising way out of the current educational predicament marked by the detraditionalization and individualization of knowledge.

ABSTRACTThis introduction outlines the rationale of the symposium 'Vocabularies of Hope in Place of Vocabularies of Critique: Can Rorty Help Us to Redescribe Education?'. In particular, it argues that, despite some early statements of Richard Rorty, he may turn out to be a particularly timely thinker in reference to debates occurring in the field of educational theory and philosophy, especially by suggesting an engagement with the latter through vocabularies of hope. Moreover, after highlighting that a valuable dialogue may be established between Rorty's stance and post-critical pedagogy, the introduction describes in broad strokes along which lines this conversation will unfold in the three papers and one response composing the symposium.

In this essay, Stefano Oliverio engages with the question of how to think about education in times of climate change and the “intrusion of Gaia” by establishing a dialogue between Bruno Latour's political ecology and John Dewey's appeal to the need to bring a genuine Copernican revolution to fruition. Oliverio argues that the panoply of conceptual tools Dewey fashioned by recognizing the influence of Darwin on philosophy not only maintains its topicality but can be fruitfully deployed to make sense of our contemporary condition and to frame an earthbound education. On the other hand, the encounter with the views of contemporary thinkers reflecting on the New Climate Regime and the endeavors it invokes may help us to recontextualize the Deweyan heritage in order to “face Gaia.” In this horizon, the idea of the school as a site of collective inquiry is acclimatized to the new existential situation, and its significance in promoting an art of the learning of attention to contrast the contemporary negligence and risk of barbarism is vindicated.

A decade ago the German sociologist Ulrich Beck seemed to consign democracy to the past and, significantly, drew upon an ironically religion-inspired vocabulary:Democracy becomes the religion of the past epoch. One still practises it—on Sunday or on Christmas under the ‘Christmas tree’ of polls. But no one really still believes in it. It is the dead God of the first modernity.1When Ulrich Beck dismisses democracy as “the dead god” of a past era or as a liturgy drained of any substantial meaning, he misses the target principally in reference to modernity: indeed, from a Deweyan perspective, if democracy is really going to expire it may be not because of the end of modernity but precisely because modernity is “as ..

This paper engages with Italo Calvino’s lecture on Visibility, included in his last—and testamentary—volume Six Memos, by understanding it in an educational and pedagogical key. While the question of pedagogy is expressly addressed by Calvino himself in his lecture, the interpretation here provided is not merely an application of his tenets but an elaboration on and an autonomous development of them. In particular, in the spotlight there is the intimate bond image-cum-writing which seems to preside over Calvino’s insights and is here suggested as key to tackling the challenges of the contemporary mediascape and the “tautological vision” dominating therein. While a part of the educational discourse invokes “homeostatic” pedagogical solutions, namely the (ultimately confrontational) deployment of writing to compensate for the iconic ruling regime, this paper explores the possibility of a specific kind of visual education (instantiated by comics and Otto Neurath’s Isotype), which combines the role of the image with some features traditionally attributed to the pedagogy of writing (e.g. the cultivation of abilities of abstraction, of reflection etc.). A pedagogy of figuration is, accordingly, proposed as an interruption of the tautological vision of the new media and as conducive to educating readers of the unwritten world and of the world of digital images, Mr. Palomar—the hero of Calvino’s last novel—possibly being the archetype of this kind of (new?) readership. By referring to two influential notions in the contemporary debate in educational philosophy and theory, this pedagogy is finally interpreted in term of (visual) thing-centredness rather than (visual) subjectification.

In this paper the question of note-taking is addressed in reference to a specific educational approach, that of the community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) in the tradition of Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp’s Philosophy for Children (P4C). After emphasizing the pivotal role that this activity plays within a typical session of P4C, its specific status (in comparison with what happens in a classic lecture) is explored, insofar as it could be interpreted as a gesture distributed among and between the teacher and the students. The argumentation is animated and sustained by three intimately interwoven questions: first, how can we construe note-taking in reference to the two philosophical-educational matrices (the Socratic-Platonic and the pragmatist) presiding over CPI? Secondly, who actually takes notes in a P4C session? Could we venture to say that it is CPI as an “intersubject”? And, thirdly, what is the status of the notes taken and written on the flip-chart as a text? Through the analyses developed, note-taking is interpreted as the ‘inscription’ of the co-philosophizing and a kind of self-writing and its significance for the emergence of CPI as such is shown

In the light of some tenets of philosophy of childhood, this paper proposes an ‘updating’ interpretation of the educational notion of repuerescentia , offered by the Renaissance humanist Desiderius Erasmus. In particular, Erasmus’ argumentation about the need for an early liberal education is reconstellated into the domain of a reading of culture as a form of play, that is, as a transitional space and his concept of repuerescentia is read in reference to Deleuzian ‘becoming child.’ It is shown, on the one hand, that there is no complete overlapping between the Deleuzian construct and the notion here investigated; on the other, that a dialogue between these two ideas could result in a more articulated way of looking at the position of the teacher within the educational relationship. It is argued, moreover, that a re-appropriation of the notion of repuerescentia could allow us to reconstruct school as a site in which the classical heritage is made alive and not simply passed on. If the idea of repuerescentia implies that the classical heritage is structured as a pedagogy, thanks to philosophy of childhood we could broaden and elaborate on this view and recognize that the classical heritage is not something closed but always in the making. Indeed, it is due to children’s voices that it revives and can continue to speak to us. In this sense, a repuerescentia-oriented teaching could also act as a strategy to resolve some of the deadlocks associated with the Deweyan controversy between the child and the curriculum. A different inflection of the latter relationship and a fresher way of experiencing ‘tradition’ seem more urgent than ever in contemporary educational scenarios, which are marked by what has been defined the “endgame of the loss of historical continuity.” In addition to that, the idea of the teacher’s re-turn to childhood allows us to overcome some of the setbacks of the constructivist approaches in education, as they have been denounced in more recent literature in educational theory

Pragmatism was considered for some decades as the philosophy of progressive education but, more recently, this identification has been problematized and different interpretations of the significance of pragmatism for the educational discourse have emerged. Against this backdrop, the chapter undertakes an exploration of the meaning of pragmatism, by highlighting how its anti-dualism, anti-foundationalism, and fallibilism have been pivotal for the elaboration of conceptual tools, which have been of major import for the philosophical-educational reflection. In the interpretation here advanced the anti-Cartesian and Darwinian matrix of the classic pragmatist thought has provided educational philosophy and theory with the resources to remove the deadlocks of modern philosophy with its dichotomies between experience and thinking, body and mind, and action and theory.This heritage of classic pragmatism is vindicated also when addressing the meaning of neo-pragmatism. While recognizing the philosophical creativity of Richard Rorty’s views and the role that he has had in reinvigorating the pragmatist discourse, it is shown how it is precisely in education that some limitations of his abandonment of the classicopragmatist emphasis on experience and his literature-oriented approach come to the fore.From this perspective, in the final section it is argued that the topicality of pragmatism resides in its being a ‘mediating way of thinking’ between the full appreciation of science for education and the need not to yield to any kind of scientism by recognizing the richness of human experience.